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Part One , 
WORLD INFLATION AND LATIN AMERICA 
The object of this part of the Economic Survey for 1974 is to 
analyse some main aspects of world inflation, especially in relation 
to the industrialized countries and Latin America. 
The importance and topicality of this subject are too evident 
to make any justification of its examination necessary. All over the 
world, peoples and governments are concerned at rising prices and at 
the economic and social consequences of inflation. This concern is 
felt even in the socialist areas of the vorld, although the 
inflationary pressures there'may only be'transmitted from the exterior. 
-Table 1 illustrates the spread or, as we have called it, the 
"internationalization" of rising prices and the growing intensity of 
this phenomenon in the period 1973-19744 although as we shall see 
there are some interesting exceptions, especially in the case of 
certain African countries.)/.  
Leaving aside the problems connected with statistical criteria 
and coverage, it may be assumed that the seriousness of the 
repercussions of external inflation will depend basically on 
(a) the size of the sector in which there is relative or 
absolute self-sufficiency; (b) the degree of openness of the 
economy towards the exterior; (c) the structure of exports 
and imports; and (d) the' internal policies applied to absorb 
or contain price rises. This subject will be dealt with 
further in chapter II. 
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Table 1 
ACCELERATION OF THE INFLATIONAFX PROCESS 
Annual ratetss variation of the 9211umM2d21.22122.1 _,. 
and 1974 (with respect to December...la...13 
and 
	 av  es  
1965-1970 1972 1973 1974.V.  
Developed countries 
Japan 5.5 4.8 11.7 21.0 (11) 
Italy 3,0 5.7 10.8 18,9 (9) 
United Kingdom 4.6 7.1 9.2 17.4 (ii) 
United States 4.3 3.3 6.2 12.2 (12) 
Norway 4.9 7.2 7.5 11.3 (12) 
Netherland 5.0 7.8 8.o 10.5 (11) 
West Germarq 2.4 5.5 6.9 5.9 (12) 
Developing countries 
Asia: 
India 6.8 5.8 17.4 28.6 (9) 
Indonesia ... 6.7 31.5 28.0 (10) 
Philippines 6.0 10.3 11.0 26.6 (11) 
Thailand 2.6 4.0 11.7 17.9 (8) 
Iran 1.4 6.5 9.8 12.2 (11) 
Africa: 
Ghana 3.4 13.5 10.2 23.2 (7) 
Burundi 2.3 3.6 6.o 19.7 (9) 
Kenya 1.8 5.7 9.3 17.7 (9) 
Zaire 24.6 15.5 16.0 12.1 (10) 
Nigeria 5.6 2.8 6.0 5.7 (7) 
Zambia 6.2 5.4 6.4 4.8 (6) 
Morocco 0.6 3.7 4.1 4.5 (7) 
Latin America 
Long-Standing inflation: 
Uruguay 590 76.5 97.0 73.5 (10) 
Brazil 29.0 16.7 10.9 27.5 (9) 
Argentina 19.3 57.8 61.5 11.3 (8) 
Irregular inflation: 
Bolivia 5.9 6.5 31.6 38.8 (12) 
Colombia 10.0 14.3 22.8 29.3 (11) 
Ecuador 4.7 7.9 13.0 17.4 (10) 
Peru 9,8 6.9 9.5 13.8 (8) 
Recent inflation: 
Guatemala 1.5 0.6 13.8 27.2 (10) 
El Salvador 1.1 1.5 6.4 19.5 (10) 
Paraguay 1.3 9.2 12.7 18.0 (10) 
Maxim) 3.5 5.0 11.3 16.5 (10) 
Honduras 1.7 3.7 6.0 13.0 (12) 
Dominican Republic 1.2 7.9 15.1 8.1 (10) 
Costa Rica 2.5 4.7 15.2 26.o (6) 
Caribbean Countries 
Barbados 1 4.1 11.8 16.9 38.9 
Guyana 2.6 5.o 7.5 9.1 (10 
Jamaica 5.3 5.8 19.3 26.52/ 
Trinidad and Tobago 3.9 9.3 14.8 17.1 (11) 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, September 1972, June 1974 and February 1975. 
B 	 February 1975. 
, Over number of months indicated, with respect to December 1973. 
bJ Source: United Nations, M nt r  
Departament of Statistics of Jamaica, Consumer Prices Indices. 
 /Another feature 
Another feature of this state of affairs, which is unusual for 
, 	 .  
many reasons, is that the problem under discussion goeb hand in hand 
with anotber which is perhaps even more iinpoi-taht-: the loss of 
impetus and perhaps even the contraction of the central economies, 
which is threatening to extend its effects, just like inflation, to 
• the rest of the countries which are linked with and dependent on the 
central countries in various ways. Furtherniore, it is well known 
• that the relative significance of each of these questions tends to 
change with the passage of time. Thus, for example, whereas in 
mid-1974 it seemed clear that inflation was considered the 
outstanding peril,/ towards the end of the first quarter of 1975 
(i.e., the date of preparation of the present document) the main 
danger was economic stagnation and unemployment. 
Both these factors are intimately connected, and a fully analysis 
of the present situation would involve going into both of them in 
depth simultaneously. Unfortunately, this is outside the scope of 
the present work, although it may be recalled that in the Economic 
Survey for 1971 some hypotheses were considered regarding the 
weakening of the forces of expansion in the industrialized market 
economies. 
We will therefore limit ourselves to discussing inflation, 
although without forgetting that inflation must be located - especially 
in the present situation - within a much broader context than that 
formed by the variables which are usually dealt with or combined in 
• 
specific studies on this matter. 
In Chapter I we will consider the picture presented by the 
central economies, concentrating our discussion on the obvious and 
generally recognized crisis of diagnoses, corrective measures and 
prospects which affects thinking and action on inflation. 
2/ 	 At the meeting of Governors of IMF and IBRD, the Managing 
Director of IMF stated that "inflation is the top economic 
problem all over the world". Press Release NO. 3, 
30 September 1974. 
/In Chapter 
In Chapter II we will deal with the impact on Latin America 
of the so-called "imported inflation" of recent years, describing 
its various aspects, the particular form they take in certain 
countries, and the main lines of existing or possible policies. 
Chapter II is actually based on the observations made in the 
analysis of six specific countries (Costa Rica, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Brazil, Bolivia and Uruguay), which make up the third and last 




INFLATION IN THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES: CRITICAL POSITION 
IN RESPECT OF DIAGNOSES, THERAPEUTICS AND:PROSPECTS 
In starting this examination, it is desirable to keep two 
significant aspects in mind: firstly, that the upsurge of inflation 
in the last two years has roots.which go back through almost the 
entire post-war period, and secondly, that the motive force behind 
the process, contrary to what:is- often believed or stated, is., 
located in the industrialized economies. 
With regard to the first point, it is yell.known thectthe 
industrialized countries have been showing a persistent tendency 
toward$ rising prices, which began in; the 1960s with an average annual 
rate of increase of 3.4 per cent and speeded up-markedly in the first 
years of the present decade (7, per cen-tinj972, around 12 per cent 
in 1973,  and over 15 per cent in 1974-with respect to the previous 
year).1/ 
From the Toillt of view, then, the generalized and active 
inflation of the present time must be-.viewed as a result,: or perhaps 
a qualitative change, of a process, which had been taking place and 
building up reactions and, expectations for a long time, paste This 
observation is important for the examination of the various diagnoses, 
as we shall see leter.2/ 
See the statement made by Mr. H.J. Witteveen, Managing Director 
of the International Monetary Fund, before the American Economic 
Association in San Francisco on 28 Deceillber 1974. The-figure 
for 1974 is taken from OECD:, Economic, Outlook, .16 December 1974. 
The evolution and increases in the rate of inflation, together 
with its relationship with the growth rate, are reflected in 
the economic terms used to de8Cribe the phenomenon in the 
English-speaking industrialiZed countries, Where a distinction 
is drawn between creeping inflationi'trotting inflation, 
stagflation andislumpflation. Of all the'main countries of 
OECD, in 1974 only Canada and France showed what could be 
called growthtlationi and even-in those two cases the rates of 
inflation are higher and the growth rates lower, than in 
previous years. 
/As regards 
As regards the second aspect, i.e., that of the predominant 
influence of the central economies, it should be clearly understood 
from the beginning that this does not mean that this influence explains 
or acts as the determining factor in every case, or, above all, every 
degree of inflation in the peripheral -countries. This is too obvious 
to require further discussion., ' 
It is justifiable, however, to hold that the "world tendency" 
towards the resurgence of inflation originated in the leading 
industrialized countries. Correspondingly, it would be superfluous 
to point out that the cases of inflation in the peripheral countries, 
even in such outstanding cases as certain Latin American countries, 
have had little or no influence in this general trend.2/ 
In order to provide more concrete proof of this assumption, all 
that is necessary is to bear in mind what was stated by the President 
of the World Bank regarding the increase in the prices of exports of 
industrial goods. In this respect he said that there had been a 
significant acceleration in the rate of inflation in the developed 
nations which had begun before the rise in the prices of petroleum 
and other primary commodities, so that such price increases could. 
only explain it partially. Ihternational prices, he said, which had 
risen only 6 per cent in the decade prior to 1968. - i.e., less than 
1 per cent per year - had risen at.an annual rate of nearly 10 per 
cent in the five years since.4/ 
This aspect of the problem is worthy of emphasis, because it 
is obvious that the importance within the overall picture of the 
"It seems beyond question that controlling world inflation is 
conditional upon controlling inflation in the industrialized 
countries. Any change in monetary parities and any programme 
of domestic monetary stabilization in the main industrial 
countries can exert an influence on the flows of finance 
at the -world level." Denis C. Lambert, "Les inflation 
oubliees d'Amerique du Sud", in Economie Appliquee, 1974, 
NQ 1. 
Statement by Mr. R. MacNamara at the Meeting of Governors of 
IMF and IBPD, 30 September 1974. 
/increase in 
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increase in the prices of primarY commodities in 'general and 
petroleum in particular has come to be exaggerated..5/ 
Following this line of reasoning, it is reasonable to assume 
thatthe intensification and wider'spread. Of inflationary pressures 
will bring about. still greater diStUrbances in the economies of the 
• 	 peripheral countries, while at the same time they will find it more 
difficult to take defensive measures against these problems. The 
first reason for this is'because the considerable 'changes in their 
levels and systems of prices will not be accompanied, in general, 
by the elaborate compensatory machinery which gives various degrees 
of protection to those affected by these chahges in the indnstrialized 
countries. It is sufficient, for example, to think of the many 
protective arrangements in the central countries which look after 
the leVel of wages and the situation of thoSe who may lose their 
jobs. Unemployment insurance and allowances are an example of this. 
The second reason is_that inflation itself is either a new 
problem for many of the peripheral countriest or else it is a very 
long standing problem, at various leVels of latency, which releases 
vigorous and deep-rooted forces and propensities as soon as there is 
some change in the equilibrium. It may be noted in passing that 
even the oil-exporting countries, which are obviously in a more 
2/ 	 An illustration of the Contrast of views on this matter is 
provided by the statements of the delegates of United States 
and Iran at the Meeting of Governors of IMF and IBRD. Thus, 
the United States SeCretary of the Treasury said that "Our 
current inflation developed from &combination of factors: in 
addition to pressures emanating from cartel pricing practices 
in oil; we have suffered from Misfortune --inOluding bad 
weather affecting crops around the world;;bad timing - in 
the cyclical convergence of a world-wide boom, and bad policies - 
:reflected in years of excessive government spending and monetary 
expansion", while the representative of Iran said that: "the 
record shows that the inflationary spiral was spearheaded by 
the rapid rise in the prices of industrial products long 
before the increase in the price of oil ..e it is interesting 
to note that even at its present price the possible share of oil 
in this year".s rate of inflation in the industrial countries, 
now estimated to reach about 14 per cent, is no more than an 
average of 1.5 per cent". 
/favourable position 
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favourable position than the others, are facing very complex problems 
as regards the manner of managing their very large amounts of foreign 
exchange in such a way as to avoid releasing uncontrollable pressures 
on price levels (some of these difficulties, as they affect Ecuador 
and to a lesser extent Bolivia, will be dealt with below). 
All the foregoing leaves aside another question of vital 
importance: the fact that this time, in the great majority of the 
countries, the spread of inflationary pressures is not accompanied 
by any reflex effects - through trade and financial flows - tending 
to give a boost to the economies of the central countries. On the 
contrary, the shadow of stagflation is looming over the peripheral 
countries. 
It is hardly surprising, then, that the developing countries. 
view with apprehension the picture which has emerged in the developed 
market economy countries as a whole. 
A. THE CRISIS OF DIAGNOSES 
The very special nature of the phenomenon of inflation in 
recent years has severely challenged traditional approaches to this 
matter, both as regards the diagnosis of inflation and its causes 
and as regards the corrective measures to be applied. 
With regard to the first element, perhaps the most striking 
feature is what Professor Paul Samuelson has called the crisis of 
monistic explanations, i.e., the search and preference for a single 
dominant or responsible cause. In actual fact, however, "the 
explanation of the varied pattern of ongoing experience calls for 
a bold combination of causations".6/ Moreover, it is usual to refer 
to a wide variety of causes of very different nature and importance 
which cannot be combined into an integrated and coherent explanation 
of the phenomenon. 
See "Worldwide stagflation" in Morgan Guarantee Survey, 
United States, June 1974. 
/The problem, 
The problem, then, is to disentangle, arrange and organize the 
mass of factors which simultaneously successively or in turn have 
been giving the inflationary process its body and rhythm. 
There is no need to stress the magnitude of. this,task and the 
caution with which it must be approacheth It maTwell be however, 
that Latin America's long-and rich experience in this matter may 
enable it to,make a contribution to this process, especially as it 
has been accompanied by an active intellectual discussion which 
continues to take, place. 
Indeed, there' are numerous references to Latin America in the 
analysis of this.question in the central.cOuntries.2/ What was 
sometimes considered:previously with Some disdain'as an eccentricity 
of the region or:of a few countries .in it, due basically to their 
indisciplined monetaryand,fiscal policies,lias,now come to hold 
particular interest because of the"durability of the phenomenon and 
the newly rediscovered complexity of its origins and processes. 
From the point of view, of the investigation of the Latin American 
situation, it is easyto distinguish right from the.start a set of 
economic, social and institutional elements which form the foundation 
of the problem, the-Procrustean:had in which pro-:inflationary 
tendencies germinate and thrivevith.greater or lesser vigour 
depending on circumstances and policies- In short, it was the 
structural factors which the regional' debate on this matter took up 
and considered with particular attention. 
It would be a long and perhaps pedantic business to mention 
the many, social-scientists-who have been stressing the significance 
2/ 	 See, for example, the following statement in an important and 
much discussed article by Peter, Wiles, "Cost, inflation and 
the :State of economic theory" in the Economid 'Journal, 
June 1973: "The presentation of very large wage demands that 
are absolutely certain to raise product prices and may 
perfectly well leapfrog. each 'other forever is both quite new 
and Universal in the capitalist world. Like hijacking and 
studentpower it originated in Latin America". 'See also 
Denis C. Latbert, "Les inflations oubllees d'Aterique du 
Sud", opocito  
/of these 
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of these aspects for some time past in the central countries, although 
it cannot be said that so far they have found much of an echo at the 
ruling levels and in academic circles.8/ This inclination, of course, 
is not limited to authors with more or less similar views. Professor 
Paul Samuelson, who thinks along quite different lines, stresses in 
an article already referred to the "deep- rooted structural changes 
here and abroad that have created a new bias towards inflation". 
Obviously, the basic elements of different types which set 
their stamp on or feed the inflationary potential are not the same 
in the industrialized economies as in Latin America and other parts 
of the peripheral area. Neither the rigidity of agricultural 
structures, which is characteristic of some Latin American countries, 
nor the vulnerability of depending almost exclusively on a single 
primary commodity export, which is something that affects most of 
the countries of the region, are among the aspectsthat are of major 
concern to the central countries. At the same time, however, as we 
shall see, there are some aspects which are familiar to any Latin 
American country, and especially those with a long tradition of 
inflation. 
Clearly, the methodological differentiation of the outstanding 
factors or levels in the diagnosis of inflation does not involve 
groups of relatively independent phenomena, and still less is there 
any unilateral type of causation among the components. On the 
contrary, the actual process involves the simultaneous and combined 
action of each group of elements and each single element, with their 
presence and importance depending onthe characteristics of:each 
country and each particular situation. 
As the long-standing inflationary way of life of quite a 
number of Latin American countries, shows, the basic structural or 
Among them, however, mention may be made of J.F. Galbraith 
in the United States, "Economics and the public purposes", 
Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1973;  F. Perroux and his followers 
in France, "Les inflations des ann6es 60", in Economie 
NQ 2, 1971; and Gunnar Myraal in Sweden, "Against 
the stream: critical essays on economics", New York, Pantheon 
Books, 1973. 
/institutional factors, 
institutional factors, and even the mechanism of dissemination, are 
relegated to a temporarily secondary place in the phases of resurgence 
of the inflationary process, and the emphasis consequently shifts to 
the moreimmediate connexion and pressures, such as the,prices-! 
wages race. As the experience of the region also shows, however, 
the proper control of the process, even within a scheme of tolerated 
and manipulated inflation, calls for parallel action on the various, 
different planes. From this point of view, as we shall see later, 
the Brazilian experience is of particular interest, and it has 
frequently received the attention of the central countries who are 
facing the difficult problem of'how to overcome or live with 
inflationary processes. This brings us to the following topic. 
1. The structural background 
Subject to the-risk involved in making any kind of classification, 
and without, Tretending that the classification is complete or implies 
any order of priority, certain factors or groups of factors of 
outstanding importance can te identified frot the examinations made 
in the central countries. 
Firstly, there are three elements which can be taken together 
for the purposes of the analysis and in the interests of brevity. 
These are the passage of an extraordinary long period of dynamic 
growth (by past standards), which has taken plade in conditions of 
virtual full employment and on the basit of growing concentration 
and organization of the key social groups, inclUding Of course the 
State. Together with and above these facts is a definition of 
economic policy (and policy in general) which is 'unequivocally 
committed to the' first two features - growth and full employment. 
We shall return to this aspect later 
Before going any further, it is essential to emphasiZe the 
differences between this piCture and the image and reality of what 
may be called "nineteenth century capitalism". While - this' was 
undoubtedly - dynamic over a long term, one of its primary characteristics 
was its cyclic irregularity. With the passage of time it was evident 
/that the 
- 12 - 
that the labour force became more fully employed and its income rose, 
but waves of unemployment, sometimes on a massive scale, and a stubborn 
residue of unemployment remained an indisputable feature of this system. 
Finally, taking into account all the variations of individual cases and 
situations, as well as of the emerging trends, there was the system 
of free or imperfect competition, i.e., of the "open market" for 
labour and the lack of organization or incipient organization of the 
wage-earners. All this took place under a relatively weak State 
which limited its activities to maintaining law and order, palliating 
the most dramatic hardship situations, and defending and promoting 
national interests. 
It should be noted that the negative sides of this contradictory 
reality were vital ingredients of its functioning and expansion. In 
other words, the periodic crisis, the rises in unemployment, and the 
bankruptcy and failure of enterprises at periods of depression and 
low prices were, as has been pointed out more than once, the harsh 
but, it was felt, necessary means for "clearing the decks" of the 
system and making way for its next growth cycle. Government 
intervention, of course, was conspicuous by its absence, and it was 
even considered undesirable, since it was felt that it could hamper 
the operation of the laws of the market. 
To a considerable extent, as we have already seen, this "world 
of yesterday" had little or nothing to do with the reality which 
took shape and became consolidated in the war and post-war years 
in the central economies, although a purist could argue that the 
essential nature of the system of private property, profit and the 
market has not been changed. However, the implications of this 
change for the problem under discussion here are obvious. Each of 
the new elements referred to above contains inflationary possibilities, 
and the combination of them obviously strengthens this predisposition. 
(a) 2Lay111adi k.__-otentiai 
By its very nature, a prolonged period of expansion - even with 
brief, scattered and local pauses like the contractions referred to 
earlier - implicitly contains such a potential and calls for constant 
/changes - in 
changes - in some cases of considerable extent - in the structure of 
production in keeping with- Variations in levels of income and patterns 
of demand or spending. The "signals" from the market and profitability, 
on the one hand, and public initiatives on the Other -'arepothetically 
responsible for channelling and redistributing resources with the 
• 	 objective of structural readaptation, -but any fault in the timing, 
objective or magnitude of the allocations willresult-in imbalances 
of varying importance and duration'which UeualIy. manifest themselves 
in the form of partial or general rises in prices if there is a 
suitable mechanism and suitable Conditions for its transmission.V 
From another point of view, the problem is also related to the 
eventual tendency to rising costs in every process of lasting 
expansion. This may be due to various causes, such as the higher 
marginal cost of the factors used (fOr example, taw materials coming 
from deposits of lower content or Turther'away), a higher density of 
investment per unit produced "(which could be counteracted or 
aggravated by the prices of capital goods),"or a number of other 
elements (scarcity of labOUr,' higher taXes, high interest rates, 
etc.). This aspect is summed up in ihe diagnOsis on overheating of 
the economy. 
Although there have beeh many references to this point based 
on many specific cases and situations, the truth is that - especially 
as regards the United States - the available evidence does not seem 
9/ 	 In this connexion, the following .appraisal of the difficulties 
anticipated in reactivating the growth of the OECD countries 
is of interest: "Important sectoral differences have arisen, 
With capacity still strained until recently in some industries 
(steel, coal, chemicals) but with large slack develOping in 
others (automobiles, textiles;*house- building, tourism). The 
unused capacity partly reflects weakness of aggregate demand 
but is probably also, in part, the result of recent large 
changes in relative prices. It is not yet clear, given the 
coexistence of bottlenecks and of slack which may partly be 
structural, how far the rate and pattern of future expansion 
both in the short- and medium-term will need to be modified". 
OECD, Economic Outlook, December 1974. 
/to confirm 
to confirm that the expansion of the central system has run into 
real limits that make it difficult to achieve further progress without 
abnormal inflationary pressures. For the United States, however, 
the margin between the "potential product" and the product actually 
achieved grew considerably narrower between mid-1972 and the 
beginning of 1973, after having been quite wide between 1969 and the 
beginning of 1972012/ 
In other words, the key inflationary element may not have been 
excessive overall and generalized demand on the available resources, 
but rather the inter- and intra-sectoral imbalances deriving from 
rapid growth and the postponement or total absence of decisions aimed 
at anticipating or remedying these problems. 
Lastly, this aspect of sustained growth and its relationship 
with inflation can also be viewed in connexion with a characteristic 
of modern economies in which there are interesting similarities 
between the market economies and the socialist or centrally-planned 
economies. Furthermore, it may be noted that it is connected with 
one of the main lines of analysis of ECLA. 
Thus, in contradiction of assumptions which were deeply rooted 
in academic circles up to the 1930s, the dissemination of the 
benefits of technical progress deriving from a period of dynamic 
and lasting growth has taken place principally through the increase 
in income and not through the reduction of prices. 
This point calls for some clarification. It is beyond any 
doubt, of course, that the technical advances and mass production 
achieved in certain lines (automobiles and television sets, for 
example) was generally followed in the central countries in the past 
by appreciable reduction in prices. This was a precondition for 
their generalized dissemination, quite apart from another fact of 
primary importance: namely, that the average levels of income 
should make such goods accessible to the majority of the population. 




It is nonetheless evident, however, that once this stage of the 
opening 'and widening of the market was completed, the. prices of the 
products of the industrial society did not continue to go down. in 
keeping with the growing "phySical" or real productivity (brought 
about by improvements in technology and economies of scale).. ..The 
reason for this is very simple, and has been set forth in analyses 
based on the most diVerse doctrines: what happened was that there 
was preferential and-sometimes total appropriation of the benefits 
of technical progresS by thoSe participating in it or controlling 
the'increases in productivity.11/ 
 
In principle,' And in itself, this closed or preferential 
appropriation of the benefits of increased productivity would appear 
not to have any great influenCe on inflationary pressures except: when 
it does not permit trends towardS lower prices to come into .effect. 
The truth is, hoWever,' that it is necessary to take into account the 
incidence of the relative improvements of income over other groups 
and the reactions of these latter groups aimed at eliminating or 
decreasing the gap thus opened. In other words, what we are faced 
with is the old "demonstration effect", but this time in the domestic 
_ 	 . 
conditions of the industrialized countries. In order to go deeper 
into this' matter and into its projections it is necessary,to bear_in 
mind the changes which have taken place in the negotiating power-;of 
the social'groups. This we will do below. 
(b) 	 Full  
It is hardly necessary to stress the influence of a situation 
of virtual full employment on the inflationary phenomenon. Many, of 
course, have pointed to this as the main element in tendencies 
towards price rises, because of the strengthening of the negotiating 
capacity of wage earners in situations of very low unemployment. The 
11/ The international response to this phenomenon is the retention 
by the central economies of the gains made through increased 
productivity, whicluoperatee through changes- inthe terms of 
trade. Among recent work by ECLA on this matter, see Part One 
of the Economic Survey of Latin America, 1973 (E/CN.12/974). 
/often-mentioned "Phillips 
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often-mentioned "Phillips curve" related the movements of wages to 
levels of employment and made it clear that, at least in British 
experience, 'increases in the former had depended mainly on the state 
of the latterl i.e., wages tended* to rise in accordance with 
improvements in the employment situation. This seemed to justify a 
very widespread and generally accepted hypothesis.12/ 
At all events, this element must be appraised in conjunction 
with the third factor referred to at the beginning of this section: 
namely, the increasing concentration and organization of the key 
social groups. Once again, it would be superfluous to refer to or 
quote the abundant literature on this matter, which goes all the way 
back to the writers who anticipated the tendencies towards 
entrepreneurial concentration and the disappearance of the atomistic 
structure which predominated for much of the last century and 
perhaps even up to the great depression. Obviously, of course, these 
writers did not foresee or include in their analysis the implications 
of the agglutination and parallel development of,the trade 
associations and the State apparatus. 
What we are dealing with is a phenomenon which is just as 
inevitable as it is irreversible, which has continued unchecked in 
spite of legislation and other expedients,,and which, we may add, is 
still obscured by the insistence on viewing it through the eyes of 
the old monopoly theory instead of considering it as a structural 
reality of the modern industrial economy. 
1E/ Recent experience has cast some doubts on this relationship, 
although from another aspect; ice,, that increases in levels 
of unemployment do not necessarily signify . .a drop in the rates 
of'remuneration of the employed population. 
/The combination 
The combination of full employment and of the .so-called,  
"Gligopolization" of large sectors where the State is an interested 
party as well as an uncertain arbiter introduces another markedly 
inflationary bias or propensity42/ 
The most recent experience (first, quarter of -1975).7- above all 
in the United States, where there was simultaneously been an unusually 
high level of unemployment and a serious contraction in produCtion 
activities: is an eloquent testimony to the considerable:resdatance 
to a drop in remunerations and, to a lesser extent, in prices, brought 
about by the institutional conditions referred-to. 
Taking the foregoing realities as a whole,: a hypothesis has 
also arisen: regarding the "functionality" of inflation as a means of 
smoothing down antagonisms and achieving certain cardinal objectives 
for the economic system On the one hand, the increase in income 
achieved by certain groups reduces -their - pressures to reach or recover 
certain given leVelsi buton the other hand ,.:the increase-in prices, 
soon reduces the real significance of:these:apparent gains. 
This is not all,':however. , To the extent that-more Or.less' 
generalized increases in remunerations exceed.the-increases in 
productivity and dininish. the resources:needed-by enterprises for 
their renewal and/or expansion, -the increases in prices have the' 
effect of making good this deficiency. by, for example redistributing 
income in favour of the enterprises.-  
12/ Analysing this matter, G. Myrdal noted the following: "The entire 
system of organizations in a society is in all countries grossly 
biased Lin faVoUr of inflation/,' and this becomes increasingly 
important as, organizations are also becoming stronger. People 
are becoming organized as income earners of various sorts or as 
profit takers, while organizations defending the general and 
common interest of all consumers are weak in all countries. 
The interests of salary-earning employees and of profit-
earning employers are not always conflicting. While within an 
ongoing inflation development the former rationally have to 
count on higher costs of living and to press for higher wages, 
the latter can in the same way often count on higher prices 




From this point of view, inflation could be considered not as 
an abnormal phenomenon, but rather as a mechanism that helps modern 
market economies to function. Naturally, this analysis does not deny 
that the process also involves serious disturbances in the progress 
of the system, which have been adequately dealt with in the literature 
on this problem. 
(c) 	 The internationalization of the processes  
The second group of basic elements in the inflationary tendency 
seems to be linked to the process of world economic integration and 
particularly to the process of integration between the central 
countries. We will not enlarge on this general aspect, since its 
characteristics and tendencies were fully presented in the Economic 
Survey for 1971. 
The last few years have of course witnessed an extraordinary 
acceleration in this integration process, and a considerable degree 
of synchronization has now been established in the bahaviour of the 
central economies. In the past, it was frequent for their growth 
rates and domestic price movements to show significant differences. 
Thus, more than once the effect of a reduction in the growth rate of 
the United States, for example, was counteracted to some degree by 
continued expansion of the Euroepan area or Japan, and although 
prices tended to rise, there were also considerable differences 
which moderated this long-term trend. 
It will readily be understood that the new situation involves 
an obvious possibility of the intensification and multiplication of 
any tendency towards inflation or deflation, expansion or depression. 
Moreover, as has been stated on a number of occasions, it makes it 
more unlikely that isolated action at the national level can 
/succeed.l4/ Indeed, 
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succeed. ly Indeed, it could be maintained that such action is 
actually undesirable in view of the possibility that arbitrary'measures 
designed to isolate specific economies from general difficulties may 
actually help to aggravate the situation of other countries and 
finally that of the world economy-in general. The experience of the 
1930s provides typical examples of this.'  
2. The mechanisms of dissemination 
In the Latin American inflationary, situation, the machinery and 
decisions of the fiscal, monetary and foreign trade areas have 
constitutec4 so to speak, the second line of elements which affect the 
rise in prices. More specifically they have generally been considered 
as "propagating factors". 
This is not the place to go-again over the foundations of this 
general hypothesis, which haS been opposed and criticised in favour 
of other interpretations. It is sufficient to repeat. two considerations 
which are of basic importance for the discussion. The first is that 
obviously in many cases the measures taken in one of those fields 
or in a combination of them can be identified as visible agents of 
inflationary imbalance (ana.•rice rises), The:secand'is that only 
,rarely can they be considered as really independent or as true sources 
14/ Consider this view of the matter: "The worldwide character 
of recent'price and wage advanaes has inevitably focuSed 
attention on inflation as an international phenomenon. The 
authorities in the industrial countries have fOund'intrnal 
stability threatened by inflationary forces from abroad. 
Increasingly, international factors: the expansion in world 
trade and investment flows, the official efforts in recent 
decades to eliminate restrictions on -private current-account 
and capital transactions, the growth of multinational 
corporations and the development of international banking 
facilities 4.. have limited the effectiveneSs of national 
programmes to protect the internal economy from .external 
disturbances ... In this environment, it no longer seems to 
make sense to view inflation merely as a collection of, 
individualnational phenomena". Samuel Katz, "Imported 
inflation and the balance,of payments", in The Bulletin, 
New York University, NQs 91-92, October 1923, 
/of the 
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of the expansive effect. There is nearly always a more distant reason 
which is reponsible for or encourages the decision on one or all of 
these fronts. We shall return to this point later. 
As regards the possible influence of fiscal and monetary 
policies on the impulsion of the inflationary process, the industrialize 
economies are too varied in their characteristics and in time to 
enable any generalization to be made. The most that can be done is 
to make general appraisals like the following: 
... The 1972-1973 upsurge of global demand was marked by 
failures or miscalculations in the conduct of monetary and 
fiscal policies. In relation to the buoyancy of private 
demand materialized during the boom period, fiscal policies 
proved insufficiently restrictive in a number of instances, and 
rates of monetary and credit expansion permitted by prevailing 
monetary policies would have to be characterized as excessive 
from the standpoint of controlling inflation. However, since 
broadly parallel judgements are applicable also to the boom 
phases of other major post-war business cycles, it cannot be 
taken as a certainty that laxity of monetary and fiscal policies 
contributed more to the excesses of the latest boom than it did 
to those of previous upswings."15/ 
There can be little doubt that this cautious appraisal of the 
role of the fiscal and monetary mechanisms would not be shared by the 
defenders of the theSis that this is precisely where the basic impulses 
for inflationary pressure are to be found. It is clear, however, 
that the experience of recent years, even in Latin America, has reduced 
the degree of emphasis of former positions.l6/ Thus recent discussions 
12/ IMF, Annualluall1274. Regarding the United States, which is 
the country most often quoted in this respect, it is also worth 
considering; the opinion of the November 1974 "Monthly Economic 
Letter" of the First National City Bank, which states that 
government spending advances have been modest over the past two 
years and monetary policy has been restrictive as the authorities 
have refused to validate double-digit inflation by allowing the 
money supply to grow fast enough to accommodate both the 
inflation and a rise in _real output. 
16/ The prudence of present appraisals is to be contrasted with the 
tone of the recommendations which used to be made in the 1950s 
and the beginning of the 1960s regarding stabilization policies 
in Latin America. 
/show a 
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show a subtle shift of judgement. regarding the role of monetary 
expansion.' Whereas in previous-explanations•this factor was given 
as the primary cause of inflation, injaore recent discussions it is 
held thatAt:would rather: or only_merely be decisive in making possible 
the continuance of the phenomenon, which is an obvious rellectipn, 
but which fails to .shed light•on all the - antecedents and consequences 
implicit in such a statement. 
Fromthispoint of view,. it is true.to say that the alternative 
criteria have become considerably morerealistic,than in the past. At 
all events, whatever. the-extreme.criteria regarding•this matter,:it 
seems clear that while the '!-independent" or original gravitation of 
monetary and fiscal-action is neither:certain nor demonstrable,. it is 
not reasonable either to thipkythat these. factors have responded to or 
permitted,. as some would say,:: the manifestation of the underlying 
forces favourin3 expansion on these two planes.17/ 
(a) 	 Transmission .via the foreign trade deficit  
.There remains to be.considered.the influencelof the action taken 
in the foreign. trade.areai which must,be.:appraised.in the light of what 
we said before about the internalization of the problem of inflation. 
There .are.many.elements_to be:considereVinregard - to this 
question,:but in the interests-of brevity we will concentrate on the 
aspect which- was emphasiied most strongly'in the debate, namely, the 
possible impact of the United States balance-of-payments deficit. 
17J Professor Gottfried Haberler, in a recent article entitled 
"Inflation as a worldwide phenomenon: an over-view", Review 
of Worlcl Economics, Vol. 110, Book 2, 1974,  sums up the 
question very frankly in the following words: "... In my 
opinion it is evident that government finances (big budget-- 
deficits) and the presSures of the.'trade associations often 
exercise strong and sometimes irresistible political pressure 
on the monetary authorities to- increase the supply of money 
~either actively or. permisSively". 'He-adds'in a footnote 
"H.G. Johnscin calls thireproachfully and even contemptuously 
a political or sociological - theory of inflation. - Whatever 
you call it, it is a fact of life that-cannot-be ignored". 
/While the 
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While the incidence .of this phenomenon on international monetary 
equilibrium cannot be ignored or under-estimated, there is some 
doubt as to whether it has really been a decisive factor in the 
inflationary tendencies of the central economies and the world as 
a whole.18/ 
In reality, the available figures do not confirm this assumption. 
As we can see from table 2, up to at least 1973 the ratio between 
the availability of international reserves and the magnitude of 
world trade - which is one of the generally employed indices - went 
down compared with the situation in 1960 and 1965. In contrast, 
because of the rise in the prices of primary commodities and 
particularly oil, the reserves of the developing countries showed 
greater relative growth, and this, although it was undoubtedly an 
important factor in internal inflation, certainly did not carry much 
weight at the world level. 
It is true, however, that one of the outstanding phenomena 
of recent years has been the increase in the amount of monetary assets 
in private hands: Eurodollars, for example. From this point of 
view also, however, the figures do not back up the hypothesis of 
excessive international liquidity, and as an IMF document has stated: 
"World imports during the period examined (1954-1974) have 
grown more rapidly than world reserves, and the global ratio 
of reserves to imports has declined steadily from 1954 to 
1970. The inclusion of private holdings does not modify this 
finding, although the downward trend becomes more stable."19/ 
18/ H.G. Johnson, for example, sees long-standing inflation as 
"a world-wide phenomenon associated with excessively rapid 
growth of the monetary base of the international monetary 
system in the specific form of a rapid growth of foreign 
official holdings of dollars" ("Secular inflation and the 
international monetary system", Journal of Money, Credit and  
Banking, February 1973). 
12/ See "Total international liquidity: economic devaluation and 






Developed countries 81 390 
Developing countries. 31 130 
Total 112 520 
International reserves 
(millions of US dollars) 
------------ 
Developed countries 50 755 
Developing countries 9 470 
Total 60 225a/ 
Ratio international: 
reserves/world trade 
Developed countries 62.4 




47.o 32.5 35.6 
29.2 46.6 46.4 




428 600 391 900 
96 000 150 600 
524 600 542 500 
139 167 139 551 
44 740 69 920 
183 910b/ 209 470b/ 
126 530 
37580 
164 110  
59.445 




RATIO OF INTERNATIONAL RESERVES TO WORLD TRADE 
Sources: United Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, January 1975. 
IMF, International Financial Statisticsi- January 1975. 
7 Gold reserves, position in the Fund, and foreign exchange. 
y Gold reserves, position in the' Fund, foreign exchange and SDR units. 
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On the other hand, in connexion with the problem under 
consideration, it should be recalled that the two countries which 
accumulated most reserves of dollars, i.e., the Federal Republic of 
Germany and Japan, were among those which had most success in controlling' 
their inflationary pressures (see table 1). The rise in prices in 
Japan since 1973 is due to the rise in the prices of commodities and 
oil. Likewise, insufficient attention has often been paid to the 
possible deflationary effect in the United States of that country's 
balances accumulated abroad, with the consequent substantial increase 
in its imports. 
These and other factors go to prove the significance, as far as 
price rises are concerned, of domestic policies and of the factors 
which determine them. 
There can be no doubt, however, that one of the primary 
consequences of the United States deficits was of decisive importance 
in the resurgence of inflation. We refer to the devaluations of the 
dollar from 1971 onwards.- At the level of the international economy, 
these devaluations had repercussions which were substantially similar 
to those of changes in the exchange rate in countries affected by 
inflation, especially where such changes had been held up longer than 
was advisable. 
This does not, of course, refer only to the direct repercussions, 
but also to the transmitted impact of these devaluations on 
inflationary expectations. 
(b) 	 An inflationary mentality? 
The last factor to be mentioned among the elements producing 
inflation is of a subjective nature, but it is nonetheless important, 
particularly at a time like the present. We refer to the dissemination 
and establishment of inflationary expectations. 
In this matter, to which growing attention is being given, the 
anticipated price rise and the "inflationary psychology" take the 
form of a variety of expedients which, while trying to avoid the 
distortions and ill-effects of the process, can in fact actually make 
it deeper rootee. and more intensive. In the words of a noted monetary 
authority: 
/"As a 
"As a result, we have shorter trade union contracts, linking of 
wages and social security benefits to the cost of living, flexible 
rules about interest rates, modifications in accounting practices, and 
other systems wIlereby price increases are passed on more rapidly than 
would be possible in other circumstances."22/ 
3. The conjunctural elements 
One of the clearest recent facts (1973-1974) is the appearance 
on the scene of certain - far-reaching conjunctural changes whiCh 
exert a powerful effect on a Situation where there is already a 
tendency towards the acceleration of inflation and which release 
pressures that Were either latent or only weakly'kept in check. In 
the highly com7Detent analyses of the process which OECD has been 
carrying out,21/ it is Shown that there is a regular sequence of 
impulses of promoting price rises. 
The first stage in the period in question can be located 
approximately between mid-1972 and October 1973,  and is characterized 
by "a sharp rise in the price of most primarycommodities relative to 
the general price level of all other goods, brought about by the 
emergence of a Marked imbalance between final demand and current 
supplies". It will be recalled, for example, that the failure of the 
harvests in 1972'in some producer countries had partiCularlY marked 
repercussions on the price of foOdstuffs and'hence on the wholesale 
and retail price indeXes. It may be noted in passing that, generally 
speaking, it was developed countries - above all the United States 
and Canada - which were most favoured by this situation, although 
this does not mean that they did not suffer from the inflationary 
effects also. 
20/ Statement by the Managing Director of the International Monetary 
Fund, 28 December 1974, op.cit. 
2,/ See, inter anal "Aspects of world inflation" in Economic Outlook, 
15 July 1977--  
/The second 
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The second dividing point is from October 1973 onwards, as a 
result of the middle East War, the initial effect of which, according 
to the OECD study referred to, was to add a new element of uncertainty 
to the world situation, followed by physical shortages of oil arising 
from the embargo and from hording, plus substantial increases in oil 
prices. 
While, from the point of view of the central countries, these 
two "moments" take the form of influences originating abroad, the 
third point corresponds to the internalization of the impacts and the 
Predominance of domestic impulses. The fundamental aspect is probably 
the reaction of workers to prior considerable increases in prices. Thus, 
..."throughout 1973 .•. a general acceleration in the rate of growti? 
of wages took place in most OECD member countries and currently wages 
are going up extremely rapidly, although often not as rapidly as 
prices".22/ In other words, the centre of attention has now become 
the well known prices-wages spiral, which is a basic factor in the 
phases of acceleration of inflation. 
E. THE CRISIS OF CORRECTIVE MEASURES 
While it is beyond doubt that there is considerable confusion 
in the industrialized economies as regards the diagnosis of the 
resurgence of inflation, the situation is even worse when it comes 
to discussing ways to combat inflation. 
The discussions show that the majority of those concerned are 
fully aware that times have changed and 'that old formulas are no longer 
suitable, but there is a marked shortage of opinions on how to deal 
with the new situation, and the suggestions that have been made are 
either subject to many criticisms or else raise fresh queries, 
perhaps of even greater scope, which introduce variables that clearly 
go outside the limits of the problem of inflation in the strict sense. 
22/ 	 See "Aspects of world inflation" op.cit. 
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1. The original success but recent imootence of 
the Keynesian, approach 
The first aspect to b tome in mind is the general disenchantment 
with the policies that have governed - with various degrees of vigour 
and efficiency - the development of the central countries in the 
post-war era: i.e., the policies inspired .by the Keynesian school. 
This involves two 'questions which ars different but not contradictory. 
On the one hand, there 'is no doubt that the policies which are 
generally called. Keynesian, and which are based on the maintenance of 
effective overall demand and.full employment, mainly through government 
initiatives, have had considerable success in achieving their ends. 
The vigour and consistency of the' growth during the period in question, 
the low rates of unemployment, and the steady rise in the standard of 
living (leavins aside any reservations regarding the:"quality of life"), 
are an indisputable proof of this assertion., Of course they are not 
the only explanation and cause of it. Among the other reasons, 
paradoxically:enough, we should not forget the challenge and stimulus 
provided to the market economies by the expansion and theaustained 
development of a competitive area made up of the socialist or 
centrally-planned economies. Taking - into account such factors as 
this only goesto corroborate,.. however, the fact that the policies 
in question were capable of:. coping with such challenges. 
As far as inflation is concerned, the truth is that the Keynesian 
philosophy did not contemplate any special corrective measures, either 
because one of its principal hypotheses was that the system had a 
persistent tendency towards under-utilization of resources, including 
labour, or because the problem.was not very'serious during most of 
the poSt-war period. When thiS- second aspect changes, attempts were 
made - above all in Northern Europe and to a lesser extent and with 
little success in Great Britain - to introduce or intensify the 
/so-called 
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so-called "income policies" designed to discipline and guide 
movements of prices and wages. At all events, however, as already 
stated, in the last few years the operational efficiency and 
interpretatiVe and regulative validity of the Keynesian heritage have 
been deteriorating. 23/  
Up to about the middle of the last decade, the prevailing Keynesio:, 
policies fluctuated between expansive and restrictive versions of the 
basic orientation. As soon as the growth rate slackened and the 
employment situation was endangered, the time came to take off the 
monetary or fiscal brakes so as to inject new impulses into the system. 
In contrast, when signs of "overheating" appeared and prices tended 
to rise, the rudder was swung to the other side, more through monetary 
discipline than reduction of fiscal expenditure, which is much more 
difficult to apply in the short term for very well known reasons, such 
as rigidity of expenditure, etc. 
In some countries, particularly Great Britain, this operation 
had to take into account a third element, namely, the balancing of 
external accounts. Very fast expansion - at least in the conditions 
in which it was taking place - not only had repercussiones on prices, 
but also manifested itself in growing balance-of-payments deficits. 
There can be no doubt that this analysis is mainly valid for the 
United States and Great Britain. As we noted earlier, with a few 
exceptions the European countries have managed to face up to this 
In some ways this assertion corroborates that made by the 
Secretary of the Treasury of the United States when he set 
out the essence of the new situation very concisely in his 
statement in September 1974 at the Meeting of Governors of 
IMF and. IBRD: 	 It is clear that most countries are no 
longer dealing with the familiar trade-off of the past, 
balancing a little more or less inflation against a little 
more or less growth and employment. We are confronted with 
the threat of inflationary forces so strong and so persistent 
that they could jeopardize not only the prosperity but even 
the stability of our societies". 
/dilemma much 
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dilemma much better, both because they took into account the 
institutional factors of the. problem and because there was greater 
continuity in the policies ,followed. 
Be that as it may, what is certain is that towards the end of 
the 1960s the compensatory effect of the .systoles and diastoles of 
the system entered a period of decreasing returns and, in some cases, 
virtual impotence. . If expansive instrumentsi were used, then it was 
more likely that these would increase the rise in prices rather than 
impart greater dynamism.to production. On the other hand,, if restrictiw, 
instruments were:, put into effect, there was a clear possibility. that 
the sluggishness of the system would be made worse and unemployment 
would rise, without this bringing any kind of commensurate relief 
as regards the rising price tendency. 
In .the presence of,, this dilemma, there are some main criteria 
regarding the action to..be.followed. 
.0n the one hand, of course, there are the various different 
versions of the basic Keynesian doctrine, which has still not been 
replaced. Up to the end of 1974 the predominant voice was that of 
the suporters of resolute deflationary actiOnalthough the events in 
24/ Ilefertint.- tb - this'-first aspect, the OECD publication Economic  
Outlook ,(16 September 1974) points,out the following: 
"A number of smaller countries believe that they have, very 
usefully, supplemented oVerali'demand management - by a variety 
of policies ranging from partial measures like wage indexation 
or price controls to comprehensive prices and incomes policies, 
with cases of clote co-ordination of fiscal and incomes poliCies 
beingaf particular interest., There is'evidence that such a 
"multi-policy" approach has often helped in combining steady and 
relatively'fast grOwth with comparative low price increases, and 
the countries practising it have felt able to react to the oil 
crisis in somewhat similar, manner, reducing the. depressive Himpact 
' on real demand of theoil prime increase while liMiting the 
propagation of its inflationary influence through the wage-price 
spiral." 
With regard to the problem of the continuity of policy, it should 
be recalled that in the last four years the United States has in 
practice had nine different policies for.facing the problems of 
inflation and growth. - 
/the United 
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the United States, where the supporters of this line have significant 
influence, have cast doubts on the viability of such a policy in the 
present conditions of marked stagnation, rising unemployment and little 
relative effect on prices and-wages. 
Those who favour a turn in the opposite direction, i.e., towards 
economic reactivation, have in their favour the existing data and the 
lack of prospects of the present situation and policies, but obviously 
they cannot give any guarantee that the traditional remedies will give 
the desired effect and not prove to be simply another stage in the 
so-called "sto-1 and go" policies, whereby they could merely amount 
to another impulse to inflation instead of bringing about the 
redynamization of the economy,. 
Leaving aside their differences, however, and the fact that the 
time factor is very important in the decisions to be adopted, there 
is a common conviction that the choice between inflation, growth and 
full employment must not imply any substantial sacrifice on the part 
of either of the two terms of the problem. 
2. Monetary orthodoxy (or hetorodoxf 
A second current which is doubtless less important than the 
foregoing ones but is of significant importance in certain academic 
circles is the so-called monetarist current. Although, at the present 
moment and in the corrective measures applied, it is close to the 
restrictive variety of the Keynesian doctrine, it calls for separate 
comments. The relative ineffectiveness of the approach previously 
in fashion has given the monetarist approach more currency, although 
it has still not been taken up in any central countries by the ruling 
circles. For this reason, rather than considering it an example of 
orthodox thinking, it should rather be considered as one of the current 
heterodoxies. 
The monetarist criteria extend in various dimensions. 
On the most general level there is the contention that the 
economic system, if left to the free play of market forces and backed 
/by a 
/ According to H.G. Johnson, who is one of the best-known spokesmen 
of this current, "In a sense the. crux of the issue prevailing 
between Keynesians and monetarists is that while the Keynesian 
position maintains that the real economy is highly unstable and 
that the monetary management has both little relevance and little 
control over it, the monetarist position on the contrary is 
that the real economy is inherently stable, but can be 
destabilized by monetary, developments, which therefore need to 
be controlled as far as possible by intelligent'monetarTpolicy". 
See "Inflation and the monetarist controversy", North Holland 
Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 1972. 
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by a suitable but unspecified monetary policy,25/ would have achieved 
better results than the Keynesian orientations, and would have done 
so without inflationary tendencies./ We are unable to go here into 
a lengthy discussion of this point of view, but it is enough to point 
out that it does not take accountcfthe past: evolution of the system, 
the characteristics of which are recalled in previous pages, for it
would be difficult to find any proofthat the pre-war economy, which 
was free of all Keynesian interference, was "inherently stable" (see 
footnote 26/). 
On the other hand, and at a more concrete level, -there is the 
criticism that policies inspired by Keynesian doctrines have generally 
intensified the tendencies in expansion or contraction phases rather 
than moderating them. Once again, as in the case of the continuity 
of policies, this reservation does seem to be quite valid as far as 
the sxPerience of the United States and Great Britain in recent years 
is concerned. 
But doubtless the most controversial Aspect af the monetarist 
position is its characterization of the control of the supply of money 
as the main anti-inflation tool. In other words, for
-folloWers 'of this 
• 
25/ On Of'the basic proposals is, that the supply of money should 
grow at a regular rate in keeping with the real increase in the 
product, so as not to introduce any' disturbances of an 
inflationary or deflationary tendency. As we shall see later in 
the study - on Brazil, the growth of the means of payment has kept" 
close to that of the domestic product (although not to price 
movements), within a picture of active financial and fiscal 
manipulation and the management of a variety of.. other non-monetary 
instruments. 
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doctrine, price discipline can only be obtained if the supply of 
money is managed so energetically and parsimoniously as to Obviate 
or make impossible a rise in prices.27/ 
Although exceptions to this principle could be pointed out, 
above all as regards relatively short periods, its hypothetical 
validity can be accepted if (and this is a fundamental condition) the 
monetary authority is in one of the following two extreme positions: 
(a) it has absOlUte power to establish the amount of the increase in 
the supply of money, or (b) it has the complete backing of the 
authorities and is in a position to discipline and manage all the 
pressures that are exerted on it. It does not seem that anyone could 
advocate the first possibility in the light of the conditions of 
modern society. There therefore remains only the second one. 
Taken in the abstract, there is no reason to reject it as a 
totally unrealistic proposition. If it is taken as a base, however, it 
will be found as one goes deeper into its significance and implications 
that the problem shifts froth the strictly monetary sphere to other 
fields or variables outside that sphere. 
Thus, when we have to admit the patent fact that the central 
banks do not have independent and complete control over the supply 
of money it becomes evident that their decisions are subject to the 
manner and the degree of success with which the many sources that 
originate the demand for means of payment are Managed. Thus, the 
dominating factor will be the general spectrum of economic policy 
and the variety of elements which go to make it up. Essentially then, 
the decisions of the monetary authority simply give sanction to a 
reality which is substantially generated and formed outside its orbit, 
although this should not lead us to forget its important role as a 
propagation mechanism" for various types of tendencies or as a key 
element in the allocation of resources in a market economy. 
22/ A sign of the times is that the dispute betweensupporters of 
shock treatment for stopping inflation and the "gradualists" has 
lost. all.significance. Today, it can be said, everyone is a 
gradualist, except the ultra-monetarists. 
/If we 
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If we contrast these observations with the experience of the 
central economies, it is easy to see that .the monetarist view has 
come into collission with or had to accommodate itself to basic 
common circumstances such as the commitment to sustained growth and 
full, employment, the strength and balance of the great social groups, 
the expansion of military and social security expenses, etc. In the 
final analysis these are the factors which have established the general 
spectrum of economic policy within which the monetary authorities 
must operate...1W 
. THE CRISIS. OF PROSPECTS 
The forecasts of.the centralcountries regarding the course of 
inflation in 1975 are - very cautious and subject to all kinds of 
, 	 • 
reservations. 
Following the examination to ,which reference was made when we 
were dealing, with cOnjunetural factors, it can be assumed that 
pressures•originatin'in thes exterior - mainly increases in the cost 
of primary commodities - Will lose some iMportanee, While endogenou6 
28/ Analysing the Ups and downs of_the monetarist position 
H.G. Johnson made this very pertinent comment: 
"... the real motive force behind the rise of "monetarism" 
(the quantity theory approach) in popular thinking in recent 
years'hasbeen the failure of the•alternative Keynesian approach 
to deal of 
	 with the problem of inflation in concrete 
economic policy terms .'.. the triumph of monetarism has-been 
Short lived in, both countries (i.e., the United States and 
Great Britain), and the quantity
-theoretic approach is again in 
popular eclipse, partly because in the euphoria of belated 
popular'reCognition the monetarists vastly exaggerated. the 
potency - a different matter from necessity - of monetary restrain' 
as a"'-means of stopping inflation once inflation is well under way, 
in terms of both the amount and the duration of the unemployment 
required,toange inflationary expectations and therefore wage 
and price determination behaviour ... When the chips are down 
the political process attaches a relatiVely low cost. to inflation 
and a relatively high cost,to heavy, unemployment". See "Inflation 
and the monetarist controversy", op, cit. 
/elements will 
-34- 
elements-will gain it, espeCially through wage claims aimed at 
recovering previous levels of real income.29/ Thus, while it is 
anticipated that the rise in the prices of indUstrial goods will 
continue at an indeterminate rate varying with the individual countries, 
the surest and most immediate relief from inflationary impulses will 
come from steadier and perhaps even lower prices for raw materials. 
Various sources seem to confirm these forecasts. In one of them, 
for example, an analysis was made of the evolution of the prices of 
various groups of goods in the United States during the whole of 
1974.30/ If we take only the cases of raw materials and producer 
finished goods, then we see that whereas the prices of the latter 
continued to rise during 1974 (albeit slower than in 1973), the price 
levels of primary commodities began to show reductions from the middle 
of the year onwards, and by Decettber had fallen by 5.8 per cent. 
It is therefore easy to understand the reflection made by the 
spokesman for most of the Latin American countries at a meeting held 
at the end of last year: "The anti-inflationary measures of the 
industrialized countries are having more effect on the prices of 
primary commodities than on their own manufactures, whose upward 
tendency shows no sign of slackening".31/ 
29/ In appraising this phenomenon, the most xecent issue of Economic  
Outlook (December 1974), op. cit., stated the following: "By the 
middle of this year, wage claims.in manufacturing were approaching 
20 per cent annual rate in the OECD area as a whole, though with 
considerable divergence between countries. To the extent that 
these claims are realized, manufactured goods prices Will be under 
considerable pressure that could only partly be alleviated by 
a shift away from profits, a rise in productivity or a fall in 
imported input prices". 
2.01 See' First National City Bank, Monthly Economic Letter, New York, 
February 1975. 
31/ Statement by the President of the Bank of Nicaragua, 
R. Incer Barquero, speaking on behalf of a large number of Latin 
American countries at .the Meeting of Governors of the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, 30 September, 1974. 
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This imbalance which is so disturbing for the peripheral economies 
must be viewed in conjunction with another, 
 negative fact: that most 
observers are more optibistit regarding the possibility of containing 
or moderating the acceleration in price rises than in reactivating 
the economy within a short period or even in the next two or three 
years, which is the time given in, some official estimates for the 
United States. In fact it is assumed that the first will be facilitated 
by the second, i.e., that a contraction, even though it may be quite 
relative compared with the growth rates of the previous period, will 
favour restriction of price rises. 
Viewing the matter more closely and in direct relation to the 
subject of this document, one unknown quantity is whether the great 
industrial economies will succeed in obviating inflationary pressures 
to a significant extent (returning, for example, to inflation rates 
similar to those of the early 1960s), or if they will have to resign 
themselves to merely stopping the present spiral and henceforth 
learning to live with inflation rates of around 10 per cent per year. 
The forecasts are situated between these reference points, because 
in actual fact very few persons fear that the phenomenon will really 
get out of hand.32/ 
Whatever the situation which finally emerges, it seems certain 
that it will differ substantially from previous conditions. It will 
therefore be all the more necessary to renew conceptual frameworks, 
to start using other instruments, or to substantially modify the 
operation of traditional instruments. 
32/ Professor Paul Samuelson makes the following comment on the 
prospects which have opened up: 
/1 ... it seems only realistic to perceive the outlook for the 
mixed economies not only as an outlook for stable prices but 
rather for a series of compromises which will make for creeping 
or trotting inflation. The problem is how to keep the creep or 
trot from accelerating. This includes the challenge of finding 
new macroeconomic policies beyond conventional fiscal and 
monetary :dolicies that will enable a happier compromise between 
the evils of unemployment and of price inflation". See 
"World stagflation", op. cit. 
/Moreover, it 
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Moreover, it is still difficult to gauge the significance that 
these changes will have for the developing countries. So far', these 
countries have only experienced the first effects of world inflation. 
The analysis of some of these countries may help to give a clearer 
picture of the new problems which are emerging, and this is the 
subject of the next chapter. 
/Chapter II 
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Chapter II 
LATIN AMERICA AND "IMPORTED. INFLATION" 
In order to examine "imported inflatioe'in Latin America, it 
is first of all essential to clarify some point& so as tO'prevent any 
misunderstanding. Of course, there will.always be those who recall' 
with some irony that the inflationary situations prevailing in 
-several 
countries of the region and in different: and sometimes fairly long 
periods were not precisely "imported'!,. but were mainly due to 
various internal factors and trends:that•are amply discussed in the 
bibliography on the subject. What is more - as noted in'the preceding 
chapter - it is not unusual to. find in the analyses of the recent 
inflation affecting the centra]..economies references to the "Latin 
Americanization" of their process of:rising prices, 
There is no reason to differ outright with that point of view. 
As will be seen later in the country_studies, care has-been taken to 
bring out the inflationary history of some countries, as well as the 
structural and other characteristics affecting this questiOn.and the 
form currently taken by the process. Among them, incidentally,-are 
those of the external sector, its structure and fluctuations which 
existed or played a decisive part in many outbreaks of phases of 
inflation. 
It is also clear, however, that these factors have never had 
such a predominant, widespread and intensive effect on the acceleration 
of prices as in the present, situation. 21 Moreover,.coming- to 
accentuate the original nature of the process, this time it is the 
reflection ,of a considerable expansion of. trade and, in particUlar 
a sudden. substantial increase im.export and import prices. 
The following analysis deals with the most significant-aSpects 
of the country studies included in chapter III, and focuses On 1973 
Even in countries like Chile and'Uruguay'where internal 
circumstances were the main cause of the recent, high rates of 
inflation, the external impact has played an important part in 
the trends and fluctuations Of the phenomenon, 
/and 1974 
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and 1974 which are the most representative years of imported inflation. 
Needless to say - it has already been pointed out in other parts of 
this study - this whole picture may prove circumstantial or transitory 
in the light of the new prospects for the international economy. 
The country studies reveal widely differing situations. Sometimes, 
as in Bolivia and Costa Rica, the renewed acceleration of price increases 
is taking place after periods of marked stability, although in both 
cases the external pressure was superimposed on other pressures that 
had been activated locally. In other countries - Brazil and Colombia, 
for example - the disequilibria broke out in a context of a precarious 
control and moderate and, in the former country, declining rates of 
inflation. Ecuador, to a greater extent than Bolivia, presents the 
peculiar case of an economy in which petroleum exports raise the 
problem - not now sui generis 
- of a qualitative change in the 
magnitude of the foreign exchange surpluses which must be absorbed. 
Lastly, there is Uruguay, where imported inflation is linked with 
domestic inflation which in previous years had led to substantial 
price increases. As may be seen in table 1, the superimposition of 
the two processes resulted in a rate of inflation of 100 per cent in 
1973, which was reduced to just over 70 per cent in 1974 thanks to a 
severe policy of restraint. 
In this spectrum of contrasting circumstances, consideration 
must be given to the basic data on past trends and on the socio-
economic structures which are exposed to the vicissitudes of the 
international situation, and to long-term or contingency economic 
policy directives. 
In Brazil, for example, the challenges of the new situation 
are present in the context of vigorous growth, relative flexibility 
of the production system, an increasing openness and dependence 
with respect to the external variables - albeit offset by a not 
insignificant freedom of manoeuvre in that respect - and an explicit, 
continuing and pragmatic overall economic policy, whatever reservations 
may be made regarding its content and weaknesses. On a different and 
certainly more restricted plane, this model could be applicable to 
/Colombia, although 
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Colombia, although its domestic Market. A.snot so large nor its 
production structure so diversified as Brazil's, and its policy has 
experienced more variations, besides being:considered in a more 
limited context.  
Ecuador and Bolivia haVe-tome,structural features in common. 
which are observable in their past evolution and are more clearly 
visualized in a situation such as that which has recently arisen. 
Without going into details, whiCh are giVen later in the country 
studies, these features point to the difficulty of absorbing 
expansionist waves (particularly of the magnitude of Ecuador's) when 
they are projected on extremely heterogeneous produCtion profiles in 
which a major part of the population
-belongs to the prititive stratum. 
It is unlikely that this stratum will be able to react to substantial 
increases in demand, but it does seem more sensitive in the way of 
adjusting its prices if for any external reason the prices of its 
imported inputs and foodstuffs rise. 
Moreover, in both cases it is
- difficult to'frate suitable. 
policies, either because for Ecuadbr it is a new problem, ih
- both 
quantitative and qualitative terms, with respect to the utilization 
of foreign exchange, or because, in Bolivia's case, the policies 
adopted in the face of the same problem but at a
-different leteL 
have followed certain basic principles which have not been 
successful in taking advantage of the potential of the external 
sector's vigorous growth. 
The situations in Costa Rica and Uruguay differ in many respects. 
There are, however, alike in others which have a significant influence 
on the issue reviewed here. For example, the external inflationary 
pressures are unleashed on two economies which in a differing order 
and degree had encountered difficulties in regaining or reaching 
satisfactory growth rates and which, moreover, are favoured less 
than others by the international trade
-situation. 
From another point of view, of course, important differences 
are observable, such as the relative novelty of the inflationary 
problem in Costa Rica, in contrast with its duration and severity 
/in Uruguay. 
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in Uruguay. This and other more basic factors are the reason for 
the different content and scope of the policies adopted. 
In the following pages an overall analysis is attempted of the 
countries selected on the basis of two main questions: the pattern 
and symptoms of the incidence of imported inflation, and the guiding 
principles and options of the policies or measures devised to combat 
it. 
A. STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS AND VULNERABILITY 
VIS-A-VIS IMPORTED INFLATION 
While admittedly inflationary pressures in recent years in the 
majority of cases mainly originatedabroad,'it is none the less true 
that their incidence has depended' on a number
- of factors which have 
given them greater or lesser force. What it'really amounts to is 
the interaction of many influences, including the external situation, 
which is the main variable, the particular features of each economy 
and - last but also highly'Important - the decisions adopted to 
contend with the situation. On this interaction will depend the 
manner and degree in which the inflationary impact is transmitted, 
imported, multiplied or attenuated, all within a dynamic process of 
successive actions and reactions. 
Among the key factors to be considered in this analysis is, 
first and foremost, the degree of openness of the economy, ice., the 
degree to which it is integrated in world trade and the financial 
aoWS. 
From this standpoint, there are a number of important points 
to consider. To begin with, most of the Latin American countries 
have'fairly low coefficients of openness compared with some.European 
countries, such as Belgium, the Netherlands and Norway, whose trade 
flows represent proportions of over 40 per cent. There are marked 
differences, however, between the larger and the smaller countries, 
/as also 
-  
as also happens in the case of the industrialized countries.2,' 
Table 3 shows that Brazil's share is very low compared with that of 
Costa Rica, which is a typical example of an open economy. This 
merely confirms the we'll`-known assumption that the development of 
foreign trade and consequent possibilities .of Specialization acquire 
more importance in the smaller countries with a smaller market and 
range of resources. 
It seems clear, however, that,the developments under review 
have resulted in a fairly widespread and appreciable enhancement of 
external relations. This is true of four of the six countries studied 
(see table 3). As regards Colombia and Uruguay, which have not 
followed that trend, some special situations affecting them must be 
taken into account. For example, the unfavourable trend in Colombia's 
traditional exports in the middle years of the past decade reduced 
the above share. Therefore, the 1973 figure indicates a recovery 
as a result of the vigorous growth of new exportable commodities. 
The situation in Uruguay, which contradicts the aforementioned 
assumption regarding small countries, is a sign of the external 
sector's inability to expand fromwhichit has long.been,SUffering,_ 
and which is one of the crucial factors of its present
-Stagnation. 
The coefficients of France (15.6 per cent), Japan (10.7 per 
cent) and the United States (5.9 per cent) contrast strongly 
with the Netherlands' coefficient of nearly 50 per cent. 
Figures for the years 1968-1970, in OECD, "The international 
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Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, Octc)3r 1967 
and March 1975. 
W 1961-1962. 
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This question, however, is linked not only with the qualitative 
representation of external transactions, but also - to a considerable 
degree - with theirstructure, particularlythe composition of exports 
and imports, an aspect which is dealt with in:detail later in this' 
study. Here attention is drawn merely to-some important facets in 
the light of recent experience. It is unnecessary, of course, to 
stress the, decisive significance .of .being a net'oil importer or 
exporter. In each case, the repercussions, apart from being 
considerable, will show :a very different sign :in the trend of prices, 
balance of payments position and monetary implications.. In the 
equally disparate case of countries with exportable agricultural 
surpluses and those importing foodstuffsl the external situation 
has a very different impact on each of these. groups and the problets 
that arise are also verydifferent, 
As the structural counterpart of the, situation as regards the 
level and quality of openness of the economy,, consideration might be 
given to the representation in the various countries of the 
subsistence sector partly.or completely outside the money market -
which in differing degrees would.not be greatly affectd by inflation 
associated with the external ,sector,:nor would it influence the 
reproduction and spread of,this phenomenon locally. 
In this respect, reference has been made above to Ecuador and 
Bolivia, which seem to be the most relevant cases Sor this discussion. 
In any case, it would not do to exaggerate the significance of this 
aspect of the situation in Latin America, although it may be more 
worthy of consideration in countries or areas with a more typically 
dual structure and with few links with other countries owing to 
their very state 'of underdevelopment. This subject is dealt with 
more, fully in the studies on these two countries. 
In addition to these structural characterithtics, the impact 
of imported inflation will largely depend On the policiesadopted 
to combat it, a matter which is examined latex* in this study. It 
can be stated in adVance that the freedom of manoeuvre and the 
/possibilities and 
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possibilities and choice of action will be decisively conditioned by 
those structural characteristics and by institutional and socio-
political elements which are well-known. 
B. CHANNELS OF TRANSMISSION OF IMPORTED INFLATION 
Against a. backdrop of the foregoing circumstances, the various 
ways and forms in which external inflationary pressures are 
disseminated should be identified. The 1973 Economic Sury 
	 includes 
a preliminary study of the question, and other attempts at analysing 
it have been made since, as inflation took root and spread. They 
include a special study by the OECD,/ which endeavours to classify 
the channels of transmission of the process, identifying the factors 
which are seen to stimulate it in the industrialized countries 
represented by that Organization:4j A different system is adollted 
here, which naturally has some elements in common with the 
aforementioned system, but seems better suited to the circumstances 
in Latin America. A distinction is made between direct influences 
and indirect influences, and, among the latter, between those 
constituting the initial spur to the propagation of inflation and 
those deriving from such influences. 
3/ 	 "The international transmission of inflation", Economic 
Outlook, July 1973. 
These factors are grouped as follows: (a) price-effects, whether 
of competitive or non-competitive imports, or of exports that 
follow the trend of prices; (b) demand-effects, deriving from 
the increase in exports and the improvement' in the external 
current account, which results in excessive demand in a period 
of full.employment; (c) liquidity-effects of the balance of 
payments on monetary conditions, and hence on domestic demand 
and prices; (d) other links, such as those between multinational 
enterpises and trade union organizations, international 
inflationary expectations and demonstration-effects. 
/The most 
If/ 
The most obvious of the direct channels is the rise in import 
prices. As will be.seen,in table 4, 'thibstantial increases were 
recorded in 1973 and 1974" in all the countries considered, especially 
in the latter year. The variations in 1974 range from 22.8 per cent 
in Bolivia to 57.5 per cent in.Brazili, 
Unfortunately, the available•data art unreliableand usually 
_ 	 . 
undiiestimates of the actual magnitude,of the adjustments. There 
are bitter classified data for Brazil, which show much sharper.. 
contrasts between the trends of prices and quantities in the case 
of some major groupsof productsTable 5 reflects the situation 
in the first six months of 1973 and 1974.. 
• 	 : 
There is, in fact, a marked disparity between the trends of 
prices and of the volUme of imports (see table 4). Some countries 
recorded substantial increases im.both. In the majority, prices 
increased much more than the,yolume. Basically, these disparities 
are in keeping with the developments in 1974 as regards oil prices 
(see in table 4 the price increases particularly affecting Brazil, 
Costa Rica and . Uruguay)• 
These ratios raise some queries regarding the inflationary 
impact of the larger volume of imports. From one point of view, the 
bigger inflow of foreign goods might be considered to act as a restraint 
on price increases, because of its contribution to total supply and, 
in particular, towards eliminating partial disequilibria within 
total supply in the face of changes in demand. From a different 
standpoint, however, opposite repercussions are observable for two 
main reasons: first, the increases in the volume of imports, to the 
extent that they increase the share of foreign goods in total supply, 
extend the area of impact of the rise in external prices; secondly, 
a varying proportion of the increase in imports may have gone tovarjs 
increasing the reserves or stocks of private or public enterprises 
as a safeguard against an uncertain situation, which would cancel 
out part of their possible contribution to actual supply. 
/Table 4 
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Table 
LATIN AMERICA: INDEXES OF PRICES AND VOLUME OF 
IMPORTS IN SELECTED COUNTRIES 
(1970 = 100) 
Price index Index of volume 
Percentage Country 1973 	 177 	 Variation 1973 2974 
Peroentage 
variation 
1973 1974 1973 19714 
Bolivia 
	 127 	 156 	 17.6 22.8 117 , 	 150 8.3 28.2 
Brazil 	 134 




	 18.2 21.5 100 114 8.7 14.0 
Costa Rica 
	 128 	 168 
	 15.3 31.3 109 126 2.8 15.6 
Ecuador 
	 ,128 	 166 
	 16.4 29.7 144 186 15.2 ' 29.2 
Urugu.1,y 
	 133 	 208 	 19.8 56,4 92 59 15.9 7.6 
Source: 
	 ECLAT 





-IN THE VALUEAND VOLUME OF IMPORTS 
(First, half of. 1973 and 1974) 
'Percentage 	 Percentage 
 
increase 	 increase 
in" value 	 in volume 
-Basic commodities 225 4.3 
S-Processed products 93.8 71.9 
Total 122.5 14.7 
Source: Con'untura EconOmica, October 1974— See table• 33 in the 
study on inflation in Brazil. 
It is not easy to clarify this point without careful research. 
At all events, it seems that the effect of the increases in the volume 
of imports remains contradictory, although the increases in import 
prices certainly is not. 
The second and more complex direct channel of transmission of 
external pressures is that set in motion by export trends. Table 6 
shows the trend of exports in terms of prices and volume. Here the 
increase in prices is considerably larger in all the countries 
studied, particularly in 1974. Obviously, the disparity is greatest 
in the case of the two oil-exporting countries (Bolivia and Ecuador), 
which reduced their volume of exports. 
As regards the transmission of inflationary pressures through 
exports, it is useful to distinguish those products which are mainly 
or, in some cases, wholly exported from those which in a fairly 
considerable proportion are absorbed by the domestic market. 
/Table 6 
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Table 6 
LATIN AMERICA* INDEXES OF PRICES AND VOLUME OF 
EXPORTS FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES 
(1970 = loo ) 
Country 
Price index Index of volume 
1973 1974 
Percentage 




1973 1974 1973 1974 
Bolivia, 116 :245 33.3 111.2 121 117 1.7 —3.3 
Brazil 166 214 37.2 28.9 136 136, 13.3 0.0 
Colombia 125 145 27.6 16.0 132 144 .6.5 9.1 
Costa Rica 120 143 20.0 19.2 122 129 2.5 5.7 
Ecuador 138 329 38.0 138.4. 190 
 .173. 37.7' 
Uruguay 190 204 45.0 7.4 77 81 
—6.8 5.5 
Sour3e: EC LA, on the basis of official statistics. 
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It seems clear that the transmission 9f price increases is 
much more direct and widespread in the case of the second. group of 
exports. Note, for example, the countries producing basic foodstuffs: 
wheat, meat or rice. Irrespective of what a prices policy can - and 
in practice actually. does - accomplish, as will be noted in the 
country studies included in this Survey, there is no doubt that an 
immediate link is established between the two spheres, transferring 
the external increases:to ,prices-On the'.:doMestic market. Table 7 
shows the price trends of some important items in the two categories 
described. 
Tdble 7 
LATIN AMERICA: PRICE INDEXES OF SELECTED 
EXPORT COMMODITIES 
(1970.. = 100) 
1965 1971 .1972 .1973 1974 
Wheat 102 107 - 119 
_3.-5 329 
Maize 108 112 .115 167 306 
Rice 92 114 , ,104L• 141 571 
Beef 108 149 t, 
	 180 243 272 
Sugar 57 120 193 256 1 300 
Coffee 91 78. , 96 117 121 
Bananas 116 108 112 113 140 
Cotton fibre 109 134 ,.147 168 206 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of .official statistics. , 
/In the 
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In the case of the former group of exports, in contrast, the 
impact of improved prices is felt indirectly and with some delay 
through government income and expenditure or through the effects on 
the demand of those benefiting from the export business. This is 
generally the case with respect to exports of basid and industrial 
inputs, such as petroleum itself and mining ProduCtS. Naturally, . 
products of the two types may,be, found'in some countries. 
for example, is an important exporter of agricultural commoditie6 
as well as of iron ore. 
1. Indirect internal spreadLandpramation: 
5.22.2123. channels  
As regards the indirect effects, attention must be centred 
first on three areas which act as amplifiers (or dampers) of imported 
inflation: (a) foreign trade; (b) the. monetary field;
—and (c) the 
fiscal area. 
In foreign trade, under other conditions, the foreign exchange 
rate and its devaluations were a major factor in raising domestic 
prices as a result of the rise in the cost 'of imports and related 
effects. In the recent situation, matters have taken a different 
course and this instrument may be said to have had an essentially 
moderating effect on imported inflation. This assumption applies to 
three countries in particular - Costa Rica, Ecuador and Bolivia -
which have kept their exchange rates stable, in spite of the 
appreciable increase in domestic prices and, consequently, the 
actual depreciation of their currencies. By this and other methods, 
such as tariff reductions and subsidies, the impact of the higher 
import costs was softened. 
The situation is quite different in other countries which, in 
keeping with their own special characteristics, have followed the 
system of mini-devaluations. These have permitted the price increases 
of imported products to filter through to the domestic market. Even 
in this case, however, the adjustments in the exchange rate generally 
lagged behind the increase in the price index, as will be seen in 
/the country 
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the country studies, particularly
- in the' case of'Braiil-in- 1973. This 
subject is referred to again later inHdiscussing economic policy 
guidelines vis-a-vis imported inflation. 
The lesser importance of this channel (the exchange rate) in 
the recent situation is counterbalanced by the considerable importance 
acquired by another element which had been of little significance in 
past inflationary Pxperfenceil the'Movementre'ot foreign exchange 
reserves and their relationship with monetary expansion. 
Table 8 shows that in three countries there were substantial 
increases in theae resources in 1973: 64.3 per cent in Colombia, 
53.4 per .cent in Brazil, and 68.5 per-cent in Ecuador. The increase 
was more moderate in Uruguay (17.2per cent), and -in Bolivia there 
was a big jump the folleingyear'(1642 per cent). 
- n 1974, however, 
except in the case of the oil-exporting countries, they.all recorded 
a drcrr in their reserves. 
These changes had an evident impact on the growth• 
	 of the means 
of payment in several countries in-ditfereriteearSeetable 9). 
In Ecuador and Bolivia, for examp1e4
- the,axpansion of monetary 
resources was basically_due to. the _purchase of .reserves by_the_Qentral 
Bank. As regards_colotilb,ia and_Brazil, tha.if.iolentexpansion_of 
reserves in 1973 would account for about one.-third of the increase 
in monetary resources in the former, and approximately one-quarter 
in the latter.5/ In 1974, in contrast, the drop in reserves 
experienced b/ the four non-oil-exporting countries helped to curb 
the increase in the money supply (see table 9). 
2/ See the country studies for a more detailed analysis of 
these questions. 
/Table 8 
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Table 8 
LATIN AMERICA* INTERNATIONAL RESERVES. IN SELECTED COUNTRIES. 
(Millions of dollars, at the end of each .period) 







Bolivia 45.5 72.1 190.5 (12) 20.8 164.2 
Brazil 1 187.0 6 417.0 
5 531.0 
(10)  
Colombia 206.0 534.0 1449;0 64.3 
-15,9 1636..87' 
Costa Rioa 16.3 42.4 14.15 (11)  
Ecuador 241.0 350.0 (12)  68.5 45.2 
Uruguay 17510 232.0 170.0 (10) 17.2 
-26.7 
ITT, International Finamfal Statistic's February 1975. 
a% 'lie figures in brackets are the number, of months considered in r0.4tion to 
December 1973. 
Table 9 
LATIN AMERICAS ITUREASE IN THE MONEY SUPPLY IN SELECTED COUNT1-,IES 
(Percentages) 
Country 1971 1972 1973 1974 il 
Bolivia 15.2 25.2 34.3 92.8 	 (9) 
Brazil 31.3 98.9 48.0 16.9 	 (9) 
Colombia 11.9 27.1 30.7 7.8 	 (3) 
Costa Rioa 28.8 14.2 24.1 6.3 	 (9) 
Ecuador 11.4 21.6 90,7 15.1 	 (8) 
Uruguay 51.1 52.1 74.5 62.2 (12) 
Sources IMF, International Financial Statistics, February 1975. 





- reserVes and their 
monetary projections follow a,fai0-T
-Tegular pattern in keeping with 
the structure of the external sector the..same cannot be said for 
• 
the movements of domestic credit, whose contribution to the money 
supply and its internal composition varies considerably between one 
country and another (see table 10). 
In•Ecuador, for example, the striking feature is,tha contrast 
between the increases in this monetary source and the T/Uctuations in 
foreign exchange reserves. The rates, of expansion are fairly moderate 
and only the private sector benefited—from the increaSe'in`credit. 
Conversely, taking-Advantage of the oil boom, public credit became 
independent of the Central Bank and even reduced its debts`. 'A similar 
process is apparent in Bolivia, althoUgh the expansionof credit was 
only slowed up in 1974, also at the expense of the public sector and 
with tairly high groWth rates for the private sector. 
In Brazil, theincreasesLand distribution of credit in the 
more favourable years were fairly uniform, excent;in1974 in the case 
of the public sector, which shows a negative sign as regards` the use 
of credit. It shoUld be borne
- in mind; however, that the financial 
market constitutes an important alternative source of fUndb'for the 
Government. 
In Costa Rica there was. an appreciable rise in the rates of 
increase in domestic credit between 1973 and 1974 especially•as 
regards the public sector. This, however, Aid:ynot prevent the increase 
in the money supply from being fairly small.in 1974 (see table 9), no 
doubt as a result of the restrictive ettect of the drop,iii foreign . 
exchange reserves (see table 8). 
The figures for Uruguay are evidence of the serious inflation 
experienced by that country in recent years. Although admittedly 
the rate of increase in the money supply decreased somewhat in 1974 
(see table 9), this was due to the movement of reserves rather than 
to the development of credit, since the latter rose appreciably in 




LATIN APERICAt VARIATIONS IN DOMESTIC CREDIT. IN SELECTED COUNTRIES 
(Percentage annual.rates) 
Percentage variations 
1971 1972 1973 19741/ 
Bolivia (millions of pesos) 21.2 28.2 31.2 8n5V (12) 
To the public sector 18.4 	 . 21.2 4.1 
-39.4 
To the private sector 25.9 39.2 68.1 60.0 
Brazil (millions of oruzeiroe) 4144 31,9 46.6 44.8 (11)  
To the public seater 12.2 
-42,4 22.4 -27.6 
To the private seotor 48.0 44.6 48.2 48.9 
Colombia (millions of pesos) 18.4 17.4 18.8 ... 
To the public sector 32.0 7.0 12.1 
To the private sector 15.4 20.0 
- 20 .4 
Costa Rica (millions of colones) 34.1 17.5 10.2 50.3 (12)  
To the public sector '37.6 42.2- 1.0 413.7 
To the private sector 33.5 12.9. 1243 51.5 
Eouador (millions of sucres) 11.6 3.5 0.0 12.5 (10) 
To the public sector 16.8 
 "1805 . -88.4• 
- 2/ 
To the private seater • 10.0 10.3 20.5. 31.8 
Uruguay (thousands of millions 
of pesos) 66.5 94.0 51.3 86.0 (12) 
To the public sector 109.4 80.7 9.8 67.0 
To the private sector 56.0 980 63.6 94.0 
Souroei IMF, International Financial Statistics, March 1975. 
1/ Preliminary estimates. In brackets, the number of months considered. 
1The'source of the 1974 fi6ures is the Central Bank of Bolivia. 
sti/ A negative balance was recorded a6ain. 
/It might 
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It might be interesting to compare the relationship between the 
increases in the money supply and'the'rise,in prices; these variables 
are usually compared in search of some causal relationship. Table 11 
presents the respective figures for the six countries considered. It 
is easy to seethat only in.Bolivia,„,Ecuador and Costa Rica 61 is 
 
there a certain parallel relationship between the two indicators. In 
the other countries the connexion is much more erratic. For example, 
in Brazil, a considerable expansion of the means of payment in 1973 
was accompanied by a substantially lower
. rise'in the price index, in 
contrast with 1974 when the second indicator increased much more than 
the first. A similar situation is noted in Colombia, Costa Rica and 
Uruguay in 1974. 
Thorough research would be required to determine the reasons 
underlying these trends and disparities, and some light is shed on 
the subject  by the country studies which form part of third Survey. 
Suffice it to say here that the figures reveal scant grounds for an 
over-simplified or quantitative approach to the relations between 
monetary expansion and price increases. 
2. The fiscal channel 
The repercussions Of imported inflatioh on the.fiscal,area 
seem to have been less severe than the classic impact
- of'bittationa 
of crisis or restraint in the external sector. The obvious exceptions 
are Ecuador and Bolivia, 'where the Governments.are the main internal 
beneficiaries of the petroleum export boom. It also seems clear, 
however, that the rppercussiOns on prices have everywhere affected 
the publicfinancea, through increases in current or'capital expenditure 
or in spending on imports or domestic good's and services. It is 
equally true that in the countries enjoying an increase in fiscal 
revenue, the inevitable tendency towards a parallel increase in 
public spending involves redoubled pressures on the availability and 
flexibility of production resources, in addition to which it is much 
••••n••• • 




LATIN AMERICA: COMPARISON BETWEEN INCREASES IN THE 
MONEY SUPPLY AND IN THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX 
IN THE SIX COUNTRIES CONSIDERED 
Bolivia 
19 73 1974a/ 
Increase in money supply 34.3 32.8 	 (9). 
 
.Increase in consumer price index 34.7 35.9 (9) 
Brazil 
Increase in money supply 48.0 16.9 	 (9) 
Increase in consumer price index 13.6 27.5 (9) 
Colombia 
Increase in money supply 30. 7 9.5 	 (7) 
Increase in consumer price index 25.1 29.3 (11) 
Costa Rica. 
Increase in money supply 24.1 6.3 
	 (9) 
Increase in consumer price index, 26.4 26.0 (6) 
Ecuador 
Increase in money supply 30.7 21.1 
	 (10) 
Increase in consumer price index - 20.5 17.4 (10) 
Uruguay 
Increase in money supply 74.5 6202 
	 (12) 
Increase in consumer price index 77.7 107.3 (12) 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of official statistics. 
of 
	
The figures in brackets are the number of mOriths considered 
in relation to DeCember 1973. 
/more difficult 
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more difficult to endeavour to raise domestic taxes, either for anti-
inflationary pruposes or in order to obtain the domestic saving 
counterpart of the bigger investments being made or in view. 
Paradoxically enough, theboom resulting from the foreign trade 
situation is not a favourableatmosphere:for pursuing those aims, 
although the objective 'conditions make them more feasible than at any 
other time. 
Table 12 shows th? trends of and'relatiOnships between the
growth of total expenditure and current income in the countries 
considered. Since the figures represent nominal values, they tend to 
overestimate the actual growth, but it is nonetheless true that the 
changes between 1974 and 1973.wi.thout exception exceed the rise in 
prices, sometimes. by a considerable amount (see, for purposes of 
comparison, table 13). This comes on top of what are also 
significant increases if the situation in 1973. is compared with that 
of the base year (1970). 
It will be noted, moreover, that the expansion of total 
expenditure in 1974 over 1973 was accompanied fairly fl=ibly 
by current income. Except in Uruguay, the lattc:r rose kt 
a higher rate, than the former. Furthermore, as regards Ecuador; the 
growth of income compared with expenditure has been considerable 
between 1970 and 1974 which is not surprising in view of_thc
. ,impact 
of the inflows obtained from the development of petroleum. 
It should be borne in mind that the evident benefits deriving 
from petroleum exports have also meant that the fiscal system of 
the countries thus favoured have become overwhelmingly more dependent 




LATIN AMERICA: EVOLUTION OF CURRENT INCOME AND FISCAL 
EXPENDITURE IN THE COUNTRIES CONSIDERED 
(Percentage annual variation) 
Variation 	 19 74 
1970-1973 
	


































32.1 	 106.7 
	
32.1 	 92.4 
	
40.2 
	 41.0 (January-October) 
	
38.1 	 33.5 (January-October) 
	
16.2 	 32.5 (January-September) 
	
35.0 	 16.3 (•anuary-September) 
	
29.6 	 86.7 
	
16.4 	 79.8 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of official statistics. 
Table 13 
General index 
Food index `  
38.8 (December) 
44.7 (December) 
General index 	 18.6 	 30.9 (November) 
Food index 	 21.1 	 38.5 (November) 
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Table 13 
LATIN AMERICA: VARIATIONS IN THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX 
(Percentage annual variation) 
Variation 













Food indeX.yj,  
General index 





















Source: United Nations, Monthly Bulletin Of Statistics, February 1975. 
Wholesale prices. 
'Iyf 	 Weighted average for food of animal and vegetable origin, and for 
beverages and other ,items. 




3. Prices and wages and salaries 
In the wave of pressures and•impulses set in motion by imported 
inflation, another element may be distinguished: the movements or 
responses of domestic prices and income to the:changes analysed above. 
As regards the above pressures, the direct impact of the rise in import 
and export prices has already been discussed., _It was also stated that 
in the case of export commodities of which a significant proportion is 
consumed locally, the impulse..is immediately transmitted to the share 
destined for the domestic market. 
Undoubtedly, however, the process of dissemination and possible 
multiplication of the direct effect only starts, here., It is recognized 
that there is a sympathetic association of changes in prices, which 
operates and is manifested in many different ways. A rise in the price 
of the products concerned - whether imports or exports - will trigger 
increases inthe prices of substitutes or competitive products. 
Spending the additional income - even if with the object of increasing 
the exploited area or the quantities produced - will in some degree 
affect the availability of resources and, consequently, their prices. 
Efforts to use land or materials for activities yielding the highest 
returns have often resulted in the reduction or insufficient growth 
of othe'r lihes of production, with the resulting price-effects. The 
reactions are thus linked together and extend indefinitely, compelling 
the' Governments to adopt different measures. . 
Without going too deeply into this well-known aspect, it is, useful 
to note the asymmetry of this phenomenon, which is of Ley.iml)ortance in 
discussing the behaviour and role of the movements of income. 
Another glace at table 1 of this first part of the Survey will 
show the rates of increase in the price index of the countries under 
review. Going a step further, table 13 has been prepared in which 
the general rise is compared with the increases in the foodstuffs 
between December 1973 and the last month of 1974 for which data were 
available at the time of writing this study. 
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It will be seen that at the end of 1973 - compared with the 
base year (1970) - in all the countries except Costa Rica the increase 
in food prices was bigger than that recorded for the overall index. 
This disparity is again evident from a comparison of the chances 
between 1974 and 1973, although Uruguay and Costa Rica do not follow 
the; 
 prevailing pattern,, which is more strongly marked in the cases 
of Brazil and Ecuador. Naturally, thi,s ratio underestimates the 
actual difference between the twofigures, because the overall index 
includes the index recorded for foodstuffs. 
Moreover, there are well-known inadequacies in coverage and 
. 	 . 
procedures which tend to have_the same effect, especially in periods 
of substantial increases, :Which make it more difficult to control 
prices and widen the gap between official prices and actual 
market prices. 
The acceleration of price increases and the asymmetry of these 
.movements have obvious and only too well-known implications in terms 
of income trends. The more than proportional increase in food prices 
and the various obstacles, 
 preventing or delaying adjustments in the 
income of large groups of wage-earners encourage the trend towards 
a regressive income distribution which isin any case a result of 
any acceleration of the inflationary process. 
At least in the,. countries under review - and for different 
reasons in each,- no greatpropagating or multiplier effect appears 
to have been exereised,by the pressure of wage-earners to regain 
former levels of real income, which in the previous chapter was seen 
to be a very significant factor in the present situation of the 
central economies. However, the country studies show that in several 
countries measures have been taken to counteract such deterioration 
or wage and salary adjustments have been accorded, especially to 
urban workers. In this respect, it is pointed out that the 
4coelerationbT,price increases in Brazil led .to a change in tho 




C. ECONOMIC POLICY OPTIONS AND INSTRUMENTS 
It is not possible to review the wide.range of positions and 
instruments which have been adopted' by the countries,considered in 
dealing with imported inflation, and which are discussed later in the 
respective studies. It might, hOWever be aseful to present the 
problem here in broad terms. 
These countries, of course, like ths:rest of the countries of 
Latin America, have had to choose between two clear-cut possibilities. 
First, to accept the rise in external prices and to adjust their:  
domestic prices and price system accordingly, with all the possible 
drawbacks and advantages involved. This is what some have called the 
"internalization" of world inflation, which would lead to tha 
search for a new balance at a different level. The o.'. her choice 
wouJA he as far as possible to shut themselves off from the tide of 
rising external prices in order:to'curly price incraes; but this 
would alsO mean, to a considerable degree, maintaining the relation 
between prices or the priceSyStem existing before the situation 
developed. 
Of course, this is merely. 6- hypothetical option. -In practice, 
no country has been or would be able to take either.of these 
opposite courses to extremes.2/ What is observable, however, is a 
tendency in the one or'the other direction. This tendency,- moreover, 
depends more on particular and objective circumstances than on the 
arbitrary or subjective decisions of policy-makers. 
The dilemma in the case of a Caribbean country was presented 
clearly at a recent meeting: 
.111MMMEM. 	
2/. 	 In the European discussion of the matter (see Economic Outlook, 
July 1974, 22:cit.) it is clear that the option of shutting 
themselves off from. imported inflation is utterly impracticable 
e for the more open conomies. Aoreciver, ekperience has shown 
it to be inadvisable even-for the more important economies, 
even though they certainly have more radius of action. 
/"Much of 
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"Much of the inflation is imported. The prices of basic food 
which we have to import - flour, rice, meat, animal feeds and 
textiles - have risen very eharply and Continue their uninterrupted 
rise. To cushion the effect of all these price increases would be 
very costly; it would further reduce the amount of money available 
for develoPmental purposes. Not to cushion would lead to the 
inevitable damands for high wage increases which will affect out 
competitive position, and will further add to inflationary pressure. 
Our dilemma is similar to'that faced by many small countries with 
open economies andan undiversified produCtion structure. The 
Government has chosen the middle way; it is to keep stable the 
prices of certain key goods such as flour, rice and internal 
transportation by means ofdirect subsidies; and to use other devices, 
including credit and monetaiy PoliCy, fiscal concessions to industry, 
and an'improvement in guaranteed prices for local farm production to 
. 	 • 	 , 
control price increases originating within the domastic economy."8/ 
This aclectic approximation seems to have been followed by 
most of the countries studied. It is easy to see, however, that some 
countries - EcUador, for exam le i which has had an ekt-iaordinary 
amount of fiscal resources haVe had more recourse to instruments 
such as subsidies and tariff reductions in moderating 
	 rise in 
price of essential imports; Furthermore, to keep the parity of the 
sucre fiXed in the face of a significant increase in domestic prices 
has in fact meant a revaluation of the exchange rate. This did not, 
however, jeopardize its basic export commodity (petroleum)' or its 
foreign exchange reserves, although the latter grew less in 1974 
than in 1973 (see 'table 8). 
Other countries, in contrast, either for lack of the same 
possibilities or in keeping With the policy adopted, or 'a combination 
of the two, have let the leVel and systeth of prices adapt to the 
changes in the external situation. 
See the statement by Mr. V.C. McIntyre, Ambassador.of Trinidad 
and Tobago, in the OAS final report, of the.Sub-Committee of 
CEPCIES on Trinidad and Tobago, September 1974 
/From:a 
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From a different standpoint, two other types.or forms of 
action in dealing with imported inflation may be distinguished in 
the national experiences reviewed here, as also in the rest of the 
countries. On the one hand, are the cases in which the measures and 
instruments applied have been placed within or have derived from an 
overall economic policy framework. On,the other hand are the 
countries which have adopted a number of ad hoc'decisions of which 
the guiding principle may have been to curb the rising prices and 
mitigate the social and economic impact of the situation. 
Neither can a rigid or complete division be established here, 
but it is clear that Brazil, for example, is a conspicuous 
illustration of the first group. Not only is it possible to observe 
a clearly-defined anti-inflationary strategy,. which has been 
implemented for.nearly A decade, but this strategy has formed part 
of an overall approach to development. In fact., it would not be 
possible to understand the former without. having in view the latter, 
and to a certain extent, it might be maintained-that the management 
of the inflation variable has had outstanding significance in the 
framing and handling of development policy. 
Contradicting what has sometimes been maintained in certain 
circles outside Brazil, those general and specific frameworks do not 
seem to have involved unvarying or dogmatic commitments through 
specific instruments and, actions. Quite the contrary, As pointed 
out by some of the foremost leaders of that experience, the basic 
definitions have gone hand in hand with a considerable dose of 
pragmatism.2/ Thus there has been no reluctance to alter rules or 
prime directives of the policy being implemented, when circumstances 
have dictated a different course. Reference waS made above to the 
criteria with respect to wage increases, It is. also useful to 
// 
	 See M.H. Simonsen, "Inflacao: Gradualism° versus tratamento 
de cholue", (Apec, Rio de Janeiro, 1970 ; and M.H. Simonsen 
and R. de Oliveira Campos, "A nova eConomia brasileira" 




recall the moderation_involved in the practice of mini-devaluations 
when external pressures on pi-ices were intensified in 1973, or the 
abandonment of the adjustability'claUse in the new Treasury. bills. 
At the other end of the scale, logically enough, as regards the 
definitiOn or scope of policies; are those countries which have had 
less experience in the ups and downs.of inflation, or which have had 
to face'substantially novel situations. Costa Rica and Ecuador are 
clear examples of these two situations. In Uruguay and Bolivia, to 
a certain degree, the measures against inflation have been conditioned 
by an overall policy, althoughthis:may. not; of course, have the radius 
of the Brazilian .policy.' Lastly; and at a different level, it is 
possible that Colombia's policy is.closer to that of Brazil, at 
least as regards the expeditious and:practical nature of many of 
its provisions. 
D. PROSPECTS AND QUERIES 
At the beginning of 1975, it may already be anticipated without 
too much risk of error'that the conditions prevailing in the dynamic 
and complex period 1973-1974 are likely.to:be
-appreciabIy modifie& 
As noted in chapter:I, the 'pr'ice- curve of basic materials. 
 pointing downwards; This trend also includesipetraleumf 
in spite of the special circumstances attaching to it. Although the 
majority assume that these prices will remain at fairly high levels 
compared with those recorded at the end or in the middle of the 
1960s, nobody can hazard specific forecasts, since a decisive factor 
in this connexion is the recovery by the central economies of their 
dynamic impetus. 
In any case, from the Latin American standpoint and with the 
relative exception of the oil-exporting countries,one all-important 
aspect of inported inflation, which is precisely the advantageous 
one, has come to an end, since the expansion and rise in the prices 
of exports has halted, while prices of imports continue to rise. 
/This change 
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This change in the external picture has an evident impact on 
the inflationary prospects of the Latin American countries, apart, 
of course, from its more general implications which are also a 
source of concern. 
This means that the effect of the rise in import prices will 
continue to be felt, in addition to the internal pressures set in 
motion by the current situation. Furthermore, the possible slowing7up 
of the inflationary process, as a result of, the slackening in the rise of 
export prices and the channelling of some export commodities to the 
domestic market, would also mean a deterioration in the balance of 
payments and in the situation of important sectors of production. 
Accordingly, it would not be surprising if in some countries a 
situation arose which was somewhat similar to the stagnation combined 
with inflation (stagflation) affecting the central economies. The 
rise in import prices and the cumulatiVe internal pressures would 
act as a fillip to inflation, while the weakening of exports and 
the consequent probable decline in the capacity to import would 
jeopardize opportunities of growth. 
Be that as it may, a new stage seems to be opening up after 
the fleeting but violent impact of imported inflation, which will 
once again put the countries'. economic policies to the test. ..No 
doubt it will not be easy to,adapt them in order to contend , 
successfully with a situation which may be more like those arising 
in earlier periods. 
/Chapter III 
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Chapter III 
RECENT INFLATION IN SIX LATIN AMERICAN COUNTREM 
The following review of inflationary experiences in six Latin 
American countries devotes particular ,attention to events in the 
years 1973-1974, which have been the most affected by international 
price trends. As will be noted, however,.an attempt has been made to 
present a retrospective view of the Thenomenon, especially in those 
countries in which its roots go fairly far back. 
It was not a simple matter to select the. countries. Two criteria 
predominated here. First, to show cases that differed as regards the 
impact of the external situation, which has depended basically on the 
consumption of exports and imports.. Thus, side by side with the 
oilexporting economies there are others in which the increases in 
import prices have been more significant than the export boom. Secondly, 
the idea was to present cases of countries in which inflation had not 
been very serious until the present situation, together with others in 
which it has been an importantfactor of past trendp. 
It should be borne in mind that the general picture and the 
specific situations presented in this study are already undergoing 
appreciable changes as a result cf the new circumstances o.f the world 
economy, particularly the central countries. It will therefore shortly 
be necessary to revise obervations and even analytical categories which 
may have been useful in dealing with this transitory situation, but 
which may not be so in grasping what is happening now. 
The data presented in these studies may differ :in Some_ cases from 
those appearing in the country studies on recenteconamic trends,, in 
which advantage was taken of the revised -information on the main 
economic aggregates that was not available at the time the inflation 
studies were drafted. 
/1. BOLIVIA 
1. BOLIVIA 
A. INTRODUCTORY NOTE 
The study of recent inflation in. 
 Bolivia is of special interest, 
in that its course would appear to be strongly influenced ty the 
interplay of factors of different types,.which go to make up a 
very individual picture of inflation as far as its origins and 
final form of expression are concerned. . 
The situation, moreover, is one of an inflationary cycle 
preceded by a long period of stability, and this undoubtedly provides 
a further factor of interest. The contrast between the stability any. 
of the period 1969-1971 and the inflation which appeared in 1972 
shows just how decisive structural aspects are in Bolivian develo'Dment. 
Perhaps the main interest of the. present case, however, is the 
simultaneous existence of a wave of prosperity in the external sector 
which reached heightaunknows previously, and an inflationary process 
whose origins are deeply rooted.in the country's productive system, 
this process being set off by the increase in the liquidity of the 
economy and then resurging under the impetus of international 
inflation. The extent to which inflation has unsettled the taking 
of deciEions, which would have been further-reaching, had 
circumstances been otherwise, makes the study of this process a 
matter bf high priority. 
The nresent document only attempts to identify the most 
significant facts and the basic elements. of inflation in Bolivia. 
Further clarification and more exact appreciations would require 
intensive work in the actual terrain of events, which is outside 
the scope of this first explanatory document. 
/B. BACKGROUND 
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B. .BACKGROUND TO THE NATURE AND EVOLUTION 
OF THE BOLIVIAN ECONOMY 
1. Tntipmx 2.1222122:t 
The actual evolution of the Bolivian economy in recent years 
has been marked by modest rates of economic growth. The main 
macroeconomic indicators show fairly moderate growth rates, the 
variations in which, generally-speaking, do not take the form of 
downward'or'upward movements of any great importance. The more 
substantial variations were restricted to centres of activity whose 
influence wasonly secondary in the general framework of the economy. 
The modest•growth rates mainly benefited certain urban groups linLeC. 
with such services sectors se.trade and banking, with some forms of 
processing such as metal-smelting, with- certain manufacturing 
industries, and with construction activities. The mass of the 
population of Bolivia, who depend on agriculture for a living, made no 
major progress in their standard of. living., 
The great endowment with natural wealth .and the fairly low 
level of economic activity would conceivably-make it possible to 
achieve'rather more ambitious margins of growth than those which 
actually materialized, i.e., the growth potential of the •  economy 
should be well above the moderate growth rate which it has shown: 
in the past.' 
It should be mentioned that, during the period referred to, 
various development strategies and policies were tried out in 
different external and internal economic situations, but they did 
mot achieve the changes which they were intended to bring about. 
The conduct of economic activity, generally speaking, has found 
obstacles of different types, among which may be mentioned the 
lack of cohesion in the structure of the economy. 
The following description of the overall economy and the 
interpretation of inflatiOn in Bolivia in recent•years call for 
the identification of a group Of'basic shortcomings in the economic 
system which seriously restrict the process of production and 
distribution on the country's economy. 
/The tremendous 
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The tremendous structural heterogeneity ,Which characterizes 
the production function is one Of the basic explanations why 
Bolivia is a relatively less developed country. By way of 
illustration, mining and petroleum must be compared with agriculture 
and even with incipient industry in Bolivia. The differences in 
productivity are exceptionally great, and, as already stated, this 
means an acute lack of interrelation between the sectors of 
production.1/ The absence of a lively manufacturing sector has 
caused the emergence of enclaves of exports of raw materials severed 
from the domestic process of production, while on the other hand 
a large tart of the agricultural sector is functioning on the basis 
of archaic technology, with anti-economic scales of production and 
with no clear idea of how to plan the allocation of resources, 
markets and prices. In other countries, industry is the sector which 
plays an integrating role, but the volume of Bolivia's industrial 
output and the type of products manufactured show that this sector 
does not succeed in carrying out this role. 
In addition to the lack of integration of the sectors of 
production, which is in itself a serious problem, there aro other 
manifestations of structural heterogeneity, Such as the existence 
of large geo-economic areas which are potentially very rich but are 
not linked with the producer and consumer centres of most importance 
in the country. On the other hand, structural heterogeneity is 
also manifested in the coexistence of several different cultural 
patterns in which different races, languages, customs, etc., 
constitute considerable obstacles to a more harmonious and integrated 
functioning of the socio-economic system. These structural features 
in turn are the cause of considerable disparities between the urban 
centres and the rural areas, and between the strata which make u,,o 
1/ 	 According to ECLA estimates and the Memoria del Banco Central 
de Bolivia, 1973, the product per employed person in 1973, 
measured in Bolivian pesos at 1970 prices, is 1,500 in 
agriculture, 9,400 in manufacturing industry and 33,200 in 
mining and petroleum, 
/each of 
each of these categories. On,one side,are the country dwellers, 
who form the majority of the population but have no real purchasing 
power as regards industrial products; on the other are the high and 
medium-income urban groups whose demand constitutes an incentive 
only to small-scale indnstries 'Which respond to their particular 
spending ,patterns. In the circumstances, it would be difficult to 
arrive at a rapid process of industrialization which would integrate 
the different sectors of production. The narrowness of the consumer 
market, resulting mainly from the low productivity of a large part 
of the agricultural sector, is a structural obstacle to any attempt 
at industrialization. 
In view of the importance of the agricultural sector in the 
Bolivian economy, and in particular in the interpretation of inflation, 
some additional observations from the point of view of the heterogeneity 
of productivity would appear to be in 'order. The levels of production 
and the growth- rates which will be given for the agricultural sector 
in the analysis of the economy overall, are an aggregate of altiElano 
and valley output, where chronic stagnation exists, and of the outrut 
of the eastern plains where products like 'cotton, sugar cane, soybean, 
etc., have excellent aexterfial markets, emplOY more advanced 
technologies and record fairly high indexes of output and productivity. 
If agriculture as a whole shows a rate Of groWth which is considered 
to be inadequate, how much more drastic such a qualification could be 
it it only referred to the agriCulture of the altiplano and valleys 
in which the majority of the rural population works. These disparities 
should be borne in mind in the description and analysis of the 
performan e of the main sectors of the economy given below. 
This summary enumeration of the Main structural shortcomings 
suffices to weigh their importance in the economic process in Bolivia 
in their true context. The disequilibria described are, in fact, 
the principal source of a series of problems affecting the economy, 
and of course lie at the root Of a group of situational disequilibria 
which in their turn are'expreased in the form of inflationary 
pressures. 
/2. gain 
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2. Main features of the evolution of the economy 
A study of inflation in Bolivia requires the identification 
of the main macroeconomic phenomena which characterized the recent 
evolution of the country's economy. The performance of some 
variables was a direct determining factor of inflation in Bolivia; 
the disequilibria which separared the physical area of the economy 
from its financial counterpart resulted in the unbottling of strong 
pressures on prices. This section therefore endeavours to select the 
aspects of Bolivia's economic evolution most closely linked with 
the phenollenon of inflation. In this context it is useful to 
compare the main variables in 1972 and 1973 (1972 was the year of 
the initial impetus and 1973 saw the aggravation of inflation) with 
their peformance during the period 1970-1971, and in some cases 
with the last five years of the 1960s, as a basis for reference. 
Of -)articular importance is the analysis of the main movements 
of the external sector, the structure of overall supply and demand 
and the evolution of the product in the main sectors. The main 
features of the overall evolution of Bolivian economy will be 
described in terms of these aspects taken in the same order. 
(a) 	 The external sector  
The very considerable variations experienced by the external 
sector came to constitute the most important phenomenon of what has 
elapsed of the present decade. Their repercussions on the production 
function, income distribution and particularly on the future growth 
potential of the economy, confers particular importance on them, 
especially if it is recalled that tremendous importance in respect 
of the country's state of underdevelopment was attributed to the 
traditional bottlenecks in this sector. The events of recent years 
meant a change of some consideration in the scales of operation of 
external trade; in a brief period of two years, the current values 
of international transactions more than doubled. This is not just 
a matter of significant increases, but more than anything else of 
a situation different from that of the recent past in Quantitative and 
qualitative terms, as is obvious from the description given below. 
/(i) The 
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(i) The _performance of exports. The current value of exports 
• 	 •,--; 
of goods showed an extraordinary increase. A comparison of the 
annval-AVerages for the PeriOI 105-1965andefer the three-year 
period 1971-;1973 shows a growtkof 62 per' 'cent, reflecting a clearly 
defined, trencl.despitethe decline in the value of exports in 1971. 
The growth. rates of..1923 and 1974 are noteworthy; they showed an 
unprecedented increase when the value of Texportsof goods amounted 
to 337 million dollars in 19731 while various estimates for 1974 
fluctuate around 630, million 011ars (see table 1). Theselevels 
imply annual growthrates of ,40 per cent in 1973 and 104 per cent 
in 1974, and show how, the valve of exports has tripled within the 
space of two years.,, 
Im:Dortant changes may 4so be observed in the structure of 
exports of goods. While during the five-year period 1965-1969, tin, 
.which at the time was the only really ipportant,export item, accounted 
for 53 po;', cent of the total value of exports, in 1973 it. accounted 
for only 3.0.6 per cent. On the other hand, most of the other 
exports of minerals, particularly oil, increased their share 
,(see tablp- 2). 
During the first years of the .1970s a stage of diversification 
began in e:cports. A comparison of the Structure existing during 
the last decade with that of 1973 speaks for itself. Products like 
oil, natural gas, sugar and cotton, accounted for an increasing share. 
This has made it possible to rise above.Bolivia's traditional one-
export system which in the past made the country extremely vulnerable', 
to fluctuations in tin prices. Although a large proportion of the 
present ennort base is concentrated in a limited number of items, 
it indicates a definite reinforcement to external trade, especially 
if the increase in the prices of primary products is taken into 
account. 
/Table 1 
- 71+ - 
Table 1 
BOLIVIA: STRUCTURE OF EXPORTS•0F GOODS 
(Values in millions of dollars at current prices) 
J 
Products 1965 Average 1965-1969 
Average 
1971-1973 1970 1971 
1972 1973 
Tin 93.0 94.4 116:5 • 101.9 105.9 113.5 130.0 
Copper 3.5 6.9 10.2 :12.5 8.3 8.8 13.4 
Lead 5.7 5.8 6.7 , 7.8 5.9 5.8 8.3 
Zinc 4.2 4.9' 18.8• 14.3 15.3' 15.4 25.7' 
Bismuth 1.4 '1.9 40 8.o 5.8 2.6 4,4 
Tungsten 2.2 7.2 ; 11,6 17.6 13.6 ' . 10.3 ' 11.0 
Antimony 5.9 6.9 11.8 31.0 9,o 9.1 17.2 
Sulphur 0.2 1.2 .0,6 	 • 0.5.' . 	 0.3 0.5 1.1 
Silver 5.3 '8.1 9.5 10.5 8,3 7.6 12.6 
Gold 2.9 • 1.6 0.5 0.5 0.3 o.6 ... 
Crude oil 0.7 15.7 34.8 13.2 23.9 31.7 48.9 
Natural gpA3 :140 - 2/ 9.9 18.1 
Cotton fibre ' 	 7.0': 3.0 3.8 7.6 9.7 
Coffee 4,4 3.8 2.6 4,7 5.9 
Sugar 6.4 aj 0,4 12.4 
Timber 5.7 a/ 3.7 7.7 
Total 128.9  162.9  264.4 225,6  215.9  240.4 336.8  
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Table 2 
BOLIVIA: PERCENTAGE STRUCTURE OF EXPORTS OF GOODS 
Produot 1975 Average 1965..1969 
Average 
1971-1973 1970 1971 1972 1973 
Tin 72.1 57.9 . 44.1 . 452 49.1 47.2 38.6 
Copper 2.7 .4.2 3.9 5.5 3.8 3.7 4.0 
Lead 4,4 3,6: 2.5 . 	 3.5 2,7 244 2.5 
Zino 3.3 .- 3,o '74'. 6,3 '7.1 6.4 7.6 
Bismuth 1.1 1.2 1,6 ' • • 3.5  2.7 1.1 1.3 
Tungsten 1.7 4.4 4.4 • 7.8  6.3 4,3 3.3 
Antimony 4.6 4.2 4.5 13.7 4',2 3.8 5.1 
Sulphur 0.2 0.7 04.2 G.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 
Silver 4.1 5.0 '3.6 4.7 3.8 3,2 3.7 
Gold 2.2 .1.0 ' 	 0,2 	 . G.2 	 ' 0.1 0.2 ... 
Crude oil 
	 . -.0.5 5.6 13.2 • 5.9 11.1 13.2 1445 
Natural gas 5.3"a/ 4.1 5,4 
Cotton fibre - 	 2,6 ' 1.3 1.8 3.2 2.9 
Coffee . 14 1.7 1.2 2.0 . 1,8 
Sugar 2.4 Ed - 042 3.7 
Timber 2.221 1.5 .2.3 
Total 100.0 106.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Table 1. 
1./ Averages 1972-1973. 
/It should 
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It should, however, be pointed out that the above mentioned 
diversification exclusively invoivesTrimary products with a 
minimum of industrial processing. •his-constitutes a'basic feature 
in the interpretation of the entire economic process, and particularly 
in the analysis of.inflation- The export nuclei figure as severed
from the rest of the economy-, thus determining the alarming disparities 
in productivity indicated above. This-is the root of one of the 
.difficulties which prevents Bolivia from caking'full use of the wave 
of prosperity in its external sector in the last two years. 
The acceleration of the growth of export values in 1973-1974, 
and the variations in their structure,• were dete'rmined to 'a large 
extent by.the changes in international prices. 
Tal)le 3 gives. a breakdown of the price and' quantum factors 
which determined the increase in the current value of exports. It 
may be observed that in 1971 and 1972 export prices were much lower 
than in 1970, while the considerable increase iwthe export quantum 
blurred the adverse effect of the decline in these prices. The 
situation was inverted in 1973, and 1974: the export quantum increased 
by 2 per cent in 1973 and decreased by 3.3 per cent in 1974, compare:7. 
with an annual growth in prices of 33 per cent in 1973 and 111 per 
cent in 1974. These uneven variations in volume and value should 
be noted since they will serve in the analysis of inflation.. 
Table 3 
BGLIVIA: INDICES OF PRICES, QUANTUM AND 
(Base 1970 = 100) 
VALUE OF EXPORTS 
1971 1972 1973 1974 
Price index 84 87 116 245 
Quantum index 111 119 121 117 
Value index 93 104 11+0 207 
Source: MLA estimates on the basis of official statistics. 
/(ii) Evolution 
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(ii) Evolution of imports. The current value of imports 
increased steadily during the three-year period 1971-1973, with 
an annual increase of 8 per cent in 1971 and 1972 and 28 per cent 
in 1973 (see table 4). A comparison of the annual average for the 
period l,66-1970 with that of the threi-year period 1971-1973 also 
shows a steady upward trend. To judge by the rate of changes, 
however, g::.owth became more pronounced as from 1973. Preliminary 
estimates for 1974 place the current value of imports Of"goods at 
a level 7)ordering on 370 million dollars, which would imply a growth 
rate of around 57 per cent compared with 1973. The result of these 
increases was that the current value of imports of good& doubled 
in the space of two years. 
From: the point of view of the structure of imports it_iS 
noteworthy that the share of capitai.goods does - not show a more 
definite upswing. On the contrary, imports of consumer goods 
increased considerably in 1973, and their share of the total rose 
by over 25 per cent. Preliminary estimates for 1974 indicate larger7  
scale growth, especially of consumer durables, which, as is obvious,  
are destined for a small sector of the population. The dynamism of 
imports of consumer good's, to the detriment of imports of capital 
goods and intermediate products, brings to light a basic problem 
in the growth of the Bolivian economy. The relaxation of external 
constraints took a rapid and easy route to spending in the form of 
imports of consumer goods, implying an allocation of resources which 
was not in keeping with the priorities assigned by the Government 
to purely productive activities.. In addition, imports of capital. 
goods for agriculture, the economy's major sector, were worth only 
6 million dollars in 1973, which accounted for 2.3 per cent of total 
imports '(see table 4). The policy of allocating resources, -)articularly 
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EqUally imortant in this context is the estimated amount of 
smuggling, which would certainly increase if this estimate, instead 
of being 'based on foreign currency sales, were also to take into 
account illegal two-way operations,2/ - which,'',)eing illegal, do not 
necessarily imply any purchase of foreign currency. 
The variations in'the current 'value 'and in the structure of 
imports may be explained-by variations'in prices. and in quanta. 
Table 5 shows the respective indicators. The trend of import prices 
showed a sharp acceleration: 2 per cent in 1971, 6 per cent in 1972, 
10 per cent.in 1973 and  23 per cent in1974. 
Table 5 
BO L=1: INDICES OF PRICES AND QUANTUM VALUE OF IMPORTS 
(Base 1970 = 100) 
Price index 102 lo8 127 156 
Quantum'index 106 108 117 150 
Value index 108 117 149 254 
•nn• • ••• ••••••nnnnn•••  
Source: 	 on he basis of official statistics. 
The import quantum,also grew at increased rates. Of particular 
importance is the 1973 rate, which exceeded.by 3 per cent the volume 
of the previous year's imports, and the 1974 rate which resultein 
an increase of 28 per cent (see table 5). lathough these increases 
are considerable, export prices rose so much that the trade balance 
showed a surDlus in 1974 and paved the way for large-scale increases 
in _international reserves, as will be seen below. 
En:.:-nings:from illegal exports melee it.possible. to finance 
external purchases of goods which in turn are smuggled into 
the country. This traffic does not necessarily assume any 
purchase of foreign exchange in the Central Bank. 
/Estimates of 
- 80 - 
Estimates of the structure of 'imports in 1974 are still not 
available. Data of this type will be useful for evaluating to what 
extent the disappearance of the external, bottleneck meant that 
advantage had been taken of this favourable economic situation. Of 
particular importance is the performance of imports in analysing the 
imported inflation which afflicted Bolivia as from 1973. 
(iii) The blance of payments. As was seen in the foregoing 
pages, the real boom in Bolivia's external situation only.began at 
the end of 1973. Up till then, the trade balance showed a continuing 
deficit. A comparison of the average deficits for the period 1966•1970 
and those for the three-year period 1971-1973 shows that they have 
increased to a fairly considerable extent (see table 6). It should 
be noted, however, that the:deficit,:particularly,in 1973, was not 
actually due to external trade difficulties, as was the case 
traditionally. The traditional deficits were to be explained by the 
slow growth of exports whiCh did' not allOw foreign ex
-change requirements 
to be met. The situation, in 1972 and particularly in 1973 was fairly 
different; despite an, appreciable increase in exports, imports 
outstried them. In.both cases, then, the importance of the trade 
deficit has different implications. 
The heavy current •.ccount deficits are not only to be explained 
by the disequilibria of the trade balance; the sums corresponding to 
payments of profits and interests on foreign capital were also 
considerable (see table 6). These items actually accounted for 
nearly 50 per cent of the current account deficit 'during the period 
1966-1970, and around 40 per cent during the three-year period 
1971-1973. It is to be noted that in 1971 these payments on foreign 
capital were more than the current account deficit. 
The balance of the current account during the three-year period 
1971-1973 was a deficit of some consideration, of more than 50 million 
dollars on average, i.e., more than 20 per cent of the value of 
exports. In 1973 it exceeded 54 million dollars, although exports 




BOLIVIA: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Millions of dollars at current prices) 
Average 
1970 





Exports of goods and services 176.5 	 210.3 	 198.3 	 224.4 	 298.5 	 240.4 
Goods FOB 163.9 	 195.7 	 181.9 	 203.0 	 273.3 	 219.4 
Services 12.5 	 14.6 	 16.4 	 21.4 	 25.2 	 21.0 
Imports of goods and services 199.2 	 210.7 	 227.5 	 260.5 	 334.4 	 274.1 
Goods FOB 158.3 	 166.2 	 181.4 	 195.7 	 252.8 	 210.0 
Services 	 • ,, 40.844.5 	 46.1 	 64.8 	 81.6 	 64.1 
Net external investment income -19.5 	 .254 	 -17.0 	 -21.6 	 -23.2 	 -20.6 
Profits -13.1 	 -17.0 	 .8.4 	 -6.o 	 -6.5 	 -70 
Interest -6.4 	 -8.0 	 -8.6 	 -15.6 	 -16.7 	 -13.6 
Net private transfer payments 1.o 	 1.5 	 2.1 	 4.9 	 4.9 	 4.o 
Balance on current account .41.2 	 -23.9 	 -44.1 	 -52.8 	 -54.2 	 .50.4 
Capital account - 
Net external financing (asb+c*ddoe) 	 41.2 	 23.9 	 44.1 	 '52.8 	 54.2 	 50.4 
a) Net external non-compensatory capital 	 49.1 	 41.7 	 67.7 	 104.2 	 55.4 	 75.8 
Direct investment 	 -11.6 	 -75.9 	 1.9 	 -10.5 	 14.7 	 -1.3 
Long-and medium-term loans 	 66.0,, 	 , 131.2 	 • 82.6 	 140.4 	 81.6 	 101.5 
Amortization payments 	 -16.7 	 -20.4 	 -22.0 	 -30.7 	 -48.5 	 .33.7 
Short-term liabilitiei 	 1.9 	 . 	 . 4.4 	 - 0.2 	 ' 	 .-3.6 	 6.9 	 1.2 
b) Domestic non-compensatory capital 
Official transfer payments 	 9.5 	 2.4 	 5.o, 	 8.6 	 10.7 	 8.1 
or assets 	 -2.7 	 -6.1 	 1.7 	 -17.0 	 -o.4 	 -5.2 
o) Errors and omissions 	 -6,1 	 -13.0 	 -31.6 	 -33.7 	 -7.1 	 -24.1 
e) Net compensatory financing  
d) Allooation of SDRs 	 1.0 	 4.9 	 4.0 	 4.2 	 0.0 	 2.7 
(increase -) 	 -0.2 	 -3.6 	 2.3 	 -4.9 	 6.3 	 1.2 
• Source: ECLAT on the buds of official statistics. 
/The financing 
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The financing of these current account disequilibria meant 
that debts were incurred abroad; these reached appreciable amounts 
in the various years of the 1970s (see table 6). This process in 
turn generated amortization payments and interests which then in 
the course of time brought pressure to bear on the external trade 
balance.' The 1972 debt is noteworthy; it 'exceeded 140 million 
dollars, and nearly tripled the current account deficit. 
Direct investment did not reach levels of importance. The 
disinvestment to be observed in 1970 corresponded to the nationalization 
of the assets of the Gulf Oil Company. The item errors and omissions 
particularly in 1971 and 1972, reached considerable proportions; this 
balancing item summed up the lack of accurate results in other items, 
particularly the estimates on smuggling commented on above. 
Balance of payments estimates for 1974 give a current account 
surplus of 26 million dollars, and also an increase in international 
reserves of approximately 53 million dollars. The re-emergence of 
inflation during this period is closely associated with these movements, 
among other reasons because of the increase in liquidity which gave 
rise to the accumulation of reserves as will be seen below. 
The evolution of prices and quantities of exports and imports 
during the three-year period 1971-1973 resulted in an adverse effect, 
amounting to considerable sums, on the terms of trade. As may be 
seen below, the main indicators resulting from these developments, 
reveal situations which had clearly degenerated in comparison with 
1970. 
3/ 	 In order to interpret these indicators it should be recalled 
that 1970 was a period of a certain upsurge in the export prices 
of mineral products. On the other hand, it should be noted that 
in the calculation of the export price index, the structure of 
exports corresponds to 1973; the share of petroleum increased 
significantly in 1974 thus changing the structure. 
/EXTERNAL TRADE 
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EXTERNAL TRADE INDICATORS 
(Millions of dollars at 19712rices) 
1971 1.972 1973 1974 
Export ruantum 232.1 255.6 264.5 254.5 
Purchasing 7)ower of exports 194.4 207.8 235.0 400.0 
Effect .on the terms of trade -37.7 -47.8 -29.5 145.5 
Index of the terms of trade 
(1970- 100) 82 81 91 157.1 
Source: -..J3LA, 	 on the basis of official data. 
The upsurge in 1974 export prices which resulted in a positive 
effect on the terms of trade but'did not 'represent a full recoupment, 
despite the fact that forecasts for 1975 anticipate considerable 
increases in import prices. 
(b) Overall suzaLald_clel 
The Derformance of supply showed,no appreciable change if the 
period 1971-1973 is compared with the five-year period 1966-1970. 
The annual rate of growth for the first period was 5.9 per cent, and 
for the second period 5.5 per cent (see table 7). It should be 
mentioned that in 1972 and 1973 supply grew at rather faster rates 
than in 1970 and 1971. 
The drop in the growth rate of the product recorded in the 
period 1971-1973, when the annual average rate was 5.1 per cent, 
compared with 1966-1970, when the annual average rate was 6.3 per 
cent, was offset by increases in imports, the growth rate of which 
increased from an annual 3.9 per cent to 7.7 per cent between the two 
periods. During the three-year period 1971-1973, the product showed 
considerable fluctuations, while imports grew increasingly rapidly 










Annual growth rates 
1970 1971 1972 1973 
14 6o4 42 211 4.2 6.4 6.1 
Gross domestic product 
(at market prices) 12 080 6.3 5.1 5.2 3.8  6.o 5,4 
Imports 2 524 3.9 7.7 -6.1 5.8  8.1 9.2 
Total demand 14 604 
.5.12 ii:i 211 4.2 6.4 6.1 
Exports 2 504 8.6 • 7.9 -3.5 10.4 10.1 3.5 
Gross domestic investment 1 88o 5.3 40 2.2 -0.7 -11.2 27.6 
Gross fixed investment 1 666 5.9 ... 0.3 8.8 -17.8 ... 
Public 1 053 15.2 13.8 • • • • • • 
Private 613 -2.9 -16.7 • • • • • • 
Total consumption 10 220 5.4 5.2 5.0 3.5 8.6 3.7 
General Government 1 351 6.9 7.7 17.0 -7.3' 28.0 5.1+ 
Private 8 869 5.2 4.8 3.4 5.2 5.9 3.4 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of official statistics. 
/No major 
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No major changes are to be seen in the structure of supply; 
only the im-port coefficient showed a slight tendency to decrease, 
and droDDed from 23.5 per cent in 1965 to 22.1 per cent during 
the period 1969-1970 and to 2109per cent in the three-year period 
1971-1973. The low level of the imports in 1970 should be taken 
into account to give an idea of the real scope of the variations 
in rate and relative share. As.from 1973,. however, the country's 
external situation meant larger increases in this coefficient 
(see table 8). 
Of the components.of overall demand, exports showed greatest 
dynamism, but growth rates were very variable (see table 7). In 
1971 and 1972, exports exceeded the annual rate of 10 per cent, while 
in 1979. they declined and in 1973 increased by only 3.5 per cent 
compared with the previous year. The trend of the export coefficient 
is significant: it increased from 18.7 per cent in 1965 to 
21.6 per cent in the two-year period 1969-1970 and reached 22.5 per 
cent in the three-year period 1971-1973. 
Gross domestic investment fluctuated somewhat erratically with 
disinvestments in 1971 and particUlarly in 1972, and a rate of increase 
of 27.6 ,per cent in 1973. Capital formation decreaSed noticeably' 
during the period 1970-1973 compared with its performance during the 
five-year -)eriod 1966-1970. A drop in the annual rate from 5.3 per 
cent to 4.0 per cent indicates a decline which is by no means 
negligible, despite the striking recovery of 1973 (see taYla 7). 
Owing to the above trends, the investment coefficient showed a 
decline com,pared with the same periods already referred to (see table 8), 
Total consumption did not undergo important changes in the 
average rates of the periods compared. There were, however, 
fluctuations of some consideration in 1971-1973. In 1971 the growth 
rate was 3.5 per cent and in 1973 it was 3.7 per cent, contrasting 
with the growth rate recorded for 1972 which was 8.5 per cent. 
These fluctuations may be explained in the main by variations in 
Government consumption: a decrease of 7.3 per cent in 1971 vis-a-vis 
an increase of 23 per cent in 1972 (see table 7). 
"r1c1.1):1..e 8 
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Table 8 
DOL/VIAs- STRUCTURE CP TOTAL SUPPLY- AND DEMAND 2,/ 
(Percentages)  
Average Average 1965 1969-197o 1970 1971 1972 1973 1971-1973 
Total supply 123.5 122.1 120.9 121.3 121.7 122.5 121.9 
Gross domestio product 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Imports 23.5 22.1 20.9 21.3 21.7 22.5 21.9 
Total demand 123.5 122.1 120.9 121.3 121.7 122.5 121.9 
Exports 18.7 21.6 20,7 22.0 22.8 22.5 22.5 
Gross domestic investment 16.4 15,8 15.6 14,9 12.5 15.0 14.2 
Gross fixed investment 14.1 144 13.8 14.5 11.2 048,  
Public 8.2 8,4 8.7 •.• ••• ... 
Private 5.9 5.7 5.1 ... ••• ••• 
Total consumption 88.4 84,7 84.6 84.4 86.4 85.o 85.2 
General Government 10.9 10.6 11.2 10.0 12.1 12.1 11,4 
Private 77.5 74.1 73.4 74.4 74.3 72,9 73.8  
Source: Table 7, ECLA estimates. 
a/ 1970 prices. 
/Of note 
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Of note is the rate of growth of Private-Consumption which 
reached an annual rate of 4.8 per cent- in the period 1971-1973 and 
'only 34;4 -,-)61- cent in the last of- these years. Mates of this order, 
which are the result of taking the average consumption of sectors 
and peoples with very different purchasing poWer, mash particularly 
delicate situations for those strata whose incomes are close the 
abject poverty level. Total consumption showed no changes of 
importance in its share of overall demand in recent years; though 
private consumption showed a decline in 1973, its'relative importance 
was balanced by the increases in'Government consumption (see table 8). 
(c) 	 The evolution of the product by sectors  
The growth rate of the sectoral product during the three-year 
period 1971-1973are, generally speaking, lower than those of the 
five-year -Period 1966-1970 (see table 9). Of particular importance 
is the decline in the growth of the mining product, the rate of 
,which dropped from 11 per cent to 5.4 per,cent between the two periods 
referrer' to, and that of indlistry, which during the first-mentioned 
period increased at an annual rate of 6.4, per cent and during the 
three-year neriod 1971-1973 at a rate of 5.3 per cent. 
Although the agricultural product had a higher rate of 
growth (2.7 ner cent during the Period 1971-1973 compared with an 
annual 0.2 nor cent during the five-year period 1966-1970), its 
rates of growth have been, generally speaking, rather lower than 
that of the population. Since this sector is the most importnant 
in the country's economy, its lack of dynamism severely affects 
overall growth and as will be seen below cnnstitutes one of the 
deepest-rooted causes of inflation in Bolivia. 
Among the goods-producing sectors the only activity which 
showed some dynamism - was the construction sector, which increased 
its growth rate of 1.8 per cent during the five-year period 1966-1970 
to 6.4 ner cent during the three-year period 1971-1973. 
/Ta7ple 9 
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Table 9 





Annual growth rates 
1970 1971 1972 1973 
Agriculture 1 901.1 0.2 2,7 4,4 4,o 2.0 2.1 
Mining 1 670.0 11.0 5.4 5.2 4.2 9.1 3.0 
Manufacturing 1 446,4 6,4 5.3 5,4 2.8 6.7 6.5 
Construction 507.0 1.8 6.4 
-3.7 4.1 8.0 7,2 
Subtotal goods 5 524.5 1112 4.6 4.1 3.8 5.12 4.0 
Electricity, gas, water, 
and sanitary services 218.0 11,1 8.4 7,4 6.9 8.8 	 . 9.6 
Transport and 
communications 995.5 5,6 4,4 2.6 3.3 4,8 5.0 
Subtotal basic. services 1 213.5 6,2 11 3.4 4.o 5....5 12.. 
Commerce and finance 1 265.4 7.1 5.1 1.6 1.9 6,4 7.0 
Ownership of dwellings 978.0 9.3 6.9 10.7 163 10.5 6.6 
Government 1 021.0 7.0 6,o 8.5 6,3 3.6 8,2 
Misoellaneous services 1 231.6 11.2 4.7 10.8 4.3 4,9 4,8 
Subtotal other services 4 496.0 8.6 4C'- 215 4.1 6.2 45. 
Total 11 234.0  61 5.21 5•2 2111 6.0 5alt 
Source: ECLAT on the basis of official statistics. 
/In the 
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In the basic services sector it should be mentioned that 
the electricity, gas, water and sanitary services sectors..showed 
rates of growth on average higher than those of all the sectors 
of the economy during the three-year period 1971-1973, although. - 
the rate was appreciably lower than that of the five-year period 
1966-1970. The transport and communications sector, which is of 
vital im2ortance in view of the geography of Bolivia, was another 
activity whose growth rate decreased, although there was some 
degree of recovery in 1972 and 1973 (see,table 
The loss of dynamism spread to all the services sectors 
between the periods compared. The annual growth rate for these 
as a whole was 8.6 per cent during the period 1966-1970, and only,  
5.6 per cent during the three-year period 1971-1973. As may be 
observed, in 1972 and 1973 the growth rates of the majority of 
these activities were higher than those of 1971. 
The trend of the different sectors of the economy was towards 
a fairly generalized loss of dynamism which no doubt constituted 
fertile ground for the growth of'inflation in Bolivia. 
Reference was made above to the structural factors which 
slow down development and feed the roots of the inflationary 
process. Care should be taken here in analysing the structure of 
_the gross,-.;)roduct, which clearly, illustrates the lack of integration 
in the Bolivian economy -(see table-10). One of the moststriking. - 
facts is the small share of the industrial, sector. Its contribution 
to the product does not exceed 13 per cent, and has remained 
unchanged since 1965. This marked stability in the share of a 
sector called upon to integrate and reactivate the economy indicates 




BOLIVIA: STRUCTURE OF THE GROSS DCPIESTIC PRODUCT BY SECTORS OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 
(Percentages) 
1965 Average 1966-1970 1970 1971 1972 1973 
Average 
1971-1973 
Agriculture 22.8 19.0 16.9 17.0 16.3 15.8 16.4 
Mining 12.0 14.6 14.9 14.9 15.3 15.0 15.1 
Manufacturing 12.8 12.9 12.9 12.8 12.8 13.0 12.9 
Construction 5..6 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.6 
Subtotal goods 53.2 51.1 49.2 49.1 49.1 481.2 !@A2 
Electricity, gas, water 
and sanitary services 1.6 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 2,1 2.1 
Transport and 
communications 
















Commerce and finance 11.4 11.3 11.1 11.1 11.3 11.1 
Ownership of dwellings 7.6 8.0 8.7 8.7 9.1 9.2 9.0 
Government 8.8 8.9 9.1 9.3 9.1 9.3 9.2 
Miscellaneous services 8.8 9.8 11.0 11.0 10.9 10.8 10.9 
Subtotal other services p6.1 38.1 40.0 40.1 40.2 40.6 lipja 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Sources Table 9. 
a/ The absolute values which gave rise to these percentages are expressed in pesos at 1970 prices. 
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As a result of its slow growth, the agricultural sector 
showed a decrease in its contribution to the product: 22.0 per 
cent in 1965, 19 per cent on average-in the five-year period 
1966-1970, coming
-to a head. with 15.0 per cent in 1973 These 
coefficients and the obstacles of-a structural nature which affect 
the agricultural sector, make further analyses unnecessary in 
order once again to point out that it is herb that the root of 
a great Dart of the country'.s underdevelopment is to be found, 
and that it constitutes the main source of disequilibria which 
take the form of inflationary preasures. 
The mining sector slightly increased its relative share, 
while:that of the construction sector rammedstable. The goods-
producing sector had a smaller share ih. the whole during the three-
year period 1971-1973 (40.9 per cent) than during the period 
1966-1970'(51.1 per cent). The sectors producing basic services 
did not undergo any changes, while the share of tertiary activities, 
which are less important to the.country's development, increased.- 
For the purposes of the description of inflation begun in' 
the next chapter, and with 'a view to placing in order of importance 
the problems of the funCtioning of economic activity in-Bolivia, 
it should be pointed out that, as has been already suggested, 
the virtual standstill in the agricultural sector and the poor 
tempo of economic activity in the industrial sector are - the'most 
far-reaching problems, to the extent of preventing any real 
advantage being taken of the dynamism of the external sector; 
the descri-xtion of the re-emergence of inflation in Bolivia will 
come back to',thi8 point. 
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C. THE INFLATIONA,ff P2OCESS IN BOLIVIA 
1. Perspective 
 1122EA9ds  and phases 
In order to study the current inflationary cycle in Bolivia 
which started in mid-1972, some data which help to interpret this 
new inflationary process must be taken into account. 
During the whole of the 1960s and up to the middle of 1972, 
domestic price trends were exceedingly stable. This long period of 
stability was directly attributable to the agents of the economic 
process, although it will be recalled that it was preceded by a period 
of acute inflation and chronic shortages in the years 1953-1953. In 
other words, between 1950 and 1972 Bolivia had experienced completely 
opposite phenomena: great stability and runaway inflation. The 
behaviour of consumers and producers, of entrepreneurs and wage-earners, 
from October 1972 onwards is accounted for by such contrasting 
experiences. It is necessary to assess the true dimension of-this 
type of eminently qualitative factor in attempting to explain inflation 
in recent years, which clearly had some very special features. 
The existence of such pronounced cycles of stability and 
inflation would seem to be linked with a special form of operation of 
socio-economic activity within the context of marked structural 
heterogeneity, as noted above. In fact, structural heterogeneity is 
a hey factor in analysing both types of situations: stability and 
inflation. The external, internal or combined situations of 
disequilibria are reflected in pressures on prices rather than in 
correlative structural changes, precisely because of the production 
apparatus' limited capacity to respond and, in particular, the 
inflexible nature of agricultural supply, which undoubtedly constitutes 
the essence of structural heterogeneity in the economic sphere. The 
two attempts made to reactivate the economy through public expenditure 
(in 1952 and 1972) resulted for this reason in acute inflation. 
Conversely, the long period of stability starting in 1959 and 
ending in 1972 was basically the outcome of the structural heterogeneity 
itself and of the socio-political controls on pressure groups, although 
/at the 
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at the expense of little change in the basic economic structure and 
the attainment of fairly mediocre rates Of growth. With these- • 
sacrifices' and' Such an expedient, It'was not difficult in the 
circumstances to control price levels throughout 'most of the period 
concerned. Contrary to what happens in more industrialized countries, 
the lack of co-ordination in the economic system prevents the 
diSequilibria occuring 'separately ii the various 'activities from 
spreading too easily to the rest of the system, which, paradoxically 
enough, is an advantage if •the'objectives are confined to the 
achievement of 'stability. .Accordingly,' in'the period 1969-1971 when 
attempts were made to attain other additional objectives, the 
maintenance of Price levels entailed a much stricter management of the 
whole financial system, limiting the possibilities of greater economic 
growth. 
Although the recent inflation in Bolivia differs in nature from 
previous inflationary cycles, the explanation for it is again mainly 
the unco-ordinated type of structure which, as well'as being the basic 
factor of inflation, is propitious groUnd for the spread, in both 
scope and depth, of another type of internal and external diSequilibria 
in economic activity, as will be seen below. 
The kind of perspective suitable for a study of this inflationary 
process requires, however, that stress be laid on the following 
questions which have already been described in the development of the 
overall economy: the problems facing the agricultUral sector, the 
backward state of industry and external sector trends. 
It will be reCalld that agriculture is the main productive 
activity of_the Bolivian economy, its contribution to the product 
- while showing significant reductions in recent-years - still 
represents annual proportions of around 16 per cent, and about two-
thirds of the-labour force is engaged in agricultural activities. It 
is easy to see the effect of its virtual stagnation on price trends; 
the type of goods this sector produces is closely associated with 
basic food consumption. 
/It must 
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It must be borne in mind that industry is of little importance 
as a productive activity and that the composition of manufacturing 
output mainly responds to demand from the higher-income strata. 
Processing methods are fairly primitive and growth is achieved at the 
expense of heavy dependence on imports of raw materials. 
The evolution of the external sector in recent years is another 
crucial factor in interpreting Bolivia's inflation. As was also shown 
in the previous section, the extraordinary increase in price of most 
export and import items led to an external relations situation which, 
as will shortly be seen, had a direct and indirect incidence on the 
inflationary process. 
2. Overall view 
As stated previously, following a long period of stability, a 
new inflationary cycle was initiated in Bolivia in the middle of 1972. 
Table 11 shows the contrast between the price increases in both periods. 
It will be noted that in 1972 the rate of price variations showed an 
increase over the previous three-year period, although being comparisons 
of annual averages, the prices still did not reflect the proportions 
they were likely to reach after the phenomenon itself. In 1973 the 
rate was already significant and available data for the first eight 
months of 1974 indicate that an even faster increase may be expected. 
The figures in table 12 show more precisely that the start of the 
recent inflation was in the second half of 1972, and more clearly 
reflect the acceleration process. Prices rose during that period by 
4/ 	 It is difficult to classify an inflationary process on the basis 
of only one price index which, moreover, is clearly inadequate 
as an indicator of inflation. The more so if an attempt is made 
to interpret a process that is more complex than previous 
inflationary cycles, the full effects of which have still to be 
felt. To analyse a past phenomenon, of which the complete cycle 
of development and effects are known, is very different from 
analysing one which is just starting, of which only the broadest 
effects are known in the light of such scant information. 
Therefore, the various quantitative assessments made in this 
study must be taken only as rough figures which are not as accurate 
as might have been desired. It is not possible to elucidate a 
number of phenomena, particularly those related to the differences 
between producer, wholesale and consumer prices, which reflect 
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Periods Housing Clothing 
Half- 
General yearly 
index 	 vari- 
ation 
Half- 	 Half 
yearly Miseel- yearly 
vari- laneous vari- 
ation 
	 ation 
December 1970 127.6 - 137.0 - 128,0 - 112.2 - 107.2 - 
June 1971 128.2 0.4 136.7 -0,2 131.1 2.4 113.7 1.3 107.9 0,6 
December 1971 131.8 2,8 141.6 3,6 133.5 1.8 117.3 3.2 107.9 0.0 
June 1972 132,1 0,2 140.2 -0.9 136.7 2.4 119.4 1.8 109.9 1.9 
December 1972 162.9 23.3 175.9 25.5 151.6 10.9 152.5 27.7 137.5 25.1 
June 1973 169,4 40 180.8 2.8 158,4 4.5 162,6 6,6 146.1 6.3 
December 1973 219,5 29.6 254.7 40,9 172.1 8.6 202.1 24.3 159.2 9,0 
June 1974 302.6 37.9 378.1 48,4 187.6 9.0 248,2 22,8 202,0 26.9 
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Table 12 
BOLIVIA: CONSUMER PRICE INDEX 
(Base 1966 = 100) 
Source: National institute of Statistics. 
/23.3 leer 
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23.3 per cent in contrast with the small increases in the index for 
previous six-month periods. The six-monthly variations from June 1973 
onwards clearly show the inflationary spiral. 
Although the price increases leave no room for doubt regarding 
the virulence of the inflation, the significant changes in the price 
system, in their turn, constitute another peculiar feature of the 
phenomenon. The price trends of the various components of the index 
show considerable disparities. Whereas food prices rose by 90.6 per 
cent between the base period and 1973, the increases in housing and 
miscellaneous items were 50.6 and 47.5 per cent, respectively, over 
the same period, and in clothing 72.3 per cent (see table 11). 
Although these variations reflect considerable changes in the price 
system, it must be borne in mind that they are the result of comparing 
averages for groups of products. The disparities in price variations 
for the individual products are much greater. 
The changes in the price system became more pronounced from 1973 
onwards, as may be noted from the six-monthly variations in the different 
components of the index (see table 12). The increases in food prices 
in the last two half-year periods are twice those for clothing and five 
times those for housing. In view of the size, persistence and 
progressive nature of the variations in relative prices, there, is reason 
to think that the indicator used (the only one available) does not 
faithfully reflect the real variation, or that the market mechanisms, 
which are generally sensitive to this type of phenomenon, are not 
operating as efficiently as is usually believed, since price controls 
have gradually lost ground to the laws of supply and demand. This is 
a situation which merits a thorough field investigation since, however 
serious the limitations of the index, it does convey an idea of 
situations connected with the functioning of economic activity, 
particularly its structural rigidity, which would enable progress to,  
be made in diagnosing Bolivia's inflation. 
/The above-mentioned 
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The above-mentioned changes in the price system and the rise in 
prices indicate the depth and complexity of Bolivia's inflationary 
process and its recent acceleration. The Government's efforts to 
control it have not so far produced the desired results. Note the 
progressively higher six-monthly rates of increase in prices: 30 per 
cent in the second half of 1973 and 38 per cent in the first half of 
1974. The increase between June 1973 and June 1974 was 79 per cent 
(see table 12). 
The following is an attempt to describe the development of this 
process and to identify the inflationary factors and the mechanisms 
reproducing the price increases. For this purpose, two phases in the 
last cycle of Bolivia's inflation may be distinguished. The first, 
covering 1972 and the early months of 1973, and the second, comprising 
the second half of 1973 up to the present (they can both be clearly 
identified in table 12). As will be seen later, each of these phases 
developed in a different context: the first responded to essentially 
internal factors, and the second to inflationary stimuli from abroad 
as well. It is worthwhile to emphasize, howeverl that in both these 
phases structural factors were an underlying constant, added to which 
was a different type of factors that acted as detonators in a latent 
explosive situation. In the first phase, the economic structure could 
not withstand the internal situations of disequilibrium and the 
interpretation of inflation is clear. The second phase, on the other 
hand, represents a complex inflationary situation in which the phenomeno 
operates with all its ingredients, i.e., situations of disequilibrium, 
structural rigidity and imported inflation, acting upon and 
simultaneously and mutually influencing one another. 
(a) First phase of inflation 
 
The first phase of the recent inflationary process derived 
primarily from internal factors: a sudden monetary expansion which, 
because of the serious structural problems confronting the country, 
was not accompanied by a similar growth in the real supply of goods 
and services. As will be seen later, the Government's attempts to 
reactivate the economy and achieve more accelerated growth by increasing 
/public expenditure 
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public expenditure and granting the private.sector exceptionally 
favourable credit facilities caused disequilibria which unleashed 
a new inflationary process in Bolivia. 
By the middle of 1972 a series of financial pressures clearly 
pointed to an upswing of domestic prices. • The liquidity which had 
been injected into the system did not result in a parallel increase 
in the real supply of goods and services. The first symptom of this 
disequilibrium was the steady decline in international reserves caused 
mainly by essentially speculative operations and only secondarily by 
larger imports of goods that would really cover domestic needs. The 
monetary pressure to which the economy was subjected made it clear that 
a change in the value of the dollar was to be expected shortly. In 
fact, purchases of foreign exchange by the private sector in August, 
September and October 1972 were 31.4 per cent higher than those 
effected in the same months of 1971.5/ 
In the face of the imminent exhaustion of international reserves 
at the end of October 1972, exchange parity was raised from 11.33 to 
20 Bolivian pesos to the dollar.6/ This devaluation is an important 
milestone in the first phase of the inflationary process. To 
understand it better, and in view of the considerable effect of this 
measure on the subsequent course of inflation, it is useful to review 
the main financial movements which took place in the months prior to 
devaluation. Table 13 shows the main components of the monetary 
balance and their variations over the period concerned. Monetary 
resources increased by 24.3 per cent during this period, as a result 
of increments of 20.4 and 53.5 per cent in money and quasi-money, 
respectively, which from a quantitative standpoint are the most 
important items. Counterpart funds V dropped by 30 per cent and 
other items showed an increase of 20 per cent (see table 13). The 
24.3 per cent rise in total liquidity was due to an increase of 
31.7 per cent in domestic credit. The private sector increased its 
credit by 44.2 per cent, and the public sector by 23.3 per cent, both 
rates being substantially higher than the previous annual increases. 
Banco Central de Bolivia, Memoria. 
6/ 	 Economic Survey of 
 
National currency counterpart funds for United States government 
credits. 
/Table 13 
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Table,13 
BOLIVIA: MONETARY BALANCE_ 














Struoture of monetary resources 
(overall liquidity) 2 473.3 100.0 3 074.2' 100.0 24.3 
Money (means of payment) 1 567.6 63.4 1 888.0 61.4 20.4 
Quasi-money 
 437.4 17.7 6744 21.8 53.5 
Counterpart funds 93.7 3.8 65.4 2.2 
-3003 
Other items (net) 374.6 15.1 449.4 .14.6 20.0 
Factors of expansion and contraction 2 473.2 100.0 3 074.6 100.0 24.3 
International reserves 181.8 7.4 57.4 1.9 -68.4 
Credits 2 291.4 92.6 3 017.2 98.1' 31.7 
a) To the Government 1 376.5.  55.7 1 697.6 55.2 23.3 
b) To the private sector 914.9 36.9 1 319.6 42.9 44.2 
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, November 1974. 
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Although the sharp reduction in international reserves, which 
was more acute in October 1972, acted as a factor of contraction, its 
small share in the total caused the financial picture to change only 
marginally. These sequences in the financial movements necessarily 
led to one of two crucial options: exchange control or devaluation. 
The seriousness of the financial situation and the important part 
played by the private sector in the adoption of decisions resulted in 
a modification of the exchange rate. 
A 63 per cent devaluation of Bolivia's currency was bound to 
have a tremendous impact on the performance of the country's economic 
activity, which is heavily dependent on imported supplies. If, moreover, 
it is recalled that the exchange rate had not been altered since 1959 
and that prices, in general, had been very stable, it will be understood 
that the effects of such a measure caused an upheaval in the whole 
economic and financial apparatus. As a result of this decision, 
domestic prices suffered violent increases, which must also be ascribed 
to subjective motivations in an atmosphere hypersensitized by the 
memory of the inflationary cycle in the 1950s which had had serious 
repercussions on the population's standard of living. In the eyes of 
producers and consumers, devaluation destroyed the principal symbol of 
confidence in the financial management. Keeping the exchange rate 
unchanged for 13 years had come to represent a general indicator of 
stability, even for sectors unrelated to the financial markets, far 
Greater qualities being ascribed to it than it really merited. Such 
a drastic change seriously altered the behaviour of the agents of the 
economic process, which accounts for that initial period of upswing 
in prices. 
The group of economic policy measures adopted simultaneously with 
the change in parity, particularly wage controls, and the lessening of 
the initial pressures tended to moderate the rise in prices. The 
consumer price index recorded an increase of 24 per cent in the month 
following devaluation, whereas in the first few days the increases 
were over 50 per cent and some as high as 100 per cent./ 
_3/ 	 It will be recalled that the increases shown by this index are 
underestimates of the real variations over the short term. 
/External aid 
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External aid. and contingency credit from the International 
Honetary.rund, which were granted simultaneously with the devaluation, 
strengthened the reservesposition. At the same time, the new single 
and -fixed•parity and the elimination of. controls on the unlimited 
purchase of foreign exchange were an. attempt to re-establish general 
confidence, which had effects. only in:the short term.. Thus, the 
price index•showed a small increase in the first half of 1973.. 
The monetary balance at the end of 1972 compared with that for 
1971 reflected more clearly, on the one hand, the sharp_increases-in 
overall liquidity and, on the. other, the strengthening of reserves 
owing to the above-mentioned credit. , In 1972, monetary-resources 
rose by 43.1 per cent asa result of increases.in all their components, 
including counterpart funds which went up at a rate of 310.3 per cent 
(see table 14). The extraordinary increase in total liquidity was due 
to the expansion of credit that year to both the public and the private 
sector, at races of 21.2 and 39.2 per cent respectively,, which are 
.significantly higher than in ,previous.years. Similarly, there was a 
considerable.expansion..of national currency due to. the-increase of 
'193.1. per cent in international reserves„, whose share among the, factors 
of expansion'rose from 3.3 per eent, in 1971 to 13.2 per cent in 1972 
-(see. table 14). 
It is useful now to .examine the reasons why the monetary. 
expansion reached these. proportions. The first was the increasing 
deficit in the fiscal budget, of which the main source of financing 
was currency issues by the Central Bank;..the second, was the pressure 
brought to bear, by the private sector to. obtain bank financing, which 
was granted by virtue of the development policy that anticipated 
a vigoroUs., production response from this sector. 
/Table 14 
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Table 14 
BOLIVIA: MCNETARY BALANCE 
(Millions of pesos at current prices and balances at end of each period) 
Structure of monetary resources 
1969 Rate 1970 Rate 1971 Rate 1972 Rate 
(global liquidity) 2 002.2 5.2 2 363.4 18.0 2 751.5 16.4 3 937.5 43.1 
Maxey (means of payment) 1 361.2 5.8 1 532.3 12,6 1 765.6 15.2  2 210.1 25.2 
Quasi-money 305.9 35.7 382.1 24.9 493.1 29.0 634.2 28,6 
Counterpart funds 120.8 -447 146.9 21.6 116.0 -21.0 476.5 310.8 
Other items (net) 214,3 19,3 302.1 41.0 376.8 24.7 616.7 63.7 
Factors of expansion and 
contraction 2 002.2 5.2 2 363.4 18.0 2 751.4 16.4 3 937.5 43.1 
International reserves 237.7 8,8 292.6 23.1 241.0 -17.6 718.4 198.1 
Credits 1 764,5 4.7 2 070.8 17.4 2 510,4 21.2 3 219.1 28,2 
(a) To the Government 1 125.5 0.9 1 294,5 15.0 1 532.9 18,4 1 858.1 21.2 
(b) To the private sector 639.0 12.1 776.3 21.5 977.5 25.9 1 361.0 39.2  
Structure (percentages) 
Factors of expansion and 
contraction 100.0 100.0 190.0 100.0 
International reserves 11.9 12,4 8.8 18.2 
Credits 88.1 87.6 91.2 81,8 
Credits 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
(a) To the Government 63.8 62.5 61.1 57.7 
(b) To the private sector 36,2 37.5 38.9 42.3 
Source: International Financial Statistics, november 1974, 
/Table 15 
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Table 15 shows the variations in the items which gave rise to 
these deficits in the 1972 fiscal'year. Budget income rose by 
13.7 per cent, and expenditure bY'299 per cent. A noteworthy fact 
is the small growth of taX collections-and the- signifidant increase 
in Personal services.; materials and supplies, and in fixed and 
financial assets. This uneven growth of income and expenditure 
resulted in a deficit amounting to 32.2 per cent of' total income in 
1972, which meant
- an 84 per:cent increase over the 1971 deficit. 
About 93 . per cent of this deficit was financed with credit from the 
Central Bank, or, in effect through currency issues. It will be noted 
that the deficit relates only to the current account of the fiscal 
budget; the total deficit,-which includeth. the capital account, was 
double that, amounting to 923 million Bolivian pesos, or 67 per cent 
higher than in 1971.9/ 
The increase in credit to the private sector referred to above 
was the other factor with distinctly inflationary repercussions. A 
groWth of 39.2 per cent in this variable was bound to create short
,  
term inflationary pressures, 'particularly if it had. no direct or"  
immediate counterpart in the way-Of bigger imports or domestic 
production. 
If the increases in total liquidity, especially those deriving 
froth the expansion of credit, are compared with the real trend of 
economic activity, particularly the supply of goods, it is not 
surprising that the system itself should have found its own natural 
corrective mechanisms, first in the reduction of reserves (up to 
October 1972) and then in drastic changes in the system and level of 
prices. In fact, in the face of d_43 per cent increase in total 
• 
liquidity in 1972, the product grew by 6 per cent in real terms and 
imports by 8.1 per cent, which represents an increase of only 6.4 per 
cent in supply (see table 7). Such disparities inevitably provided 
fertile ground for definite inflation. 
CIAP Sub-Committee on Bolivia, El esfuszoiaternoLla,LIece-
sidades de financiamiento extern() ,oara el desarrollode Bolivia, 




BOLIVIA: BUDGETARY OPERATIONS 
(Millions of Bolivian pesos) 




Income 1 070.2 1 120.4 1 330.0 21,1 
Internal revenue 399.3 511.7 565.3 10.5 
Customs revenue 418.0 377.1  418.2 10.9 
Revenue from medium- and small-scale 
mining 174.2 47.5 43.1 .-.9.3 
Revenue from petroleum production 2.7 53.5 68.9 2.8 
Other income 76.0 130.6 234.5 79.6 
Expenditure 1 248.7 1 353.4 1 758.7 _2.2:2 
Personal services 675.1 832.0 1 009.5 21.3 
Non-personal services, materials 
and supplies 157.2 152.7 224.4 47.0 
Fixed and financial assets 16.9 6.7 19.0 183.6 
Public debt 169.5 192.4 293.5 52.5 
Current and oapital transfers 227.5 160.9 174.8 8.6 
Other expenditure 2.5 8.7 37.5 331.0 
Deficit 178.5 233.0 428.7 34.0 
Financing 
External credit 17.9 18.5 28.4 53.5 
Central Bank credit 155.5 220.0 398.0 80.9 
Balance of previous period 17.6 12.5 18.1 44.7 
Balance at and of period 12.5 18.0 15.8 -12.2 




	 Acceleration of inflation 
The middle of 1973 marked another point of inflexion in Bolivia's 
-inflation, since the consumer price index rose by 29.6 per cent in the 
second half of the year. The acceleration of inflation continued 
'unabatedi• with the same index showing price increases of 37,9 per cent 
kn the first half of 1974 (see table 12). 
In this second phase of the recent inflation in Bolivia, the 
inflationary pressures deriving from the grbwing liquidity in the 
'economy are still active, but in addition there are appreciable 
external inflationary "pressures which find a propitious field for 
reproducing themselves locally. These two influences are examined 
'below. 
From the standpoint of total liquidity in the economy, it will 
be noted that its most important components - money and quasi-money - 
increased by 34.3 and 27.2 per cent respectively in 1973, maintaining 
their accelerated rate of growth. In contrast, counterpart funds and 
other items decreased appreciably, but, because of their Smaller share 
in the total, they failed to counteract the expansion .of money and 
jivasi-moneT(see table 16). Therefore, monetary'reSources grew by 
13.1 per cent is 1973. .1n. vietrcr this -apP6rently IciVirate, which is 
below that of previbus periodsl . two warnings are necessary. First, it 
represents an increase over a reference period in which there was 
already exceptional liquidity. It is not easy to determine how far 
the increased liquidity observed at the end of 1972 was absorbed by 
the economic system, in particular by prices, in the first few months 
of 1973. It will be recalled that prices rose by only 4 per cent in 
the first half of that year. Furthermore, the 13.1 per cent increase 
in monetary resources was the result of a combination of the growth of 
components with a greater degree of liquidity (money and quasi-money) 
and .reductions in those with a lesser degree of liquidity (counterpart 
funds and other items) (see table 16). 
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Table 16' 
BOLIVIA: MONETARY BALANCE 
(Millions of pesos at current prices and balances at end of each period)' 
Structure .0.; 
	 resources 




(global liquidity) 3 937.5 	 . 43.1 4 452.* 13.1 5 641.7 26.7 
Money (means of,payment) 2 210.1 	 25,2 2 968.9 34.3 3 639.3 22.6 
Quasi-money 634,2 	 28,6 806.9 27,2 988.6 22.5  
Counterpart funds 476.5 	 310.8 95.0 .800 340.6 258,5 
Other items (net) 616,7 	 63,7 581.2 . -5.8 673.2 15.8 
Faotors of expansion and contraction 3;937.5. 	 43.1 4 452.0 13.1 5 641.7 26.7 
International reserves 718.4 	 198,1 228.7 -68,2 1 734.7 658.5 
Credits 3 219.1 	 28,2 4 223.3 31.2 3 907.0 -7.5 
(a) To the Government 1 058.1 	 21.2 1 934.9 4.1 1 c44,0 -460 
(b) To the private sector 1 361.0 	 39.2 	 • 2 288.4 68.1 2 863.0 25.1 
Structure (percentages) 
Factors of expansion and contraction 100,0 100.0 100.0 
International reserves 1862 5.1 30.7 
Credits 81,8 94.9 69.3 
Credits' 1000 100.0 100.0 
(a) To the Government 57.7 45.8 26.7 ' 
(b) To the private sector 42,3 54,2 73.3 
Sources 111F, International Financial Statistics, November 1974. 
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In the first half of 1974, total liquidity once again increased 
appreciably. It will be noted that monetary resources rose by 
26.7 per cent in this. period as a result of significant increases in 
all their components (see table 16). 
Monetary -expansion in 1973 was mainly due to the expansion of 
credit, which reached the rate of 31.2 per cent, exceeding the rates 
in previous years. What stands out once again is the extraordinary 
increase in credit to the private sector (68 per cent), while credit 
to the Government rose by only 4.1 per cent. The sharp drop in 
international reserves to one-third of their value over the period 
of one year acted as an important factor of contraction. In fact, 
thi6 decrease meant the sterilization of about 500 million Bolivian.  
pesos, which represented 67 per cent. of the increase in money in 1973 
(see table 16). 
The factors of expansion and contraction followed opposite trends 
in the first half of 1974. Reserves trebled, while credit dropped by 
7.5 per cent over the six months, as a result of a decrease of about 
46 per cent in credit to the Government and the continued increase at 
• a rate of over 25 per cent in credit to the private sector. 
Monetary expansion in this second phase of inflation in Bolivia 
was mainly attributable, as stated previously, to the extraordinary 
expansion of credit to the private sector. The Government's development 
policy has openly supported private entrepreneurial activity. In this 
respect, it is highly illuminating to compare the amount and proportion 
of credit assigned 'to the privatesector at the end of 1972 with the 
.position in June .1974. Whereas in 1972 it amounted to 977.5 million 
Bolivian pesos, or 42.3 per cent of total credit, in June 1974 it had 
risen to 2,863 million Bolivian pesos and its share was 73.3 per cent 
of the total; conversely, the Government's share of total credit 
decreased considerably (see tables 14 and 16). No more data is 
required to conclude that the monetary expansion was mainly in favour 
of the private sector. The increases in credit which successively 
benefited private activity already as from the end of 1971 were so 
/accelerated that 
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accelerated that they could not- hUt'haVe repercussions in terms of 
inflation. The tren6 Of.--thi&Nariahle 	 •Clear expression of the 
Governmentls development-policy, which firmly- supported the—
strengthening of private enterprise. 
The - financial behaviour of the Treasury was another exacerbating 
factor of the inflationary process. 
Table 17 summarizes the fiscal position. Current income rose by 
85.7 per cent and expenditure by only 57.3 per cent. The increase in 
,
.income is basically due- to the high prices of" export CoMmOdities 
(particularly mining products, petroleum and gas), which meant 
eXceptiondl increases in production:royalties and export taxes'. The 
smaller increase in expenditure is largely attributable to the wages 
.policy under which only moderate Wage and salary adjustments were 
granted. . It will be noted that the increase in personal services was 
only 31.9 per cent and that, if the recruitment of new government 
officials is subtracted from this, the increase in wages and salaries 
was considerably lower, while in the same year consumer prices went 
up by 35 per cent. In spite of this austerity in connexion with 
wages and salaries and the higher-tax revenue obtained, itvas not 
possible to avoid a deficit in the fiscal budget. The current account 
deficit was 298 millionBo1iyian..pesos in 1973. (12par_centpfthe total, 
fiscal. revenue for that year)..' Althoughlower than in theprevious 
financial year, it continued to represent one of the important reasons 
for currency issues, with their sequel in terms of inflation. 
It should be noted, however, that it was not only the fiscal 
deficit and its financing by means of currency issues that spurred on 
inflationary pressures. An increase of 57.3 per cent in expenditure 
in so rigid a structure as that of the Bolivian economy also caused 
disequilibria between supply and demand and, therefore, exerted 
pressures on prices. It will be noted that the considerable increase 
in income which made such a growth of expenditure possible is . 
mainly attributable to royalties in respect of exports of mining 
products, petroleum and gas, the export prices of which had soared. 
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Table 17 
BOLIVIA: BUDGETARY OPERATIONS 








Income 1 330.0 2 469.4 ilia 2 635.2 
Internal revenue 565.3 769.4 36.1 687.3 
Customs revenue 418.2 517.4 23.7 427.6 
Mining revenue 43.1 190.7 342.5 488.6 
Revenue from gas and petroleum 68.9 278.6 304.4 393.7 
Other income 234.5 713.3 204.2 
Expenditure 1 758.7 2 767.3 2-12 2 705.6 
Personal services 1 009.5 1 331.7 31.9 1 207.0 
Non-personal cervices, materials 
. and supplies 224.4 361.9 61.3 268.2 
Fixed and financial assets 19.0 113.6 497.8 62.3 
Public debt 2936 412.4 40.5 485.8 
Current and capital transfers 174.8 473.8 171.1 . 	 467.3 
Other expenditure 37.5 73.9 97.0 215.0 
Deficit 428.7 297.9 -30.5 70.4 
Financiang 
External credit 28.4 31.0  9.2 
Central Bank credit 398.0 384.0 
-3.5 
Balance of previous period 18.1 15.8 12.7 132.9 
Balance at end of period 15.8 132.9 741.1 62.5 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Office of the Under-Secretary of Financial Administration. 
/This fact 
This fact was particularly important because the increase in fiscal 
revenue did not lead to a contraction in spending power in the economic 
system, but rather to increases in liquidity through the purchase of 
foreign exchange from exporting concerns. 
In the light of the economic situation in the first nine months 
of 1973, the prospects for the final balance were decidedly gloomy. 
In October of that year the current account deficit was estimated at 
960 million Bolivian pesos (then 4o per cent of estimated income), 
which was over three times the deficit actually shown at the end of 
the year. The prices of export commodities distinctly benefited the 
public finances, which would otherwise have had to face pressing 
problems. 
Be that as it may, the inflationary process was strongly 
influenced by the difficult situation in the earlier months. The 
monetary balances recorded at the end of the year, particularly as 
they underwent significant changes in the last quarter, conceal 
intermediate situations which it is useful to consider because they 
determined domestic price trends. Suffice it to say that Central Bank 
credit to the Government at the end of September. 1973 was 18 per cent 
higher than at the end of 1972, and three months later it was only 
4.1per cent over the same figure. The change in the fiscal situation in 
those last three months obviously mitigated the quantitative impact 
of the liquidity recorded previously, but the motivations, both 
objective and subjective, of the agents of the economic process were 
more influenced by the expansionist situation in the first part, of 
the year than by the balances at the end. 
As in the first phase of inflation, the extraordinary liquidity 
experienced by economic activity could scarcely,be absorbed without 
drastic chances in the system and increases in , prices. If indexes of 
monetary expansion in that period are compared with the indicators of 
the real increase in, the supply of goods, it will be seen that the 
real product grew by 5.2 per cent in 1973, tie agricultural product 
by 2.1 per cent, and imports by 9.2 per cent, resulting in a 6.1 per 
cent increase in total, supply. Although this is not a really strict 
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comparison in view of the nature of the physical and financial 
variables considered, it has sufficient value to show that the two 
spheres failed to operate in a synchronized manner and their adjustment 
would necessarily involve an increase in prices. 
The acceleration of inflation was closely associated with what 
has been called imported inflation. Since this factor has only 
recently made its appearance on the inflationary scene and has 
particular features which need to be identified, it is dealt with in 
a separate section. 
(c) 	 The incidence of imjDorted inflation  
With the purpose of clearly identifying the exogeneous factors 
stimulating inflation in Bolivia, a study is made of both_ their nature 
and their mode of action. 
The dynamic impetus of international prices as from mid-1973 
had distinctly favourable effects for Bolivia. The high prices of 
export items alleviated the pressures on the balance of payments and 
enabled imports to be increased so as to cover the needs which the slow 
growth of supply of agricultural commodities was unable to satisfy. 
Concurrently with these benefits, world inflation was transmitted 
through various mechanisms to the domestic scene with infavourable 
results. 
(i) Import prices. The first direct impact made itself felt 
through the higher prices of imports of goods and the higher cost of 
freight and insurance. As noted above, the import price index went 
up 17.6 per cent in 1973 and 23 per cent in 1974. The increases were 
bigger in the case of machinery, equipment and spare parts in general, 
which mal:e up almost half of Bolivia's imports. The new prices of 
these products indicate price increases well above the rates 
already mentioned. The effects of these increases, combined with those 
those produced by the devaluation of the exchange rate, rowesented 
severe inflationary pressures on production costs in 11:7tiona1 currency. 
In view of the dependence on imported supplies which is a feature 
of the Bolivian economy, this exogenous impact spread rapidly inside 
the country. It is not easy to determine to what extent inflation 
/may be 
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may be ascribed to each of the various factors involved. The 
interaction of some and the essentially qualitative nature of others 
make an accurate breakdown somewhat difficult. However, an increase 
in import prices of the magnitude reached in 1973 and 1974 is 
justification for assigning to this aspect of inflation tremendously 
important quantitative and qualitative effects in terms of the 
phenomenon itself, particularly the acceleration which took place 
between mid-1973 and mid-1974. 
(ii) Enlargement of the imoorted base. In view of the 
exceptional increase in the volume of foreign trade operations, 
imported inflation was not only transferred through prices; the 
increase in volume means an enlargement of the imported base, which 
offers a wider opportunity for the importation of foreign inflation. 
From this point of view, the appreciable increase in the import 
coefficient favours the transfer of external inflationary pressures. 
This dual effect is, however, partly offset by the bigger supply of 
goods resulting from the real increase in imports. To determine how 
far this fact moderates the exogenous pressures would require a 
detailed knowledge of the structure of demand by income strata and of 
the composition of imports. 
In this respect, too, the change in the scale of Bolivia's 
foreign trade fostered the spread of imported inflation. A considerable 
and rapid increase in foreign trade activities, particularly imports, 
came up against a basic infrastructure which had not grown, and could 
not grow, at the same rate. The increases in demand associated with 
this type of activity were naturally an additional source of price 
increases. 
(iii) Ex22ILprices. In addition to the higher cost of imports, 
world inflation had adverse effects of a different type on pricing. 
The excellent prices of commodities such as meat, sugar and flour 
prevailing on the external markets caused exports to soar at the 
expense of covering domestic needs.- There were periods in which these 
movements led to acute local shortages, with the natural repercussions 
on prices. In the middle of 1973, the Bolivian economy began to feel 
/this new 
this new impact of external inflation. Paradoxically enough, a 
situation of excellent export prices had negative internal effects. 
In the face of foreign markets to which access was difficult in the 
past, a policy of export promotion and incentives had been developed, 
which combined with the new foreign trade conditions to obtain large 
export flows. Not only did this situation, as stated previously, 
upset the balance between domestic supply and demand, which, in itself 
exerted pressure on domestic prices, but the excellent external market 
conditions strengthened the position of the exporter groups. Within 
a general policy of promoting private enterprise, it was not easy to 
direct entrepi-eneurial decisions against the market forces. For 
this among other reasons, the domestic prices of these types of 
commodities, which have both domestic and external markets, were 
adjusted. 
Among the negative effects of external inflation, mention cannot 
but be made of the proliferation of illegal export and marketing 
activities. Although it was impossible to assess the volume of these 
operations with any accuracy, data obtained from various official 
sources indicate a considerable scale of illegal trade, including 
contraband in gasoline.10/ The increase in these activities not 
only meant large transfers of physical resources abroad without any 
kind of fiscal control, but it fostered imports of essentially luxury 
goods, also in the form of contraband,, with all their pernicious 
effects. The unrestricted freedom of exchange certainly helped such 
activities, which in some departments reached very high levels. 
Contraband had been a big problem for many years, so that it can well 
be imagined how much more serious it became after it had increased 
so alarmingly, to the extent that at times it was the focal point of 
the Government's concern. This was yet another way in which imported 
inflation passed into the Bolivian economy, obviously with worse 
consequences than through the legal flows. 
.....1nn•• •• ••nn••• ••••••41.40 
22/ Estimates of the Finaacial Administration Department of the 
Idiaistry of-Finance. 
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The steady growth of legal or illegal exports meant a considerable 
concentration of income in the hands of the groups associated with 
those activities. The sequel of negative effects does not.stop there, 
however. The surpluses accumulated by the exporter sectors boosted 
their internal and external purchasing power. Prompted by the urgent 
need to take advantage of the external situation, they stepped up 
their purchases of inputs, freight and other services, and the 
behaviour of their suppliers,. conscious of the extraordinarily high 
profit margins obtainable from exports, brought additional pressures 
to.bear on prices. 
(iv)-Accumulation of reserves. Another phenomenon which clearly 
had some influence on the recent inflationary process, especially the 
acceleration of inflation, was the exceptionally rapid growth of 
international reserves. In view of the foreign exchange policy in 
force in Bolivia, the expansion of .exports and the consequent 
accumulation of reserves resulted in national currency issues which 
significantly increased the liquidity in economic activity 
(see table 16). It will be remembered that the increases in money 
and quasi-money in the first half of .1974 were 22.6 and 22.5 per cent, 
respectively. The expansion of total liquidity was 26.7 per cent over 
the same period, one of the main causes being the increase, in reserves, 
which in June 1974 stood at nearly eight times the end-1973 figure. 
A violent change is noted in the ratio of credit to reserves as 
factors of expansion. At the end of 1973 this ratio was 19 to 1, and 
six months later it was only 2 to 1. Such variations over so short 
a time can scarcely be harmless in terms of prices. The larger 
currency issues, albeit motivated by increases in reserves, had 
inflationary effects. Although the bigger supply of foreign exchange, 
as already stated, makes for more imports which increase total supply, 
there is generally a period in whiCh the actual entry of imported 
products lags behind the increase in liquidity, and degrees of variable 
incompatibility between the structure of the additional demand and 
the composition of the new imports. Similarly, the lead time of the 
investments militates against the achievement of basic equilibria in 
/the economic 
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the economic system. These maladjustments are clearly observable in 
the second phase of inflation in Bolivia. The price increases in the 
first half of 1974 tool:. place in a context of a considerable 
accutulation of reserves, large-scale investment and imports at ever-
increasing prices. 
(v) InflationariLexpectations. Lastly, in thus identifying the 
inflationary. factors associated with the pressures from the external 
sector, mention must be made of the fact that inflationary expectations 
played a highly important role. . In pricing, profit margins were 
usually calculated on the basis of replacement costs Whichmore than 
safeguarded future increases in'prices. Similarly, as regards consumers, 
the expectations of price increases meant the accumulation of stocks 
and little resistance to the usual sPeCulation6 in openly inflaionary 
processes. For the one reason or the other, prides soared. 
The most important entrepreneurial decision-making centres in 
BOlivia are generally associated with foreign trade activities and, 
of course, with banks. Any changes in world commodity prices or 
currency values are rapidly reflected in these groups. The recent 
world inflation found in them a'direct mechanism for spreading the 
additional inflation to the quantitative
- factors reviewed- above. 
No further explanations are necessary to realize that all these 
forms of "importing". external inflation were facilitated', extended and 
magnified by structural factors which have adverse effebts whatever 
the direction of the current movements. In situations of external 
bottlenecks, these factors aggravated the crises and hamper any plan 
or progrante which under different circumstances would have been able 
to palliate them. In a boom situation such as that recently occurring 
in Bolivia's external sector, the structural deficiencies in that 
economy prevented it from reaping the full benefit and fostered the 
importation of external inflation. 
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D. INFLATION AND ECONMIC POLICY 
1. The frame of reference 
The first fact which should be stressed is the non-existence of 
an explicit economic policy, The basis and main features of .the 
development policy in general and the economic policy in particular 
corresponded,to very general principles and objectives. At this 
level, it is impossible to pin down an overall idea which includes 
specific intentions and determined policies for the different sectors 
of the economic system and for the different areas of economic policy. 
In a context in which serious structural problems had to be 
faced and government policy was to,give• definite support to private 
initiative, stability and growth objectives were not wholly consistent 
with. such policy, IA pursuance of these objectives use was made of 
economic policy instruments the scope of .whicil was fairly limited, 
considering the type, of underdevelopment to be found in Bolivia. In 
this context, it would perhaps be relevant to define the radius which 
conventional. action in respect of economic policy has for manoeuvre. 
In a country ground down by serious•structural problsms, .which- - • 
consequently suffers from serious. deviations in the functioning of 
socio-economic activity, the use of the classic machinery of economic 
policy_ has definite limitations. Just as architectural construction, 
however boldly and well planned it may be, cannot maize much headway 
in the face of geological faults in the earth's crust, an economic. 
policy which limits itself to action on the surface of the production 
and distribution system is necessarily restricted. Bearing this in 
mind, in the case of Bolivia, such a policy. will only directly influence 
a small core of the population, and as far as the economic phenomena 
which it covers are concerned, the full. extent of its influence is to 
achieve a certain basic balance at the macroeconomic level, and even 
here, only with serious difficulties. The diversity of grassroot 
situations which is a result of the structural heterogeneity which has 
so frequently been referred to, deprives the overall economic policy 
instruments of their efficacity while serious incompatibilities affect 
. /their use. 
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their use. In the enumeration of the main economic policy measures 
below, it is essential that this contrast between the limited area 
for manoeuvre and the deep-rootedness of the problem which they 
endeavour to solve should not be forgotten. 
On the same lines, there wouldlappear to be a similar lack of 
adjustment between a development policy which takes its basic support 
from private enterprise and its main orientation from market forces, 
and a policy whose objective is to correct the structural disequilibria 
of which repeated mention has been made. 
Despite its major influence, the private sector finds itself 
before a fairly limited prospect in terms of its scale of production. 
The small size of the consumer market in Bolivia, in view of the level 
and distribution of income, limits the expansion of the industrial 
product. The most vigorous management activities in recent yearS were 
those connected with the external sector and those producing goods 
and services for the wealthiest sectors of society, i.e., those 
activities which had a safe market ensured for them. The narrow limits 
of the domestic marl:ets are consequently a visible impediment to any 
industrialization process of consideration based on efficient private 
enterprise, with a minimum of competition. This means that the low 
level of purchasing power of the majority of - the population does not 
provide an adequate stimulus in the form of economic viability to 
undertaking activities which imply risks and terms of maturity which 
are not necessarily brief. 
It should be observed that the small scale of production of the 
majority of the enterprises makes for high unit costs, overlaid by 
large profit margins resulting from the special structure of demand. 
Price formation was affected by this double influence which inflation 
and the expectations it aroused became responsible for aggravating. 
Another important element in the frame of reference to the 
economic policy of the last three years which merits a further 
reference, is the abrupt change in the volume of external trade 
operations. As has already been said, international inflation has 
brought to light some of the limitations of public administration. In 
/the context 
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the context of a continuing bottleneck in the external sector the 
state apparatus had developed certain responses, i.e., its abilities 
were directed at defending itself from what were generally deficit 
situations. The increase in export prices has in this sense placed 
the country in a diametrically opposed situation. Spending capacity 
on productive investment was not in line with the growing availability 
of foreing exchange. Similarly, imported inflation signified an 
entirely new problem, of considerable impact and rapid dissemination 
in the country's economy; the
- econothic policy aimed-at tackling it 
did not have the amplitude and speed which inflation' employed to 
spread its effects throughout the countiv. 
It should not be omitted that during the same inflatiOnary period 
being studied here, the structure of economic and political power 
underwent an appreciable change compared with previous years. The 
possibilities of regulating the operation of the economic system, 
especially in a context of inflations, decreased as the influence of 
the private sector on the decision-making centres increased. Private 
sector pressures on prices, credits and taxes were powerful 
limitations on the adoption of government deciSionS. 
The situation outlined above made up a picture which made the 
conception of a clear and well-defined economic poliCy very difficult. 
From the point of view of inflation, the description of which is the 
aim of the present document, it is impoSsible to identify any open and 
cotinuing policy of stabilization; rather the reverse, State action 
tended to provide pragmatic responses to economic events. The type 
of underdevelopment existing in Bolivia, among other reasons, hindered 
the advance of the socio-economic process and the operation of economic 
policy machinery basically consisted of a series of responses to the 
phenomena which materialized and not of a preconceived implementation 
of the country's development policy. 
/2. The 
- 120 - 
2. The main measuresaSlLed 
The economic policy process which began in 1972 was markedly 
different from earlier processes. Throughout the period 1959-1971 
the high priority objectives of the conception and implementation of 
the different economic policies which can be identified was to prevent 
structural disequilibria from coming to the surface of the economic 
system in their political, social and .economically most harmful 
manifestations. Generally speaking, the handling of the financial 
variables was in keeping with this aim. It may be concluded from the 
observation of the increases in money supply, credit, the fiscal 
budget, etc., that monetary programming throughout this entire period 
was very much tied to not exceeding annual increases of around 6 per 
cent in price rises; this objective was generally speaking, achieved. 
The economic policy decisions adopted as from 1972 constituted 
a basic change, especially in connexion with the expansion of public 
expenditure and the increase of credits to the private enterprise 
sector, and the liberal sales of foreign exchange. This change of 
economic policy meant that the structural disequilibria typical of 
Bolivia's economy forced their way to the financial scene, in the 
form of blatant inconsistencies between supply and demand, which the 
market forces, as has already been stressed, took on the responsibility 
of correcting by means of changes in the system and increases in price 
levels. The limited ability of the apparatus of production to respond 
to stimuli originating in the financial sphere became obvious. 
(a) 	 Wa,7es and;oric es 2olic_y 
The Government'.s main concern, once the modification in the 
exchange rate had been decided upon, was to regulate price increases.11/ 
The maximum limits for the increase in prices were, however, exceeded 
in fact. The annual target of 25 per cent for the prices increases 
between October 1972 and October 1973 was .unable to resist the pressures 
from costs and demand which the devaluation and the monetary expansion 
took upon themselves to activate. 
11/ A more detailed commentary on the devaluation appears in ECLA, 
Economic Survez2112.1joulsaa 4.925_, p. 235 onwards, 
TE7=5147 mimeographed version. 
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The Policy aimed at controlling the progress of prices had 
various stages: the freeze decided upon in the first instance was 
disrupted by the pressures analysed, successive requests by the 
producers and the market forces themselves were the cause of a 
further chain of increases, and lastly, the disparity between the 
prices of some products in the markets of neighbouring countries and 
those existing in the domestic market encouraged contraband which 
the Government endeavoured to control on a basis of readjustments 
which brought some domestic prices close to international levels. 
These examples clearly show the shifts in price policy, which moved 
from an attempt at strict control and regulation to an endeavour to 
follow the pressures of external demand. If it is also borne in mind 
that the increase in import prices determined increases in the production 
and distribution costs of products with the whole range of demonstration 
effects implied, it will be seen that price-decisions were'the object 
of restrictions of the most varied types. The implementation of a 
stable policy in this respect was therefore not possible. 
From the point of view of wages, the policy had more lasting 
and better-defined trends. On the one hand, the majority of the 
readjustments were on a basis of fixed sums, in an attempt to benefit 
the low-income workers, and on the other hand there was considerable 
control in the handling of this variable, with a view to slowing down 
the excessive growth of demand and ensuring that the higher costs 
which would be generated by the larger readjustments should not 
constitute additional pressures on prices. 
Together with the devaluation, a fixed readjustment equivalent 
to 135 Bolivian pesos per month was granted to all Bolivian wage 
earners.12/ The magnitude of the ensuing price increases resulted 
12/ As a point of reference, the average monthly salary in the 
Central Government was estimated at approximately 1,090 Bolivian 
pesos in 1972. See the Interamerican Committee on the Alliance 
for Progress (CIAP), Sub-Committee on Bolivia, op.cit.,.  
tables IV-5 and IV-6. On the other hand the total remunerations 
for the Central Government increased in 1973 by slightly over 
30 	 cent (see table 17). 
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in grants of subsidies to low-income workers according to the number 
of dependents: 20 Bolivian pesos per worker plus 25 pesos for each 
dependdnt. Later, in mid-1973 as a result of new price increases, an 
extra payment of one month's wages per worker was decreed. Lastly, 
following the wake of inflation, a further readjustment of 120 Bolivian 
pesos per worker was granted in 1973. 
Very rough estimates would seem to show that the average wage 
in the Central Government, thanks to the above-mentioned readjustment, 
had increased by approximately 45 per cent between October 1972 and 
October 1973. During this same period prices increased between 
52 and 66 per cent according to different sources of information. That 
year, a large proportion of wage-earners experienced varying degrees 
of decline in their standard of living. As regards the low-income 
population, especially the rural population, it is not possible to 
evaluate their gains or losses owing to the lack of price indicators 
in rural areas. In view of their low incomes fixed amount readjustments 
and the output of subsistence farming, it is to be hoped that their 
standard of living did not deteriorate during this period. 
On the other hand, the exporters, importers, the groups closely 
associated with the financial market and industrialists in general eawan 
increase of their share in the product generated. External prosperity 
was mainly concentrated in these nuclei, while, as is usually the 
case, the inflationary process itself produced larger quotas of 
surpluses for these groups. There is still no complete data available 
on the capital formation which may be attributed to these sectors, in 
order to determine to what extent the retrogressive trend in income 
distribution was offset by increases in growth potential, or whether 
the flight of capital once again was the means of taking large sums 
from them. 
(b) 	 E::changeLpolicl.  
The most important decision in this area was the maintenance of 
the exchange rate at the level of 20 Bolivian pesos to the United States 
dollar as from October 1972. Similarly, the free sale of foreign 
exchange to private persons and the compulsory surrender of foreign 
/currency from 
-123- 
currency from exports, were the main complementary measures which 
made up the exchange policy as from the date mentioned. The 
maintenance of the exchange rate has constituted a form of subsidizing 
imports in view of the high level of domestic prices, and, of course, 
constituted a type of subsidy to hoarding in hard currency. It is 
the only asset which has not Undergone any - price increase since then. 
Only a reasonable supply of foreign exchange can guarantee a liberal 
policy of this type, in a situation in which there exists a high 
level of liquidity in the economic systeM. Tp till now, the dynamic 
forces of external demand were the mainstray of the free sale of 
foreign exchange and the fixed exchange rate. On the one hand, this 
resulted in the deadening of the effect of imported inflation, and 
on the other, it represented a channel for the flight of foreign 
exchange and in particular facilitated smuggling to a tremendous 
extent. Owing to the lack of detailed data on the structure of 
imports, it is not easy to evaluate the POsitive and negative results 
of the way in which this instrument was handled. Considerations along 
the lines of the above, however, and, better still, clear indications 
that legal:and illegal imports of luxury 'Goods may be reaching levels 
hitherto unknown, cast doubts on whether this exchange policy is 
compatible with making the most of:the - external economic' situation 
. which could mean the acquisition of permanent benefits for the country. 
The following. could be taken as an example: while the consumer price 
index underwent an increase of 126.5 per cent between October 1972 
and July 1974, the price of the dollar remained steady. 
Since'domectiC ihflatiOn is considerably higher than external 
inflation, the subsidizing of the exchange rate should haVe produced 
a drastic change in the system of prices in the sense of a fairly 
meaningful reduCtion in price of imported products. Incomplete data 
available susgeSt that such a chance did not take place and this 
would imply that the single, fixed and free sale exchange rate is 
one of the mechanisms through which the retrogressive distribution of 
income is channelled to the importer groups. 
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The growing supply of foreign exchange, basically as a result 
of external prices, provided Bolivia with an important defence
-
mechanism against imported inflation, since it was able to
- keep its 
exchange rate unchanged. While its external trade continues along the 
same lines, it will be able to continue to absorb some of the effects 
of this foreign inflation. The doubt will remain, however, whether 
alternative policies would not in fact have had more promising effects. 
It proves very difficult to evaluate such alternatives while the 
structure of imports is not known in detail, as has already been 
stressed. It should also be recalled that the above reflexions 
basically cover the context of the economy; socio-political restrictions 
play a basic. role in the control of an instrument as sensitive as the 
exchange rate. A more general apreciation Would of course have to 
take them into account. 
(c) 	 Tax .policy 
At the same time as the currency was devalued, important measures 
were taken in taxation. Mention should be made of the revaluation of 
assets, by 60 per cent for imported goods and 20 per cent for buildings 
and other goods of domestic origin, with a tax of 5 per cent on this 
revaluation. Measures were taken at the same time•to revalue assets in 
gold and foreign currency at the new rate of exchange, with a tax of 
20 per cent on the increase. 
Also with a view to attracting the benefits implied in a 
devaluation, new taxes were created: 60 per cent of the import value 
of stock of imported articles on sales; 40 per cent of the net value 
of exports of minerals, hydrocarbons and cotton already produced or 
exported but pending payment and the compulsory surrender of foreign 
exchange; 20 per cent on the net value of all new exports of minerals, 
metals, hydrocarbons, cotton and meat; and 15 per cent on the value 
of exports of other goods. 
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A year later in October 1973 a tax reform was introduced, aimed 
at simplifying tax legislation and exercising a stricter control over 
the very considerable tax evasion.13/ 
This tax reform introduced modifications in following taxes: 
personal income tam, tax on the income of enterprises, sales tax, and 
selective consumption taxes. The most important, feature of_the 
personal income tax was the replacement ofa schedule system by a 
global system in which a single progressive scale was applied, The 
most outstanding features of the tax. on the income. of enterprises are: 
the extension of the universe of contributors to agricultural and 
livestoe: enterprises; the distinction made between enterprises with 
sales exceeding 200,000 Bolivian pesos annually (a71proximately 1,500) 
and the smaller enterprises, and the increase from 25,4 to 30. per cent 
of the rate of tax on profits. It should also be mentioned that clear 
insentives are given for investment and reinvestment of profits and 
for the utilization of labour-intensive production techniques, 
The results of this modification in taxation cannot be evaluated 
using available information. From the point of,view of ,its effects on 
inflation, however, it may be stated that the results,were only 
secondary. The increase in domestic revenue between 1973 a44 1974 
was less than a general increase in prices; the increase in prices as 
a result of tax reform was apparently more than compensated . for by 
the reduction in real demand which the reform itself implied. In any 
case, besides the other factors of inflation which have already been 
analysed, the effect of taxes as has already been said, had little 
importance. 
1727 As an example of this it should. be noted that the most dynamic 
area in the country, the Department of Santa Cruz, generated less 
tax revenue in 1973 than in 1972 and contributed a
-smaller quota 
to' the Exchequer.than that. of the. Department of Cochabamba where 
economic activity is at an appreciably lower level. 
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(d) 	 Fiscal finance policy 
From the fiscal viewpoint, the traditionally most important items 
of income did not undergo significant changes. The increases in the 
sums collected, referred to as internal and customs revenue, were less 
than increases in prices; tax evasion increased considerably to judge 
from some partial indicators. The so-called revenue from production 
and taxeson exports of minerals, gas and petroleum, showed extraordinar: 
increases, however. As may be seen from table 17, during the fiscal 
year 1973 and particularly throughout the period January-July 1974, 
their contributions increased significantly. While inr 1972 these items 
accounted for barely 13 per dent of current earnings, in the first 
seven months of 197• they came to account for 50 per cent. Obviously, 
there was a change in this type of source of fiscal financing and 
dependence on external trade increased. The increases noted meant that 
the fiscal deficit was considerably smaller and that it reduced to a 
similar extent Central Bank credit requirements (see table 17). From 
the point of view of inflation, however, the short-term situation had 
not changed very much. The greatest increases in earnings were from 
issues originating in surchases of foreign exchange from exporters. 
Issues which were not occupied in financing the fiscal deficit were 
used to accumulate reserves and this meant an increase in the liquidity 
of the economic system; while this foreign exchange does not become 
real supply, inflationary pressures will continue to take their course. 
The Government's financial requirements benefited from a major 
inflow of external credit. The increase in the external public debt 
comparing the balances at the end of 1971 and 1973 Was approximately 
136 million dollars, which meant an increase in the debt of 23.7 per 
cent during this period. The external public debt at 31 December 19?3 
amounted to the sum of 721.6 million dollars, 14/ which was nearly two 
and a half times the value of exports of goods and services in that 
year. 
14/ See CIAP, Sub-Committee on Bolivia, 912.sit., table V-10. 
/(e) The 
- 127 - 
(e) 	 The financing of the private enterprise sector  
As regards the financing of the private enterprise sector, it 
has already been stressed that bank credit underwent extraordinary 
large increases. Government policy in this respect. was exceedingly 
indulgent with financial requirements, so much so that the increase 
in liquidity which resulted from-the inflationary process described 
above must be largely attributed to the increases in this form of 
financial support. Furthermore, the external credit attracted by 
this sector made up a large share of the country's debt. During 
1972, external financing for these entrepreneurial activities was 
40.3 million dollars, and in 1973 it was 47.2 million dollars.U/ 
The traditional problems of the external bottleneck which the 
Bolivian economy came up against in the past, did not arise in recent 
times since the private enterprise sector too had access to ample 
facilities for external finance. In the face of these well defined 
incentives, the speed of response of private activity would not appear 
to have manifested itself in as vigorous a fort as might have been 
expected, if the data available for 1972 is taken into account. 
In this regard it should be mentioned that private investment 
in the main sectors of production in 1972 was significantly lower than 
in 1971 (see table 13). No data is available for investment in 
housing and the services sectors, which probably increased, but if 
tentative figures for investment in-the basic productive sectors are 
confirmed, there may be reason to believe that the performance of 
this sector was far from constituting a dynamic element, despite the 
major role assigned to it in the beginning. If to this is added the 
decline in foreign investment during the year, and if these movements 
are compared with the various types of stimulus given to private 
enterprise, it will be understood that it is other problems - arising 
out of structural heterogeneity - which determine the failure of 
intentions to materialize in more rapid rates of growth. 
15J IMF, Balance of Payments. 
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Table 18 
BOLIVIA: ESTIMATED INVESTMENT III THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
(Millions of Bolivian esos at current nrices) 
Sector 	 1970 	 1971 	 1972 
Agriculture 	 1+6 
	
49 	 33 
Mining and quarrying 	 109 	 115 
	
09 
Industry (manufactures) 	 71 	 75 
	
50 
Hydrocarbons 	 199 
	
210 	 163 
Energy 	 63 	 66. 	 50 
Total 
	 480 	 515 	 393 
 
•nn• ••• •••••n• Il 4•-•••• • •••••• n• • 
 
40•nn•••••0/0- -•nn• .•••••,...1 
  
Source: Secretariat of the Consejo Nacional de Economia y PlanificaciOn. • ---- 
Direcci6n de PlanificaciOn Global. The original source 
indicates that some data are estimates and subject to 
modification. 
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2. BRAZIL 
A. INTRODUCTORY NOTE 
Inflation in Brazil must be analysed in a wider setting than 
would be required for other Latin American countries. It is in fact 
part of an overall economic policy project which has been applied for 
the last ten years. Questions relating to manner of growth and matters 
concerning the inflationary process are thus very closely interrelated. 
Consequently, the study on Brazil is more lengthy and detailed than 
those of other countries; this is also because a variety of background 
facts is provided on features of development during this period, and 
in particular as from 1963, which marks the beginning of a period of 
high growth rates in the economy of Brazil. 
B. OUTSTANDING FEATURES OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE 
BRAZILIAN ECONOMY 
1. Evolution of the gross domestic product and  
its components  
Table 1 shows the performance of Brazil's gross domestic product 
by the sectors of economic activity which compose it. 
As may be seen, the growth of the economy put on a spurt as 
from 1963, and the average growth of the product increased from around 
7 per cent during the period 1965-1969 to 11 per cent during the 
years 1970-1973• This increase in tempo was predominantly linked 
with the favourable performance of the secondary sector, both on 
account of its importance in the total product (27 per cent of the 
gross domestic product during the years 1971-1973), and because of the 
natural repercussion on the growth of other sectors, for example, 
trade, finance and transport and communications. 
The boom in Brazil's economy may largely be explained by the 
steady growth of industry, with growth rates of 10.2 per cent during 
the period 1965-1969 and 13.7 per cent in the years 1970-1973. 
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Table 1 
BRAZILt GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, AT FACTOR COST, 
BY SECTOR CF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 
(Growth rates) 
1965- 
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
1970- 
1973 
Agriculture 2.4 5.6 11.4 4.5 3.5 6.4 
Mining 10.1 12.7 11.0 .14.3 11.5 12.3 
Manufacturing 10.2 .11.0 11.3 14.1 15.8 13.7 
Construction 9.7 14.9 8.4 12.9 15.5 12.2 
Subtotal goods 15 8.8 --- Eta 10.1 10.9 10.8 
Eleotricity, gas and water 9.2 10.1 11.4 11.1 . 12.5 11.7 
Transport and communications 8.7 15.0 _8.4 8.1 14.0 10.1 
Subtotal basic services 8.8. 22:2 .24 8.9 2.1.1 El 
Commerce and finance 7.8 - 	 9.1 12.3 11,4 12.5 12.1 
Commerce 8.1 8.9 12.8 11.9 13.0 12.6 
Finance 7.0 9..5 11.3 :10.4. 11.4 11.0 
Ownership of dwellings 7.0 9.5 11.3 10.4 10.5 10.7 
Government 7.0 9.5 11.3 :10.4 10.4 10.7 
Miscellaneous services 4.:1 9.5 11.3 10.4 10.4 10.7 
Subtotal other services 6.6 2'12 11.8 Ea 11.4 11.4 
Total gross domestio product 74' : , 212 1i2 10.4: 11.4 11.0 
Source: ECLA, on the basis• of official" statistics. 
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The growth of the sub-sectors which make up the industrial sector, 
however, was not homogeneous. In fact, a wide disparity is to be 
observed in rates of growth, and this should be stressed in order to 
show clearly where the dynamic core of the sector lies and hence the 
root of the growth of the total product. Table 2 shows that the expansion 
of the industrial sector was linked to a large extent to the favourable 
progress of the industries producing "heavy" consumer durables, such 
as appliances, motor-vehicles, etc., and the basic metals industries. 
It may be observed that the rates of growth of the metallurgical, 
engineering, electrical and transport materials industries are very 
much higher than those of the "traditional" sectors and the sectors 
producing intermediate articles. Table 3 gives a clearer picture 
of this phenomenon, and makes it easy to identify the industrial sectors 
of greatest relative dynamism, by categories of use. Consumer durables 
grew at an average rate of around 17.6 per cent during the period 
1968-1972, and most certainly contributed to the acceleration of 
industrial growth, followed by the production of capital goods with 
an annual average growth rate of 15.8 per cent. However, the output 
of non-durable consumer goods evolved along lines similar to its 
traditional course and the rates of increase of.the output of intermediate 
goods barely exceeded the total industrial average. 
It may be deduced from the foregoing that the growth of the 
Brazilian economy in recent years was tied up with the higher rates 
oPgrowth observed in the consumer durables and capital goods industries. 
As will be understood, for this dynamic core to have grown rapidly, 
certain requirements must have been fulfilled: 
(i) favourable evolution of internal and external purchasing 
power in respect of its product; 
(ii) a finance policy which contributed the resources required 
for the growth of these industries at the right moment; 
(iii) no narrow limits to import requirements; and 
(iv) investments in supporting infrastructure and in complementary 
industries. 
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Table 2 









Non.metallio mineral products 11.0 11.7 11.3 
Metallurgical industry 9.8 10.8 10.3 
Engineering industry 9.9 23.0 16.2 
Electrical material 15.8 13.6 14.7 
Transport material 13.0 16.4 14.7 
Timber 9.7 • . • • • • 
Furniture -2.5 • • . • • 
Paper and paper products 11.6 4.6 8.0 
Rubber 9.5 14.6 12.1 
Hides and skins 6.4 • • • • • 
Chemical 10.3 15.0 12.6 
Beauty products 13.7 0•0 000 
Textiles 6.o 1.4 3.7 
Clothing and footwear 6.0 10.2 8.o 
Food products 11.0 
7.6  
9.3 
Beverages 3.3 7.6 5.4 
Tobacco 6.0 5.7 5.8 
Total 212 11.1 21912 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of official statistics. 
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BRAZIL: QUANTUM INDEXES 
Table 3 
OF MANUFACTURIAG BY 
(1966 = 100) 
CATIGO,LIS CF GOODS 






Capital goods 117.2 124.4 140.1 173.0 ,210'.8 .15.8 	 , 
• 
Consumer durables 125.5 156.9 168.8 198.6 239.9 17.6 
Non-durable consumer goods 116.7 125.4 134.5 137.2 147.9 6.1 
Intermediate goods 119.9 131.3 150.3 167.6 188.5 12.0 
Total 118.9 131.3 145.0 159.6 180.3 11.0 
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As a matter of fact, it could be said that these requirements 
for the dynamic sectors of industry were fulfilled thanks to the 
application of a growth policy which laid the necessary bases for the 
restructuring of the economy round this key core. 
2. The bases for growth  
Although the present analysis does not attempt to explain the 
recent development model of the Brazilian economy, which would be too 
complicated and outside the scope of the present paper, certain factors 
which more obviously laid the bases for expansion, may, however, be given 
an explanation. These factors were associated with the reformulation 
of the finance schemes, the opening-up of the economy to the exterior, 
public investment policy and the evolution of the structure of income 
distribution. 
(a) 	 The reform of the finance system  
During the five-year period 1964-1960 Brazil introduced a reform 
of the national finance system, which brought profound changes to the 
finance schemes existing in the economy, in that new forms of attracting 
and distributing resources were created, and played an important role 
in activating the system and in particular in speeding up industrial 
eximnsion. The main changes introduced with this reform are described 
below.16/ 
In connexion with the finance system, an operational modernization 
of its functions took place, with the diversification of financial 
instruments and the introduction of some degree of specialization of 
functions, which meant the more flexible operation of the money and 
credit market, and the emergence of an institutionalized capital market, 
as from 1968. 
As regards the immediate financing of the private and public 
sectors, the changes made led to a considerable growth of liquidity 
which was independent of the primary expansion of the means of payment 
16/ 	 Tavares, M.C. - Da substitui do de importacties a6 capitalismo 
financeiro recente, Ed. Zahar, Rio de Janeiro, 1972, pp. 211 
et. seqq. 
/as a 
- 135 — 
as a result of the development of loans schemes outside the banking 
'system and machinery for the tapping and intersectoral circulation 
of surpluses, by means of the issue of index-tied bonds and debentures.17 
On the other hand, the financing of capital in the long and 
medium-term benefited considerably from important government measures 
aimed at attracting foreign capital in the form of money loans and 
import financing. 
As far as the financing of consumption Was concerned, promotion 
was given to expanding and diversifying consumption of durable goods 
by the urban middle income classes, and this played'an important part 
in the recovery,and growth of the modern sectors of industry. 
As regards long-term financing, several special public fUnds were 
set up in association with national and regional development agencies. 
However, since domestic supply of this type of credit proved 
inadequate for the needs of the economy, the GOvernment complemented 
it with external. finance. (the importance of the external resources 
used to tack up credit in the short, medium and long-term will be 
analysed below). 
As from 1968, the capital market began to develop effectively, 
with the creation of investment banks, the reorganization of the 
traditional finance sectors, amalgamations of financial groups, the 
opening up of entrepreneurial capital and the progressive activation 
of the direct securities markets, mainly on the exchange. 
Lastly, mention should be made of the establishment of specialized 
sub-systems for financing housing, linking up methods of compulsory 
savings (guarantee fund of length of service) 18/ and voluntary savings 
(letras inmobiliarias). The Banco Nacional de la Vivienda, the director 
agency of the system, taps compulsory savings and is the discount 
house for the real estate credit documents issued by finance or real 
estate companies. 
12/ Readjustments in terms of price increases. 
13/ This Fund  was set up in 1966, and consists of a monthly deposit 
in a special bank account of 3 per cent of the total remunerations 
paid by the enterprises. 
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Tables 4 and 5 show some of the changes which took place, for 
example, the loss of importance of the banking sector and the important 
diversification of financial institutions. The 80 per cent share of 
the banking system in total private credit in 1964 decreased to about 
half in 1973,  while the amount of diversified financial intermediation 
increased to a similar proporticin;- this was represented in particular 
by the finance companies (predominantly consumer credit), investment 
banks (mainly financing for working capital) and the schemes for 
financing housing. 
From another point of view, the new forms of tapping resources 
significantly changed the structure of the financial assets of the 
economy (see table 5). A drop in the share of money assets may be 
observed (from 92 per cent in 1964 to 43.1 per cent in 1973) alongside 
the increase in the importance of the characteristic instruments of 
institutions outside the banking system - bills of exchange 19/ (16.9 per 
cent in 1973), fixed-term index-tied deposits (12.6 per cent) and 
tetras inmobiliarias (3.0 per cent). Also of note is the importance 
in 1973 of index-tied debentures, which had a share of 17.7 per cent 
in the total financial assets of the system. 
The new structure of the financial intermediation in the economy, 
briefly summarized here,20/ contributed to a considerable extent to 
maintaining high growth rates during the period. Obviously, it implied 
a viable solution to the basic problem of the current financing of the 
enterprises, and made for greater fluidity of supply in the more dynamic 
sectors of the economy. 
12/ Credit orders accepted by the borrower, negotiable in the market 
by the financial institution lending the resources which is 
jointly responsible for the order. The institution advances 
the resources to the borrower and renlaces its liouidity by 
selling the order on. the market. 





BRAZIL: AIA9bER OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS OPL,ATING AT LAD OF YEAR 
1964 1568 1971 . 	 1973 
Commercial banking institutions - 	 336 231 155 115 
Development banks 2 4 12 13 
Federal 1 1 2, 2 
State 1 3 io , 	 11.,  
Banco Naoional de la Vivienda 2. 1 1 1 
InveStment banks - 21 4o 45 
Saving 	 banks 26 26 6 6 	 " 
Feeral 22 22 1 1 
State 4 4 5 
5.. 
Finance. companies 134 245 170 152 
Insurance companies 144 157 157 110 
Real estate credit societies .. 25 45 . 44 
Savings and loan associations - 21 34 36 
Brok3rst associations - 377 421 414 
Distributors:. associations ... 556 572  569 
Investment societies. ... 6 .. 
Credit co -operatives - - 318 324 
Source: Banco Central do Brasil, Relattgrio Anual, 1969 and 1973. 
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Table 5 
BRAZIL: MAIN FINANCIAL ASSZTS 
(Relative share) 
1964 1968 1970 1973 
Monetary assets 1249. 0.12 1E4 
Paper money in power of the public 21.0 12.8 10.5 7.9 
Sight deposits 71.0 54.2 45.0 35.2 
Nen monetary assets 8.0 1212 litti 1.6..2 
Savings deposits 
... 1.0 3.3 6.7 
Fixed-term deposits 2.5 4.5 6.9 12.6 
Non index-tied 2.5 1.2 0.2 n 
Indexotied 
- 3.3 6.7 12.6 
Bills of exchange 2./ 462 14.3 15.3 16.9 
Letras inmobiliarias n2.0 3.1 3.0 
Federal debentures (ORTN, LIT and 
others) 12/ 1e3 11.1 15.8 17,,7 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Relat4rio do Banco do Brasil. 
2./ Zee notelV,1 page 136. 
12/For this olassifieation the traditional criterion was used; as regards the LTN, it 




The.growth of consumer credit, mainly represented by the extension 
of the operations of the finance companies, which showed an annual 
average rate of real growth, of credit of approximately 41 per cent:  
between 1967 and 1973, was a decisive factor in maintaining urban 
demand, specially in respect of consumer durables. 
Mention may also be made.of the creation of the schemes for 
financing housing, which in 1973 accounted for 13 per cent of total 
private sector financing; it prOduced an increase in the growth of 
the civil construction industryf which is highly labour-intensive, 
and constituted an - important source of intersectoral demand in the 
industrial sector. 
The restructuring of the capital market did not only provide 
support to investment by the enterprises but also - and this,was its 
major contribution - it made possible an increase in the intersectoral 
mobility of the capital invested in productive activities, and helped, 
to centralize-it in the dynamic core of the economy. 
However, despite the fact that it was possible to finance 
consumption, working capital and investment simultaneously and adequately, 
no appreciable increase would appear to have been achieved to date 
in the real rate of domestic savings, which was the main explicit 
objective for reformulating the national finance system. 
(b), The changeover to outward-directedErowth 
Mention.should be made'here of the important role of the external 
sector in maintaining the high rate of growth of the economy. 
During th.e period 1968. -1972 Brazil changed the direction of its 
growth model, turning - it outwards, and came to depend increasingly 
on the external; sector to provide capital for immediate and long-term 
financing, as an important source of export demand for some sectors 
and as a complement to domestic saving8, through the increasing deficits 
in current transactions. 
In connexion with imports, a more liberal policy was followed, 
consistent with the aim of avoiding bottlenecks in the increased rate 
of growth of the economy. Total imports therefore increased at average 
rates of around 20.5 per cent during the period 1967-1970, increasing 
/to 54.5 per 
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to 34.5 per cent in recent years (1970-19y3), which raised the import 
coefficient from 4.7 per cent in 1967 to 11 ner cent in 1973. 
It should be observed that this speeding-up of growth was 
basically due to the performance of industrial imports which accounted 
for more than Co per cent of total imports, and within these, to 
imports by the most dynamic sectors, e.g., metallurgy, engineering, 
electrical materials, transport materials and chemicals (see table 6). 
The importance of these industrial imports in the growth of the domestic 
supply of the manufacturing sector may be seen from table 7; it is to 
be observed that the percentage increases in the coefficient are 
particularly meaningful in the sectors producing capital goods. 
It may be noted that the growth of imports in the economy of 
Brazil, together with the substantial increase in the import coefficient, 
was.unquestionably bound up with the expansion of the dynamic core of 
industry, which played an important role in ensuring and maintaining 
high growth rates for the product. While on the one hand this provided 
a possibility of speeding up growth, on the other it constituted the 
vulnerable aspect of such growth, in that it began to inflict increasing 
rigidity on the pattern of imports, which could come to constitute a 
bottleneck to maintaining growth in the future. 
In another area, as from 1964 Brazil began to apply an active 
policy to attract foreign capital, which was accepted without restriction 
in any economic activity, with the sole legal exception of the production 
and refining of petroleum. For this purpose new forms of external 
borrowing were created and adopted, making possible a broad-based use 
of external resources. External loans could be directly and freely 
arranged between enterprises abroad and in Brazil, for medium-term 
financing, while the commercial and investment banks and the Banco 
Nacional de Desarrollo Econcimico (BNDE) were authorized to contract 
medium and long-term foreign loans, with the guarantee in both cases 
of the availability of the foreign exchange required for amortization 
payments, 
 and remittances of interests. 
/Table 6 
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Table 6 
BRAZIL: IAPORTS CIF BY SECTORS OF EOUNOAIO'ACTIVITY 
(Aillions fo dollars at current prices) 
Perm 
Sectors of eoonomic 	 cent 1965 






Metallurgical industry 	 128 	 11.7 363 514 10.8 
Engineering industry 	 153 	 14.0 510 1 060 22.4 
Electrical Material 
	
48 	 443 241 424 9.1.1  
Transport material 	 72 	 6.5 277 416 8.8 
Paper 	 19 	 1.7 60 103 2.2 
Chemioals 	 217 	 19.8,  520 799 16.9 
Textiles 	 ' 	 : 4 	 0.3 35 48 
- .40  
Feed prod4cts 	 45 	 4.1 89 98 2.0 
Others 
	
47 	 4.2 211 3'79 8.0 
Trial industrY 
	 2/2 	 67.0 2 306 3 81  81.1 
Tote.! imprts 	 1 096 	 100.0 2 849 100.0 
Source: 	 Instituto de Planejamento Ecori6mioo e Social (IP2A). 
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Table 7 
BRAZIL: PERCEATAGE SHARE OF IIIPORTS IN TOTAL INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY, 
BY SECTORS OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 
(Percentages calculated on the basis of current values) 
1962 1966 1970 1972 
Non-metallic mineral products 3.8 3.1 3.2 3.9 
Metallurgical industry 12.5 160 18.7 18.7 
Engineering industry 43.1 28.8 35.6 40.4 
Electrical material 15.6 11.1 20.6 24.9 
Transport material 17.0 8.8 14.8 14.1 
Paper and paperboard 16.3 7.7 11.6 14.6 
Rubber 0,5 0.5 1.8 4.0 
Chemicals 21,2 16.0 19.6 17.7 
Pharmaceuticals 4.9 4.o 5.7 ... 
Textiles 0.3 0.3 2.0 2.1 
Food products 2.0 2.8 2.7 2.2 
Beverazes 2.0 u.7 1.7 2.4 
Printing and publishing 3.2 3.9 3.2 ... 
Miscellaneous 16.2 14,0 28.8 ... 
Total 11'1 10.0 13.3 15.2 
Source: 	 Instituto de Planejamento Ecoamioo e Social (IRA). 
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As a result of the measures adopted and in conjunction with a 
favourable international economic situation, Brazil received a _substantial 
inflow of capital, especially as from 1968'. Table 8 shows the evolution 
of the inflow of resources in its two main forms: financing of imports 
(suppliers' credits) and money loans. As a result, Brazil's, external 
debt increased at an annual average rate of 25 per cent, and grew 
from 3.3 thousand million dollars in 1967 to 12.6 thousand million 
in 1973; the servicing of this debt accounted for an average of53 per 
cent of the value of exports during the; three-year period 1971-1973. 
The immense inflow of capital made it possible to finance the 
growing deficits in current transactions, with the result that the 
economy's balance of payments came to record a. surPlus which enabled 
international reserves to be stock-piled over the last two years. and 
reach the sum of 6.4 thousand million dolla'rs in:1973 (see table 8). 
It came to constitute an important factor in the increase in domestic 
levels of finance for working capital and investment, although it 
could be said that the credit granted was to a large extent selective, 
since it benefited the relatively more dynamic activities or those 
controlled by foreign capital, or both at once. It should also be 
observed that the largo intake of external resources dangerously 
increased the external vulnerability of the economy, and also represented 
a constant factor of inflationary money growth, as will be seen in 
the second part of thepresent document.. 
The external debt and the increasing deficits in current 
transactions unavoidably came into conjunction with an aggressive 
export policy, which made'it possible to finance the growth of imports 
and remittances of interests and profits, and also cope With servicing 
the debt itself. Export dynamism also contributed to complementing 
domestic markets, resulting in a more active demand and a better use 
being made of the economies of scale and of the inernal patterns of 
efficiency of the more dynamic enterprises. It is hard to imagine that 
the high rates of growth observed in recent years could have been 
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In order to promote exports, especially of manufactures, a 
broad-based incentive policy' was applied. Exports were exempted from 
indirect taxes; income tax ceased to be applied to export profits; 
sales of manufactures were subsidized, special interest-subsidized 
lines of finance were set up for products for the_ external market; 
and as from 1963, a system of periodic devaluations of the cruzeiro was 
adopted (frequent small adjustments) in order to achieve a stable 
balance between domestic and external prices. 
As a result of this policy, Brazilian exports increased at an 
annual average rate of 24.5 per cent during the period 1967-1973, and 
their money value increased from 1.6 thousand million dollars to 
6,2 thousand million dollars (see table 9). Of this,total, exports 
, 	 . 
of manufactures, which were insignificant in 1964, accounted for 
1.9 thousaftd - million dollars in 1973, or 31.3 per cent of total exports. 
The real importance of the increase in exports, however is not 
to be found in the additional demand which they imply for the system, 
especially as regards exports of manufactures. Although their share 
in the industrial product doubled, they accounted for only 6.3 per 
cent of the product in 1973 (see table 10). 
In fact, the success of the export policy was rather in constitutin€ 
the axis of outward-directed growth, and led taa liberal policy of 
imports of capital goods and inputs, which were of basic importance 
to industrial growth, and Which came- to- be the basie for the large 
intake of internal resources. 
(c) 	 The role of the public sector  
Among the factors of expansion of the new stage of growth in the 
economy of Brazil, the evolution of public investment as from 1967 may 
be mentioned, both in quantitative and qualitative terms. 
/Table 9 
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Tablo 9 
BRAZIL: STRUCTURE OF EXPORTS 























	 1 317 	 82.0 	 1 492 79.3 1 988 68.6 2 725 68.3 4 096 66.1 
Industrial products 	 281 	 17.5 380 20.2 821 28.3 1 222 30.6 1 241 31.3 
Semimanufaotures 
	 139 	 8.7 178 9.5 240 8.3 310 7.8 476 7.7 
Manufactures 	 142 	 8.8 202 10.7 581 20.0 912 22.8 1 465 23.6 
Others 	 7 	 0.5 9 0.5 65 2.2 44 1.1 162 2.6 
Total 
	 1 605 	 100.0 	 1  861 100.0 2 904 100.0 3 991 100.0 6 199 100,0,  
Source: 
	 Carteira de ComSrcio Exterior (CACE). 
Table 10 
BRAZIL: SHARE OF EXPORTS OF -MANUFACTURES IN THE INDUSTRIAL PRODUCT 









1968 26.2 	 849.1 3.1 
1969 35.9 	 940.8 3.8 
1;70 47.0 	 1 069.8 4,4 
1971 67.2 	 1 190.7 5.6 
1972 83.4 	 1 358.6 6.1 
1973 99.3 	 1 573.3 6.3 
Source: ECLAT on the basis of official statistics. 
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It is fairly difficult Ao elucidate this point in the case of 
Brazil, since there are no official data referring to the public 
sector as a consolidated whole, including State .entrepreneurial activity, 
especially important in the .economy,of Brazil, particularly because 
of the presence of public .enterprises in such dynamic sectors of 
industry, as petroleum, steel, chemicals, mining, electrical energy 
and transport and communications.21/ State presence in the economy 
can thus only be measured on the basis of Central Government data, 
including independent public enterprises, foundations and some special 
funds. Even so, the importance of the central administration is not 
negligible in terms of its effects on the system, since Government 
investment accounted for around 17 per cent of the gross fixed capital 
formation of the economy during the years 1971-1973 and for 35 per cent 
of the economy's total savings during the years 1972-1973. 
As will be understood, the consideration of the public sector 
as a consolidated whole would greatly increase this influence. It 
may indeed be estimated that public investment, including Government 
bodies and public enterprises, could account for between 11 and 12 per 
cent of the gross domestic product,22/ which would be as much as to 
say that its share in gross fixed capital formation would exceed 
40 per cent. 
Apart from its volume, public investment played a pertinent role 
in the recent growth of the Brazilian economy, particularly because 
it was directed towards the activities with most influence on the 
system. In this context, as from 1967, the public sector destined 
resources on a massive scale for investment in electrical energy, 
transport and communications, petroleum and associated products, mining 
and steel. The public investment programme, conceived as a complement 
to and a harmonious part of the growth of the dynamic core of industry, 
represented a substantial demand aimed at the communications, metal 
El/ Of Brazil's 20 major enterprises, 11 are state-owned -
Simonsen, H.H. and Campos, R. A novaeconomia brasiloira, 
Ed. Jose Olympic), Rio de Janei75717747TT717% 
EE/ Simonsen, L.H. "0 modelo brasileiro de desenvolvimento", in 
Simonsen, 11.H. and Campos, R. 	 page 14. 
/manufactures and 
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manufactures and machinery, electrical materials and chemical industries, 
and came to be one of the bases for the rapid growth of industry., 
(d) 	 The evolution of income distribution 
The foregoing pages endeavoured to show that the growth of the 
Brazilian economy in recent years was basically associated with the 
rapid growth of some dynamic sectors of industry which coincided with 
the consumer durables and capital goods sectors. 
As will be understood, to propose an increase in growth in some 
branches of industry means, among other things, proposing an increase 
in the growth of purchasing power directed at the products of these 
industries. In other words, in a process of growth, the structure 
of supply should be consistent with. that of demand. The growth of 
the dynamic sectors of industry must.thus have been accompanied by 
the corresponding changes in the profile of demand. 
Some of the mechanisms which contributed to the profile of demand 
evolving along the same lines as the dynamic sectors of industry were 
already dealt with when the changes in the system of financing 
(especially as regards consumer credit), the expansion of industrial 
exports and the structure of public investment were considered. Although 
these factors played an important role in the reformulation of demand, 
they can hardly explain all the changes which took place in recent 
years. In fact, the profile of demand is conditioned above all by 
the structure of income distribution and this is where the main basis 
for its makeup must be sought. 
In this respect, table 11 is fairly revealing. It shows that 
between 1960 and 1970 income distribution in the Brazilian economy 
underwent a process of marred concentration, with the drop in their 
share of total income of 30 per cent of the economically active populatio 
which would go to show that the dynamic purchasing power of the system 
was concentrated in the top 20 per cent of the income pyramid. In the 
case of Brazil, it may be observed that this would represent a pattern 
of high-level consumption for around 20 million persons.227 
22/ Preliminary estimates by ECLA indicate that the top-income 20 per 
cent had an annual per capita income of over 2,000 dollars in 
1972 (expressed in dollars at 1970 prices). 
ix,:om another 
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From another standpoint, the same conclusion may be suggested 
from the observation of table 12, which gives the percentage increase 
in real per capita income for the different income. groups. The annual 
average rates Of'groWth of real income increase sharply after the 
seventh decile, showing that income is concentrated in the upper-medium 
and upper income groups. The data also show that the rate of growth 
of the real income of the poorest 40 per cent of the population is 
dynamic, especially in the case of the top 10 per cent. However, 
the importance of this growth, from the point of view of purchasing 
power in respect of the products of the dynamic industries is fairly 
secondary, since absolute levels of per capita income in these groups 
constitutes a minor market for consumer durables. The rapid growth 
of purchasing power in respect of goods with a more sophisticated 
degree of manufacturing is therefore unmistakably associated with 
the uppoer income groups which correspond in particular to the top 
20 per cent of the economically active population. 
The concentration of personal income, with the profile of demand 
which it influences, therefore played a decisive role in the resumption 
and maintenance of recent growth in the economy of Brazil. 
C. MAIN FEATUFES OF ANTI-INFLATIONARY POLICY 
The anti-inflationary policy applied in Brazil must be interpreted 
with reference to a much longer period than is usually taken into 
account in this type of analysis in Latin America. In effect, the 
continuity of Stabilization efforts has been maintained throughout 
the terms of office of four governments and extends over the ten-year 
period 1964-19740 
Although the control of inflation has followed harmonious lines, 
it is possible to distinguish three major periods, in which the keynotes 
of stabilization policy have differed, with varying results, attributable 
to policy implementation or to changes in the_ international situation, 
or to a combination of both. 
/Table 11 
- 150 - 
Table 11 
BRAZIL: INCOME DISTRIBUTION ANONG THE 
ECONOMICALLY 	 ACTIVE POPULATION 
Deoile of the economically 
active 	 population 












Poorest 40 per cent 
Next 40 per cent 






























Source: 	 M.H. Simonsen and R. Campos op.cit., p. 188. 
Table 12 
BRAZIL: PERCENTAGE INCREASE LN REAL PER CAPITA 
INCOME BY CLASS OF INC0a, 1960-1970 
Docile of the economically 
active 	 population 
Increase 	 in real 
per capita income 
1960 	 1970 
1st deoile 
2nd decile 
5 	 docile -rh  
d 





5th docile 6.8 
6th decile 3.4 
7th y 	 docile 5.o 
8th  deoile 18.2 
9th docile 31.8 
10th docile 61.5 
Poorest 40 per cent 16.0 
Next 40 per cent 9.1 
Richest 20 per cent 53.5 
Total ato 
  
Source: M.H. Simonsen and R. Campos, op.oit.r, p. 189. 
r. 	 „c• • , 	 4_ 
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The first of these periods was the 'triennium 1964-1966, in which 
stabilization was the primary objective of economic policy, pursued 
essentially through strict control of demand. Although the rate of 
increase of prices dropped rapidly (from 91.9 per cent in 1964 to 
34.5 per cent in 1965), the concomitant was a severe "stabilization 
crisis", with mediocre growth.rates- of the product. . 
Nevertheless, this crash policy, combined with a strong swerve 
towards outward-directed development, created the right conditions 
for combating inflation more gradually, in such a way that the Tate 
of increase of prices declined gently, from 24.3 per cent in 1967 to 
20.2 per cent in 1969, 19.2 per cent in 1970 and 15.5 per cent in 
the two-year period 1972-1973, while the product expanded at annual 
rates of over 9 per cent. This 'period of growth combined with decreasing 
inflation extended from 1967 to 1973, and marked a second phase of 
policy. 
During the last 'two years of the period under consideration, 
Brazil's economic development, closely linked as it is to the external 
sector, was considerably affected'by the contraction in the European 
financial markets; the high growth rates were maintained, but were 
accompanied by an inflation which resumed its active role in the 
economy, with prices rising by 34.6 per cent in 1974. On this account, 
rapid changes had to be introduced in' stabilization policy, and thus 
began the third phase of Brazil's anti-inflationary policy. 
1. The crash colic' 1964-1966 
As from 1961, inflationary trends sharpened in the Brazilian 
economy, and although attempts were made to apply stabilization 
programmes, the process was steadily aggravated up to 1964. 
The anti-inflationary. policy appl7i.ed from 1964 onwards was based 
on the diagnosis that the prevailing inflation was one of demand, and 
stemmed from three main causes: the cash deficits of the National 
TreasuTy; the over-expansion of credits to,the private sector; and 
wage adjustments disproportionate to the increase in productivity.24/ 
212/ Ministerio do Planejamento, Pro•rama de A do Econ6mica de Governo 
1964-1966, p. 28. 
/Thus, the 
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Thus, the chief policy instruments were concentrated in the conventional 
spheres of fiscal, credit and wage policy, in different degrees of 
intensity as circumstances dictated. In practice, the primary objective 
of economic policy was the drastic control of increases in total 
demand. 
(a) 	 Growth patterns of the product and of prices  
The evolution of the economic sectors and of the product in 
1964-1966 can be traced in table 13, where the slow rate of economic 
growth is plainly evidenced. It should be noted that the highest rate 
for the gross domestic product does not exceed 4.4 per cent, and that 
in the most important sectors of production, such as agriculture and 
industry, violent fluctuations took place. Although it must be recognize( 
that the previous three years had been a period of economic crisis, 
development in 1964-1966 was radically affected by the crash anti-
inflationary policy. In 1965, for example, manufacturing showed a 
negative growth rate of about 4.9 per cent, which reflected the profound 
"stabilization crisis" to which it was exposed. Had it not been for 
the exceptional results obtained by the agricultural sector, thanks 
to favourable weather conditions, the rate of increase of the product 
in that year would not have reached 2.5 per cent, and the per capita 
growth rate would have been negative. In 1966, in contrast, manufacturing  
regained its dynamic impetus, and it was in agriculture that the rate 
of development was negative, with the consequent depressive effect 
on the increase in the total product. In the following year, agriculture 
and industry again switched roles, their respective growth rates 
being 9.6 per cent and 1.8 per cent; manufacturing underwent a second 
"stabilization crisis", which began at the close of 1966. 
From another angle, price trends in the period show how the pace 
of inflation quickened up to 1965, in which year, as in 1964, the rates 
of increase reflected in the overall price index exceeded 90 per cent 
(see table 14). From 1965 onwards, with the adoption of a strict 
anti-inflationary programme, the process if inflationary el..ansion was 
definitely disrupted, and the result was the "stabilization crisis" 
of 1965. 
/Table 13 
- 153 - 
Table 13 
BRAZIL: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT BY SECTORS OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 
(Annual percentage growth rates) 
Sector 1960-195 1964 - 1965 
Agriculture, forestry and 
fishing 5.7 1.3 13.8 
Mining and quarrying 13.5 • 13.4 ' 12.0 
Manufacturing 3.7 5.1 -4.9 
Construction -2.8 2.2 0.7 
Electricity, gas and water 6.3 7.0 4.7 
Transport and communications 5.3 3.6 0.8 
Commerce and finance 3.o 3:1 5.0 
Ownership of dwellings 3.6 3.6 3.6 
Public administration and 
defence 2.4 2.4 2.4 
Miscellaneous services 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Total 4.2 3.1 3.3 
1966 











Source: ECLA, Economic Surve 
Excluding coffee. 
f Latin Am ric 
Table 14 
BRAZIL: PERCENTAGE VIARIATIONS'IN SELECTED PRICE INDEXES 
Index 1962 1963 1964 1963 1966 
Cost of living in Guanabara 88.5 80.6 36.5 45.3 41.1 
Cost of living in Sao Paulo 612 3o.5 85.5 4101 46.3 
Wholesale prices in general 50.2 A.,  95.3 2o.2 37.4 
Wholesale prices excluding 
coffee '+5.7 87.c 34.o 31.3 41.6 
Source: ECLA, Economic Surve of Latin America, 1967. 
/In the 
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In the following year, the inflexibility of stabilization policy 
was slightly relaxed, and price indexes rose again, showing the stubborn 
resistance of rates of inflation to reduction below a limit of about 
35 per cent per annum. 
(b) Eainlines.211212.131114tiorL2221sz 
Anti-inflationary policy in 1964-1966 pivoted upon measures 
relating to fiscal, monetary, wages and price policy. 
With respect to fiscal policy, the strategy adopted consisted in 
reducing the deficit through the expansion of income and the restriction 
of public spending. In view of the inflexibility of the structure of 
expenditure, despite the partial contraction of public investment 
achieved, it was on action to increase revenue that emphasis was placed, 
an emergency tax reform being introduced in the second half on 1964. 
In real terms, public-sector income expanded at an average annual rate 
of 8.7 per cent over the three-year period, whereas the annual growth 
rate of expenditure did not rise above 1.7 per cent (see table 15). 
What was left of the fiscal deficit was financed through the compulsory 
and voluntary placement of official securities in the form of the 
newly-created Adjustable Treasury Bonds, which were safeguarded against 
devaluations of the currency, and of which the redemption period, 
originally fixed at three years, was subsequently reduced to one year. 
It was thus possible to finance 54 per cent of the fiscal deficit in 
1965 and to collect revenue in excess of the deficit in 1966, so that 
the National. Treasury became a net source of funds for the monetary 
authorities (see again table 15). 
The implementation of fiscal policy, which was reflected in a 
substantial increase in income and restriction of expenditure did 
succeed, on the one hand, in reducing the deficit and thus obviating 
a primary expansion of the means of payment; but, on the other hand, 
it had heavily depressive effects on the level of economic activity, 
causing a greater contraction of total demand than the Government had 
desired. 
/Table 15 
- 155 - 
Table 15 
BRA.ZIL: NaTIONLL TREASUAY. EVOLUTION CF FISC1kL BUDGET 
(Trillions of cruzeiros at current prices) 
Real 
income 





a:pend- 	 Ature 
















1964 2 129 2 129 2 857 2 857 -728 736 -3 3.2 
1965 3 907 2 491 4 500 2 869 -593 270 323 1.6 
1966 5 910 2 733 6 500 3 006 
-587 -190 606 1.1 
Source: Central•Bank of Brazil. 
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The second front in the anti-inflationary battle was constituted 
by wage policy. This was based on a'diagnosis to the effect that 
wage adjustments during the post-war period had outstripped the increases 
in the average productivity of the economy, and that in consequence 
it was necessary to re-establish the structure of income distribution 
as between wage-earners and the other groups. A new system of wage 
adjuStments was therefore applied, under which the average real wage 
for the past twentyfour months was restored, with the incorporation 
of the increases in productivity achieved in the preceding period 
Ono an estimate of the expected rise in prices in the period during 
which the new wage would be in force ("inflationary residuum"). This 
method of adjustment considerably reduced the real minimum wage since 
it was based on rates of inflation projected by the Government (25 per 
cent,. 10 per cent and 15 per cent for 1965, 1966 and 1967, respectively), 
which fell short of the price increases that actually occurred (see 
table 16). Thus, wage policy became yet another depressive factor 
affecting demand in the economy, besides playing an important part 
in the redistribution of income in favour of the higher brackets, 
as was shown in the first section of this chapter. 
The aim of credit policy was to mobilize the savings of private 
enterprises for the financing of their current operations. To that 
end, the credit provided by the Banco do Brasil (which is responsible 
for one-third of total credit) was severely restricted, and strict 
control was exercised over the private commercial banks' capacity to 
expand the means of payment (see table 17). The real value of bank loans 
during the three-year period was kept far below the average for 1960-1962. 
Enterprises, in the impossibility of converting their immovable assets 
(accumulated as a safeguard against inflation) into ready cash, exerted 
pressure on the financial market, thus forcing up the real rate of 
interest. In addition, the Government itself aggravated the financing 
problem by competing on advantageous terms with the private sector 
in the tapping of savings and of the monetary reserves existing in the 
system, through the sale of the Adjustable Treasury Bonds. 
/Table 16 
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Table 16 





Index of evolution of minimum 
wage in real terms (1965=100) 













	 81-00 	 93 	 90 
Source: P. Aubercer, Le modele br6silien de  lutte contre l!inflation. 
Problemes d'Amerique Latine, December 1973. 
Table 17 
BRAZIL: LOANS TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
(Thousands of millions of old  
cruzeiros at 1960 prices) 
Year 	 Banco do Brasil 
	 Commercial, banks 	 Total 
	n•••• •••••••••n••••• 
1963 	 161.4 	 293.7- 
1964 	 165.0 	 236.4 
1965 	 173.5 
	
'79.7 





Source: ECLA/ILPES, A evolucao recente da economic  
Rio de. Janeiro, 1967. 
/Aside from 
Aside from these measures, but with no less significant 
repercussions, an adjustment was made in prices that had remained 
frozen or had lagged behind during the preceding five-year spell of 
inflation. The "corrective inflation", as this line of action was 
termed at the time, affected exchange rates, rents, public utility 
tariffs, prices of transport and fuels and, in general, prices of the 
inputs produced by the public enterprises. Its impact made itself felt 
in pressures on costs, which made their appearance in the economy from 
1965 onwards. 
The cash programme applied during the three-year period 1964-1966 
succeeded in drastically reducing price dncreases, and definitely checkinE 
the advance of inflation. The implementation of anti-inflationary 
policy, however, had negative effects on the level of economic activity, 
through the contraction of real disposable income and the consequent 
insufficiency of total demand. At the same time, other cost pressures 
emerged in the economy, with the imposition of heavier taxation, the 
raising of the real rate of interest, and the price increaces deriving 
from the so-called corrective inflation. 
2. Growth with relative stability. The .gradualist 
polio applied in 1967-1973 
To judge by the rates of inflation and by economic development, 
the successes of the gradualist policy are obvious. In the evolution 
of the rate of inflation, measured by the variations in the overall 
price index, three different periods can be distinguished: the two-year 
period 1967-1963, in which rates of inflation fluctuated between 24.3 and 
25.4 per cent; the triennium 1969-1971, in which annual rates ragged 
from 19 to 20 per cent; and the years 1972-1973, in which the annual 
variation in the index was 15.5 per cent. These indicators adequately 
illustrate the steady diminution of rates of inflation in the period 
analysed (see table 20 below). 
Moreover, the expansion of economic activity, measured in terms 
of annual growth rates of the product which exceeded 9 per cent from 
1968 onwards, reflects the attainment of another objective. 
/If the 
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If the anti-inflationary. policy pursued in Brazil as from 1967 is 
to be correctly interpreted, it must be considered in the broader 
framework of an economic policy with growth as its primary objective, 
by which stabilization policy is conditioned. 
Although at times both objectives - stability and growth - were 
furthered by the same expedients {as-in the case of the reform of the 
national financial system and the-strengthening of _internal credit by 
means of external loans), they:dicUnot always coincide. In the second 
phase growth be- Came the predominant aim, and in consequence an 
expansionist monetary policy was adopted, which. was intended to stimulate 
demand and support production,-but which, at the same time, constituted 
an inflationary factor.. 
It is, of courbs,plain at a glance that stabilization efforts 
were greatly favoured by the:changesAntroduced in the financial system, 
as briefly described in the first section of this chapter. While, on 
the one hand, the broadening and diversification of the financial system 
was designed to lay'the foundations for the expansion of the dynamic 
core of economic development, another aim was to put into practice 
financing pi"OgraMmes which were based on the tapping of private savings 
and monetary reserves and which would progressively replace the 
traditional modes of finanCing, based on inflationary expansion of the 
means'of payment and on the over-dependence of enterprises on their 
own internal sources of funds. In the last analysis, the reform of 
the national financial system permitted the creation of liquidity 
in the economy, independently of primary expansion of the means of 
payment (see again table 5)9 	 the flow of external resources 
was favourable to the proposed,expansion of economic activity; the 
growth of imports, especially of capital goods, was strongly supported 
by external finanCing. From. the point of. view of inflation, however, 
it must be recognized that the inflow of capital constituted the most 
dynamic factor of monetary expansion during the period undor 
consideration: an expansion -which was offset by the implementation of 
an active open-market policy. 
/Access to 
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Access to external credit made enterprises less dependent upon 
the traditional sources of internal financing, which suggests that 
without this foreign backing the rate of inflation might have been. 
higher. 
With respect to monetary and credit policy, the period was 
characterized by a relatively -tolerant attitude towards the expansion 
of the means of payment, with a view to ensuring the encouragment of 
demand. The aim was not to eradicate inflation over the short term, 
but to compromise with declining rates that would be compatible with 
the accelerated growth of the product. In this context, stabilization 
policy was concerned mainly with applying mechanisms to counteract those 
effects of inflation that made for disequilibrium (periodical devaluation 
 
of the exchange rate, generalized monetary adjustments), rather than 
with stringent measures to prevent a moderately inflationary expansion 
of the means of payment, although the monetary authorities had at their 
disposal a great many fiscal, credit, financial and monetary instruments 
by means of which they could extend their control over the expansion 
of liquidity in the economy. 
From another standpoint, the more drastic stabilization measures 
sought to keep under control certain cost items considered to be of 
strategic importance; this enhanced the significance of wage policy, 
of action taken to stabilize rates of interest, and of price control 
policy. 
(a) 	 Sources of inflationary pressures durin, the neriod 
The main sources of inflationary pressures through expansion of 
the means of- payment during the period 1963-1970 are shown in teble 18. 
It can be seen that monetary expansion in the period was essentially 
linked to the increase in credits to t'23 private sector and the national 
currency counterpart of the increment in international reserves. 
The annual rate of expansion of credit to the private sector 
averaged 38 per cent during the quinquennium, while the growth rate of 
reserves was 50 per cent per annum between 1969 and 1973. 
/Table 18 
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It is of interest to note that these two factors were closely 
related to the maintenance of the rate of economic development, and 
served the intention of economic policy in the application of ,a specific 
growth model, making it patent that the stability objective was 
subordinated to , the proposed growth targets. 
From a different point of view, linked to cost pressures in the 
economy, a major role was played by the raising of the rate of interest, 
which from 1967 onwards became increasingly positive. Table 19 shows 
the evolution of real rate of interest, which from a negative value 
of about 30 per cent in 1964 rose by 1969 to positive rates of 8.4 per 
cent and 19.3 per cent on bank loans and bills of exchange, respectively 
Special mention must also be made of the expectation factor in 
the maintenance of rates of increase of prices during the period under 
consideration. The persistence of an active inflationary process in 
the recent past had incited enterprises to adjust their prices largely 
as a function'of the rate of inflation expected for the coming period, 
thus introduCing a factor of self-propagation of the inflationary 
process. This factor, operative in the early years of the period, 
lessened in importance insofar as the rate of inflation was reduced. 
By no means negligible, however, was the similar role played in refuelli 
inflation by such mechanisms as monetary adjustment and the flexible 
exchange rate, which was established to mitigate some of the effects 
of inflation. 
Lastly, attention must be drawn to the traditional role of the 
agricultural sector in the Brazilian economy. It operates as an autonom 
factor of expansion or contraction of prices in accordance with the 
variations in agricultural production, exposed as it is to the vicissitu 
of weather conditions and to greater pzice flexibility. Agricultural 
price fluctuations are reflected directly in the rate of inflation, 
through changes in the wholesale price index, in which they carry 'a 
weight of approximately 37 per cent. It is worth noting, however; 
that in 1967-1968 increases in agricultural prices were lower than 
those shown in the other price indexes. As from 1969 the situation was 
reversed, and agricultural prices rose faster than the rest (see table 2 
/Table 19 
wholesale, prices 	 Index of 
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Table 19 
BRAZIL: AVERAGE ANNUAL RATES OF INTEAST ON LOANS, DEPIZED BY THE OVER-ALL 













1960 7.4 -15.2 9.9 - 
1961 .11.8 -18.0 10.9 - 
1962 -17.5 -25.1 5.5 ... 
1963 -25.6 -35.0  .2.8 - 
1964 -30.1 .376 .4.9 = - 
1965 -14.1 .21-.7 . 14.1 -, 
1966 
-2.3 -9.1 24,2 
1967 4.5 -5.1 16.1 903 
1968 7.6 8.4. 17c7 28.9 
1969 8.4 - 190 11.1 
1970 - 19.91 806 
Source: Donald Syvrud, Estrutura e Politica de Juros no Brasil, 1260-197.c, January. 
Earoh 1972. 
2/ Resolution of the Central Bank under which domestic enterprises were grandud aooess 
to external credit, through the commercial and investment banks. 
11 Eve 
Table 20 
BRAZIL: INDIMULS OF PRICES 
(P:roentage rates of variation) 
1967 22.5 21.1 23.1 24.1 41.3 24.3 
1968 25.0 16.7 34.6 24.5 32.7 25.4 
1969 21.8 31.7 15.1 24.3 12,3 20.2 
1970 19.3 20,3 18.9 20.9 18.7 19,2 
1971 20.2 24.7 16.7 18.1 12.7 19.8 
1972 17,5 22.3 1504 1400 1908 15.5 
1973 16.7 16.7 16.6 13.7 21.1 15.5 
Souree: Fundagao Getdlio Vargas, 
J Index of oonsumer prices. 
b/Synthesis of indexes of total supply (wholesale prices), post of living in Guanabara 
and post of oonstruoticn, weighted by 0.6, 6.3 and 0.1, respectively. /Paradoxically enough 
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Paradoxically enough, the changes in the price system determined by 
the greater increases in the agridultural prices coincided with the 
decline of inflation and the speeding-up of the growth rate of the 
product. The incidence of agricultural price policy on the achievement 
of the objectives consisting in economic growth and the control of 
inflation is plain to be seen. 
(b) 	 Control of inflation 
(i) Fiscalsolisz. The main concern of fiscal policy in relation 
to the stability objective was the control and financing of the fiscal 
deficit. 
As had already been shown, the aim of the first line of action, 
initiated in the preceding period (1964-1966), was to improve fiscal 
revenue through the implementation of a tax reform, which expanded 
the sources of taxation and promoted the-redistribution of fiscal . 
revenue between the Federal Government and the States. By.virtue of 
these measures, it was possible to increase revenue more rapidly than 
prices rose, as can be seen in table 21. 
This increment made no appreciable difference to the proportion 
of the gross domestic product represented by the tax burden. The 
increase in the share of the Federal Government was offset by the 
decrease in that of the local governments and other public institutions 
(see table 22). 
The real increase in public expenditure - was approximately 14 per 
cent per annum in 1967-1973, which reflects a considerable expansion 
and a heavier incidence on the Brazilian economy. To analyse the growth 
of public spending from the standpoint of the interpretation of inflation 
two important facts must be taken into account: the type of financing 





BRAZIL: NATI'JNAL TREASURY. EVOLUTION OF THE FISCAL BUDGET, 
(iIiilions of Cruzeiros at current prices) 
1967 1968 1969 	 . 1970 1971 1972 	 . 1973 
Income 
	 . 6 314 10 275 13 953 1,) 194 26 980 37 738 52 863 
Percentage rate of 
variation 15.3 50.7  35.8 37.6 40.5 39,9._ . 40.1 
Expenditure 8 039 11 502 14 709 19 932 • 27 652 38 250 52 568 
Percentage rate of 
variation ' 220 - 43.1 . 	 27.9 35,5 ,. 	 38.7 38.3 57.4 
Deficit -1 225 -1 227 ++756 	 : -738 	 . 472 .-516 295 
Gross domestic product 71.  436 99 879 	 . 133 117 . 174 624 234 005 298 902 406 221 
Income as percentage of 
gross domestic pro4uot 
Expenditure as percentage 
of gross domestic: product 
Deficit as percentage of 
gross domestic product 
Evolution of oven-all 
index of prices 
9.5 10.3 10.5 11.0 11.5 12.6 13.0 
11.2 11.5 11.1 11.4 11.8 12.8 12.9 
1.7 . 	 1.2 0,6 0.4 , 	 003 0.2 
24.3 25.4 20.2 19.2 19,8 155 15.5 
Source: Central Bank and Funcapao Getdlio Vargas. 
Table 22 
BRAZIL: EVOLUTION OF TAX REVENUE 
• 	 Rates of 	 taxation in relation to 
gross domestic 	 product 
1968 1971 
Federal government 10.6 12.0 
Local governments 104 9.1 
Other public bodies 7.6 6.9 
Total 28,5 28.0 
Source: 	 P. Auberser, optoit.  
/The lap.:_ntonance 
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The maintenance of the policy launched in 1964-1966, which 
consisted in financing the deficit' through the sale Of Adjustable 
Treasury Bonds, obviously meant that'there was no direct expansion 
of liquidity in the economic system under this head. Moreover, the 
success achieved with these bonds was such that from 1969 onwards the 
National Treasury was in a position to supply. the monetary authorities 
with funds, as will be shown later. 
With regard to the structure of public expenditure, attention 
must be drawn to the greater expansion of investment, consistent with 
the desire to keep growth rates high over the period under. review. 
The share of current expenditure, which had been about 75 per cent of 
total outlays in 1966-1967, decreased to 63 per cent in 1972, so that 
the capital budget was able to expand more rapidly, especially the 
proportion allocated to infrastructure, and a safeguard was provided 
against undesirable increases in the fiscal deficit. 
As a result of the changes indicated in both income and expenditurE 
the deficit in question was substantially reduced. Whereas in 1962 it 
had represented 1.7 per cent of the product, by 1972 it accounted for 
only 0.2 per cent, and in 1973 had even given place to a small surplus 
(see•again table 21). 
(ii). Monetary and credit policy. Monetary and credit policy in 
the period was subordinated to the maintenance of levels of liquidity 
in the economy which would be compatible with the attainment of high 
growth rates. In this connexion, unremitting care was taken to keep 
the money supply constant as a proportion of the product, thus 
forestalling, above all, liquidity problems which might have a depressivE 
effect on economic activity. The experience of the previous two years, 
when monetary policy had gone too far in showing down the growth rate 
of the means of payment, counselled the maintenance of an easy flow 
of operations in the financial sphere. Thus, the monetary supply expande 
at an average annual rate of 35 per cent in 1967-1973, end the proportior 
of the product that it represented hovered between'19 and 22 per cent 
(see table 23). 
/Table 23 
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Table 23 
BRAZIL: EVOLUTION OF MEANS OF PAYMEET 
(Millions of oruzeiros at current prices: balances at close of period) 
1967 	 1968 	 1969 	 1970 	 1971 	 1972 	 1973 
Means of pa,yhent 
Rate of increase 
Evolution of over-all 
index of prices 
Gross domestic product 
14 931 	 21 352 	 28 35o 	 33 638 	 44 514 	 61 55o 	 90 490 
	
42.6 	 43.o 	 32.8 	 10.6 	 32.3 	 38.3 	 47.0 
	
24.3 	 25.4 	 •20.2 
	
19.2 	 19.8 	 15.5, 	 , 	 15.5 
71 486 	 99 879 	 133 117 	 174 624 	 234 005 	 298 902 	 406 221 
Means of payment as 
percentage of cross 
domestic product 	 20.9 	 21.4 	 21.3 	 19.3 	 19.0 	 20.6 	 22.3 
Source: Fundacao Getdlio Vargas, Conjuntura Econcmica. 
/The variations 
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The variations undergone by the means of payment and prices during 
the years 1970-1973 refute assumptions that these variables are closely 
associated. In actual fact, whereas from 1970 onwards the means of 
payment expanded at increasing rates, the overall price index, precisely 
in that period, showed a'dlearly-defined downWard trend, within a 
framework of thriving economic growth. 
It should be recalled, of course, that monetary policy in the 
period was greatly facilitated by the changes introduced through the 
reform of the national financial system, which made it possible to 
give the economy increased liquidity independently of primary expansion 
of means of payment, as was explained in the first section of this 
chapter (see again table 5). 
Another factor which enlarged the sphere of operation of the 
monetary authorities was the possibility of avoiding the financing of 
fiscal deficits through primary issues. As has been stated, fiscal 
deficits were successfully covered by issues of Adjustable Treasury 
Bonds which were sold to public institutions, commercial banks and the 
general public. The growth of these placements is worthy of note, for 
by 1969 the operations of the National Treasury had already become an 
important factor of monetary contraction (see table 24). In 1972 the 
funds collected by this means amounted to 8,202 million cruzeiros, or 
the equivalent of 20.6 per cent of fiscal revenue in that year, so that 
in this expedient monetary policy had an efficient instrument for the 
regulation of liquidity. The contraction of the money supply assumed 
considerable proportions from 1971 onwards, largely by virtue of the 
steady improvement in the fiscal situation. 
Thus, the expansion of the means of payment in the period was 
linked to factors which had a bearing on the aim of economic policy: 
primary expansion as the result of a balance-of-payments surplus and 
secondary expansion, via a monetary multiplier, through an increase 
in credits to the private sector. 
/Table 24 
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Table 24 
BRAZIL: FINANCING OF FISCAL DEFICIT 








1967 -1 225 699 526 
1963 -1 227 1 077. 150 
1969 . -756 -1 026 1 782 
1970 
-733 -833 1 571 
1971 -672 -3 368 4 036 
1972 : '1-516- -7'766 8 282 
1973 295 -6 016 5 721 
Source: Central. Bank of Brazil. 
/As was 
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As was previously shown, the national currency counterpart of 
the inflow of foreign capital was the most dynamic item among the 
increases in overall liquidity; so much so, indeed, that as from 
1972 deposits of this counterpart -in.proportions ranging from 25 to 
40 per cent of the foreign loans concerned were made compulsory as 
a means of controlling its inflationary repercussions. 
The other expansionist factor - credits to the private sector -
although not so highly dynamic as the inflow of foreign funds, because 
of its relative importance among the expansionist factors (more than 
Co per cent) and its steady annual growth, became the principal source 
of liquidity. Indeed, the quest for a degree of liquidity compatible 
with high growth rates led to an expansion of bank credit at the real 
annual rate of 22 per cent in the period 1967-1973, and, in particular, 
loans granted by the Banco do Brasil, which was more responsive to 
government policy, increased by 25.5 per cent per annum (see table 25). 
Another point to note is the growth of credit extended by the 
investment banks to finance circulating capital, which in 1973 came 
to represent 11.3 per cent of total loans to the private sector, with 
an average rate of expansion of approximately 54.5 per cent. The 'boom 
in the operations of the credit and investment companies specializing 
in loans for consumption purposes is also worthy of comment; by 1973 
these associations accounted for 15.2 per cent of total credit to the 
private sector, with an average growth rate during the period of about 
41 per cent in real terms. Lastly, the rapid expansion of the system 
for financing house purchase is reflected in a share of total loans 
amounting to roughly 12.9 per cent.22/ In the aggregate, these changes 
highlight the system's capacity to expand liquidity in the economy, 
keeping demand brisk and reasonably independent of primary expansion of 
the means of payment. 
25/ The mechanisms for financing consumption and house purchase played 
a supplementary role in the process of concentration of income, 
in the sense that they brought the profile of demand into line 
with the structure of production, allowing the growth of private 
consumption to outstrip that of disposable personal income. 
/Table 25 
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Table 25 
BRAZIL: FINANCIAL SYSTEM. LOANS TO THE PRIVATE SECTCR 
(Millions of aruieiros at current prices) 
Per-
cent 





















Bank system 12 008 69.5 34 991 36 002 52 182 78 180 113 831 48.1 22.0 
Coimeroial banks 8 456 49.0 24 641 23 824 34 121 51 130 73 346 310 19.9 
Banco do Brasil 3 552 20.5 lo 350 12 178 18 061 26 850 40 485 17.1 25.5 
Development agencies 1 598 9.3 4 657 3 512 5 226 8 018 11 185 4.7 15.7 
Credit and investment 
oompanies and investment 
banks 2. 276 13.2 6 632 13 185 20 840 37 297 63 989 27.0 46.0 
Credit and investment 
companies 1 579 9.1 4 601 7850 11 823 19 790 ' 35 946 — 15.2 41.o 
Investment banks 697 4.1 2 031 5 335 017 17 507 28 643 11.8 54.5,  
House purchase finanoing 
system 540 3.1 1 574 7 464 12 558 19 393 30427 12.9 64.0 
Others 844 4.9 2 459 4 364 6 594 10 103 17 148 7.3 38.0 
Total 17 266 100.6 50 313 64 527 57 400 152 991 236 580 100.0 
Source: 	 Central Bank of Brazil, Relat6rios. 
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As an indispensable complement to this definitely expansionist 
monetary an credit policy, the Government, as from 1971, initiated 
open market operations, partly substituting them for-the traditional 
monetary manoeuvres based on rediscounting and compulsory deposits, 
and thus securing increased flexibility and more effective control of 
liquidity in the economy. 
To this purpose, use was made chiefly of National Treasury Bills 
of Exchange, securities which were issued weekly, maturing in periods 
of 91 to 182 days, or monthly, maturing at the end of one year; they 
were sold chiefly to enterprises and the general public (34 per cent 
in 1973), and to the commercial banks (25 per cent) (see table 26). 
In practice, these operations repreSented the most important 
,instrument for controlling the money supply in Brazil, and although 
they were started only recently they can be credited with 60 per cent 
of the effect produced by the factors making for contraction of the 
money supply in 1973. Furthermore, to give an idea of the volume of 
resources handled in these operations, suffice it to say that in 1973 
the Central Bank's National Treasury Bills'transactions amounted to 
114.6 thousand millionicruzeiros in absolute terms, and were equivalent 
to 30 per cent of the monetary value of the gross domestic product in 
that year. 
If Central Bank operations with the National Treasury Bills are 
taken together with the Adjustable Bond transactions negotiated mainly'. 
for the financing of the fiscal deficit, an idea. oan be formed of their 
contractionist impact on the liabilities of the monetary authorities, 
in comparison with the annual expansion of the liquid money supply 
(see table 27). As will be noted, in 1972 this impact came to represent 
an amount equivalent to 40 per cent of the annual expansion of the 
means of payment. In face of the liberality of credit policy and the 
accumulation of foreign reserves, factors which constantly generated 
powerful inflationary pressures, the importance of the policy of 
monetary absorption through open-market operations can be readily 
understood. 
/Table 26 
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Table 26 
BRAZIL: PRINCIPAL HOLDERS OF NATIONALTREASURTBILLS OF EXCHANGE 
(Balances in millions of cruzeiros) 
1970 1971 1972 1973 
Central Bank of Brazil" 204 1 810 2 150 5 906 
Commercial banks ... 683 2 623 4 381 
Official ... 167 729 1 571 
Private ... 516 1 894 2 810 
Federal Savings Bank 9.. ... 388 831 
Social Integration Programme — — 57 104 
State Savings Bank .. 0 1 14 
Federal Development Banks ... 140 183 24 
Reinsurance Institute of Brazil - 8 8 
Private enterprises and general 
public. 496 1 239 4 794 5 911 
Total tOLL 3 88o lo 204 17 400, 




BRAZIL: MONETARY AUTHORITIES. IFPACT OF NATIONAL 
TREASURY ADJUSTABLE BONDS AND BILLS 
OF EXCHANGE ON EONETARY LIABILITIES 
(Millions of oruzeiros) 
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
Contraotionist effect 1 307 5 117 13 202 19 802 45 957 96 230 
Subscription of National Treasury 
Adjustable Bonds and Bill of 
Exchange 1 186 1 962 4 089 11 215 22 531 32 421 
Sales of Nation Treasury Adjustable 
Bonds and Bills of Exchange by the 
Central Bank 121 3 155 9 113 8 587 25 426 63 809 
Expansionist effeot 1 153 4 097 11 863 18 c45 4o 758 93 823 
Redemption of National Treasury 
Adjustable Bonds and Bills of 
Exchange 1 116 3 775 9 888 13 001 22 594 37 847 
Purchases of National Treasury 
Adjustable Bonds and Bills of 
Exchange for the Central Bank 
portfolio 37 322 1  975 5 *44 18 164 55 974 
Balance 
-154 -1 020 -1 339 -1 757 -7 199 -2 407 
Expansion of liquid money supply 6 421 6 998 7 570 11 241 17 156 28 768 
Source: 
	 Annual reports of Central Bank, 
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From another standpoint, a main objective 'of monetary policy in 
the period was the control of the rate'of interest, because of its 
obvious repercussions on the production costs of enterprises. As 
has already been noted, real interest rates increased continuously 
from 1964 onwards until they became positive, since the nominal rates 
decreased at a slower pace than the rate of inflation. This evolution 
seems to be explained by the rising levels of demand for circulating 
capital, investment and consumption resources which resulted from the 
maintenance of high growth rates, and which exerted pressure on the 
financial resources of the economy, despite the expansionist monetary 
policy and the reform of the financial'system that enabled the degree 
of liquidity to be increased. This pressure on.resourCes meant that 
the element of speculation in financial movements was considerable, 
thus partly accounting for the tenacity With which the real rate of 
interest withstood reduction. 
In these circumstances, the policy of the monetary authorities 
was mainly directed towards cutting the operational costs of the 
bank system, through incentiVes'to 'bank mergers rand to'the 
reorganization or closing-down of branches run at a loss. Furthermore, 
from 1963 onwards commercial banks were allowed to'maintain increasing 
proportions Of their compulsory deposits (55 per cent as from 1971) 
in the form of National Treasury securities (Adjustable Bonds and Bills 
of Exchange), by which means, concurrently with the creation of 
remunerative conditions for a large proportion of the compulsory deposits 
and the improvement of the bank network's rates of'return,.the market 
for public debt securities was expanded and stabilized. Nevertheless, 
these incentives do not seem to have brought about any significant 
reduction of the real rate of interest. 
Such traditional instruments of monetary policy as rediscounting 
and compulsory rates of reserves, were somewhat cautiously utilized 
in the period under review, largely owing to the success achieved in 
26/ At the end of 1973 there were 37 commercial banks in existence, 
with a total of 5,540 branches, whereas in 1969 there had been 
164 establishments with 5,659 branches. See Central Bank of 
Brazil, Relat6rio, 1973. 
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oepn-market operations, by which they were advantageously superseded. 
Thus, rediscounting was used mainly as an instrument for the sectoral 
allocation of credits, special rates being established which enabled 
the banks to refinance credits assigned to the production and marketing 
of agricultural commodities in general and of certain agricultural 
export products such as coffee, cocoa, tobacco, etc., and to the 
production of manufactures for export. With regard to compulsory 
reserves, rates varied very little during the period, fluctuating 
around 27 per cent for banks operating in the developed parts of the 
country and 13 per cent for those in the less developed areas, and 
no anti-inflationary objectives were pursued. 
(iii) Wage policy. The wage policy formulated.in the three-year 
period 1964-1966 was maintained during the period under discussion. 
As already noted, this policy implied the abandonment of the traditional 
principle of adjusting wages proportionally to the rise in the cost 
of living, replacing it by a formula which calculated wage adjustments 
in such a way that during the twelve month for which the new nominal 
wage was in force, average real wages were equivalent to the average 
for the preceding 24 months, augmented by a percentage representative 
of the increase in productivity. This formula, which took into account 
a projection of future inflation ("inflationary residuum"), was slightly 
modified as from 1963, when it was established that if the "inflationary 
residuum" had been underestimated for the previous twelve months, this 
,could be taken into consideration in the calculation of the new nominal 
wage levels. Although this change brought the evolution of wages 
closer to that of the cost of living, real wages continued to decrease 
up to 1972, and thenceforward began to show increases too modest to 
restore their 1964 purchasing power (see table 28). 
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Table 23 




in 	 . 
minimum wage 
Cost of living 
in 
Guanabara 
Index of evolution 
. 	 of real 
minimum wage 
1964 91.7 91.5 105 
1965 54.0 65.9 100 
1966 30.6 41.3 93 
1967 25.3 30.6 89 
1963 21.6 22.3 89 
1969 19.2 22.1 87 
1970 20.0 22.7 35 
1971 20.6 20.2 85 
1972 19.2 16.5 88 
1973 16.1 12.7 89 
Source: Central Bank, Funda;do Getfilio Vargas, Con'untura Econ6mica. 
The importance of this wage policy formula can be measured not 
only by its application to the adjustment of the so-called legal 
minimum wage,22/ but also by its utilization in the adjustment of 
public-sector salaries and in cases of collective wage bargaining, 
'apart from the fact that it constituted the frame 6f'reference for 
fixing the lowest salary levels in the economy. In other words, wage 
policy affects a range of remunerations considerably wider than the 
earnings of recipients of the'legal minimum wage.; 
While it is true that this wage policy was of decisive importance 
in the gradual reduction of rates of inflation, and enabled the price-
wage spiral to be broken down, it had significant effects on the 
22/ According to estimates prepared by the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Security, in 1968, 51 per cent of wage-earners in Brazil 
were earning less than 1.23 times the legal minimum wage. 
See P. Auberger, coo. cit., p. 28. 
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allocation of resources in the system. As can easily be understood, 
it was a powerful factor in the concentration of personal income which, 
as previously pointed out in the first section of this chapter, was 
one of the bases for the high growth rates recorded in the period. 
Wage policy had a depressive effect on basic wages in the economy, 
favouring a redistribution of income which benefited the upper-middle 
and upper income strata, in whose hands the dynamic purchasing power 
of the system lay. Only thus is it comprehensible that real private 
consumption in the economy was able to expand at an average annual 
rate of 12.1 per cent during the period 1967-1973,23/ just at a time 
when the real minimum wage - the standard of pay for a large proportion 
of the economically active population - was diminishing. 
(iv) Price policy. The price control policy applied during 
the period may be regarded as a necessary complement of an expansionist 
monetary policy and a fiscal rolicy compatible with high rates of growth 
of the product. In this connexion, it was sought to use mechanisms 
which without blocking prices would be capable of controlling them, 
and preventing increases that would anticipate inflation or substantially 
boost profits. In contrast, the aim pursued was that rising prices 
should reflect real increases in costs. Thus, price policy was applied 
to agricultural and industrial products and to the tertiary sector, 
with varying results. 
For the agricultural sector a two-fold objective was pursued. 
In the first place, price policy sought to protect the sector's income 
through the fixing of minimum guaranteed producer's prices; secondly, 
the intention was to keep agricultural prices within a margin compatible 
with the control of inflation, and prevent them from following 
international trends, since this might have represented a serious 
internal inflationary pressure. 
With the object of maintaining certain minimum prices, credit 
policy was directed towards the continued extension of loans by the 
Banco do Brasil for financing the storage and purchase of products; 
23/ Primary data taken from Economic Survey of Latin America, 1968  
and 1973. 
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this constituted a factor of monetary expansion in the economy, but 
did not unduly affect the placements of the monetary authorities. 
As regards general agricultural price policy, the principal 
measures were those applied to exports of certain commodities, such 
as coffee, cocoa and beef, and the establishment of quantitative expOrt 
restrictions, which affected, inter alia, cotton, maize, sisal hemp, 
soya beans, beef, cocoa, etc. The aim of these measures was to prevent 
internal agricultural prices from rising in consequence of the development 
of export lines at prices more remunerative than those obtainable in 
the domestic market (see table 29). 
As regards prices of industrial goods, a succession of different 
types of control was established in the period, reflecting a somewhat 
wavering policy in respect of the use of various instruments. The 
first measure adopted was the application of a system of incentives 
to enterprises that kept their prices within the margins fixed by the 
Government, guaranteeing them rediscount facilities in respect of their 
Central Bank credits, supplementary credits from the Banco do Brasil, 
lengthening of time limits for tax payment, etc. This system was 
subsequently replaced by another of automatic price adjustments, based 
on the index of wholesale prices, at intervals of three months. Some 
months later the type of control was changed again, and as from 1968 
adjustments of the prices charged by enterprises were determined by 
equivalent increases in costs, subject to prior authorization by the 
Inter-Ministerial Price Commission (IPC). This control is at present 
applied to about 4,500 industrial enterprises. Failure to comply with 
the regulations laid down by the IPC may incur sanctions such as the 
suppression of Banco do Brasil credits, loss of Central Bank rediscount 
rights, or, in extreme cases, official intervention in the running of 
the enterprise. Generally speaking, control of industrial prices does 
not seem to have had unfavourable repercussions on the sector, to 
judge by the rates of return of industrial enterprises, which have 
been rising since 1967 (see table 30). 
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Table 29 
BRAZIL: PERCENTAGE VARIATIONS IN PRICES OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
Index of wholesale prices of total 
supply 
Industrial products 16.8 17.5 16.0 14.7 Z7.92/ 
Agricultural products 28.7 25.3 22.3 19.0 25.1x/ 
Index of exports prices 
Sugar 7.6 9.2 60.6 2.0 156.62/ 
Soya beans 
-0.8 21.8 8.7 113.2 -10.71t/ 
Cotton 0.8 34.2 9.5 16.7 
-36-712/ 
Coffee 36.1 -23.5 26.5 22.8 14.52/ 
Beef 
... 56.4 
-1.9 41.6 ... 
Source: Fundasao Getdlio Vargas, Conjuntura EconOmica. 
/ Up to September 1974. 
by/Up to July 1974. 
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Table 30 
BRAZIL: RATES OF RETURN OF INDUSTRIAL ERERFRIBES, 
BY BRANCHtS OF ACTIVITY 
{Percentages) 
Branoh of activity 
Consumer goods (textiles, food prOducts, 
beverages, tobacco, paper, etc.) 
.Intermediate goods (non—metallic ores, 
products of metallurgical and chemical 
industries, etc.) 
Capital goods (products of metal ranuw 
faeturing and machinery industry, electrical 
appliances, transport media, etc.) 
Miscellaneous 
1967 1968 .1970 1772 
14.9 15.6 17.7 16.5 
13.5- 14.7 17.5 17.5 
9.4 16.9 - 16.1 20.8 
7.9 26.5 '• 	 9.1 16.3. 
Total 
	 12.6 	 16.0 	 165, 	 7.8  
Source; P. Auberger, op.cit., on the basis of estimates prepared by the Funda9ao Getdlio 
Vargas in respect of the 500 largest enterprises in Brazil. 
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The controls imposed on other domestic prices, as in the commerce 
and services sectors, for example, were, of a somewhat piecemeal character, 
and had no significant repercussions on anti-inflationary policy. 
(v) Handling of the exchange rate. From another point of view, 
a feature worth noting in overall price policy during the period is 
the establishment, as from 1968, of a flexible exchange rate system, 
one of the basic instruments of the effort to neutralize the effects 
of inflation. 
Up to 1963, it had been the practice of the monetary authorities 
to move the exchange rate closer to more realistic levels, at intervals 
of ten to fourteen months, a procedure which was clearly disadvantageous 
in respect of the deterioration of real export earnings, and, furthermore, 
favoured speculative movements of capital. 
From 1963 onwards, Brazil's economic development became outward-
directed, and depended more and more upon a growing inflow of capital, 
a vigorous expansion of exports and a rapid increase in imports. In 
these circumstances, the policy pursued in fixing the exchange rate 
needed to be more flexible and realistic. Thus, in 1968 the system 
of periodic devaluations was introduced as a necessity imposed by the 
country's style of development. In essence, the new system was put 
into practice in the form of frequent small adjustments in the exchange 
rate, from seven to ten times a year on an average, the devaluations 
ranging from 0.5 per cent to 2.5 per cent, (see table 31), so as to 
make for an adjustment between the rate of increase of domestic prices 
and the trends followed by external inflation. This system was 
complementary to the policy of incentives to exports and afforded 
protection for real export earnings, acting as a basic factor in their 
expansion. Moreover, the fact that devaluations took place so frequently 
and at intervals of unknown length discouraged speculative movements 
of capital. In addition, these periodic devaluations played an important 
part in the policy for tapping foreign resources, since they meant that 
capital could be repatriated at a real value comparable to that of the 
original contribution. With regard to imports, the periodic adjustability 
of the exchange rate obviated the explosiveness of violent devaluations, 
mitigating their psychological effects and helping the economy to adapt 
itself better to the new costs. 
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Table 31 
MAZIL4'VARIATION IN EXCHANGE RATES 





















24-09-68 56 3 675 
19-11-68 	 - 20 3 745' 
09-12-68 57 3 805 
31-12-68 3 805 18.9 25.5 
28-01-72 47 5 750  
16-03-72 53 5. 810 
08-05-72 68 5"88o 
14-07-72 53 5 930 
05-09=72 42 5 990 
17-10-72 36 6 060 
22-11-72 23 6 130 
15-12-72 61 6 180 
31-12=72 6 180 10.4 15.5 
14-02-73 69 5 995 
24-04-73 76 6 060 
09-07-73 . 
	 73 6 090 
20-09-73 85 6 120 
14'-12-73 48 6 180 
31712-73 6 186 oso 15.5 
31-01-74 20 6 300 
20-02-74 55 6 415 
16-04=74 5o 6 515 
05-06-74 20 6 6140 
25-06-74 14 6 775 
09-o7-74 36 6 845 
15-0874 34 6 980 12.94 25.6 
Source: 
	 Central Bank'of Brazil. 
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(vi) Monetary adjustability. As a second mechanism for neutralizing 
the effects of inflation, ample use was made of the monetary adjustability 
instituted in 1964. Its application was a cornerstone of Brazil's 
entire financial policy, and, in particular, paradoxical as it may 
seem, of anti-inflationary policy too, since it gradually covered 
a high proportion of transactions in the Brazilian economy. It meant 
that instruments of indebtedness could be utilized in an inflationary 
situation, by virtue of the constant updating of liabilities. 
Adjustability, which at first covered only the National Treasury's 
Adjustable Bonds, progressively spread to public utility tariffs, 
rentals, mortgages, balance-sheets of enterprises, loans, taxes, etc., 
reducing the volume of speculative operations and consequently weakening 
one of the causes of inflationary pressures, and safeguarding the real 
value of savings. At the same time, as was previously shown, it 
constituted an efficient instrument for regulating the liquidity of 
the economy, especially where the issue of adjustable securities was 
concerned (the National Treasury's Adjustable Bonds and Bills of 
Exchange). It must be borne in mind, however, that although periodic 
devaluations and monetary adjustability mitigated some of the effects 
of inflation and permitted a sort of compromise with it, in a-certain 
sense they also tended to institutionalize it. The mechanism of 
adjustability exercised a pervasive influence on the whole behaviour 
of the agents of the economic process, encouraging a propensity to 
expect price increases which came to be taken as a matter of course. 
In inflationary situations, in which producers and distributors 
tend to defer their sales, while consumers seek to spend their earnings 
in advance, imbalances between supply and demand are generated, and 
obviously exert pressure on prices. Tendencies to go in for stockpiling 
and borrowing in national currency likewise undermine the financial 
savings of individuals and enterprises. 
The potency of the propagating effects of the institutionalization 
of inflation seems to be in inverse ratio to the virulence of the 
disease. In cases of galloping inflation, with annual rates of over 
30 or 40 per cent, deeper-rooted causes exist which detract from the 
/relative importance 
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relative importance of these economically superficial self-propagating 
factors. On the other hand, when the rate of inflation has been 
reduce to 10 or 15 per cent per annum, the inertia caused by the 
adjustability mechanism may become a serious hindrance to the combating 
of inflation. 
D. THE RECRUDESCENCE OF INFLATION (1974) 
After almost a decade in which considerable control over 
inflationary pressures was achieved, in 1974 the upward trend of 
prices regained momentum; by the end of the year the rate of increase 
had reached 34.6 per cent, as against 15.5 per cent in the two-year 
period 1972-1973. Basically, as from the second half of 1973, the 
resurgence of the inflationary process was linked in two ways to the 
behaviour of the .external.sector. In the „first place, the economy 
was affected by the repercussions of the world petroleum crisis and 
the rise in prices of raw materials, including, of course, the raw 
materials exported by Brazil; secondly, the increase-,in the prices of 
imports struck the Brazilian economy a particular heavy blow, in view 
of its sensitiveness to the viciSsitudes of the external:dector. 
(a) 	 Sources of inflationary pressures  
In analysing the causes of the recent acceleration of the.rate 
of inflation in Brazil, certain trends in the economy during 1973 must 
be taken into account. 
To begin with, it is of interest to note the high balance-of-
payments surplus in 1973, which gave rise to a marked:increaseinforeign 
currency assets (2.3 thousand million dollars), so that pressure was 
exerted on the expansion of the domestic'monetary supply. This phenomenon 
had been in evidence since 1972, in which year the surplus had amounted 
to 2.4 thouSand million dollars (see table 32).' Thede sur'pluSes were 
primarily attributable to the abundant inflow of foreign capital in the 
form of medium and long-term loans. Althoug in August 1973 such inflows 
of funds were to some extent checked by the application of a 40-per-cent 
rate of retention to the cruzeiro counterpart of foreign loans, the amount 
they represent remained at practically the same level as in 1972, i.e., 
about 3,000 million dollars. This was the main factor making for the 
expansion of the means of payment in 1973. 
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Table 32 
BRAZIL: BALAWE OF PAnENTS 
(Millions of dollars) 
1970 1971 1972 1973 
	
1974 
I. Trade balance 232 -363 .-244 182 
Exports (FOB) 2 739 2 882 3 991 6 198 
Imports (FOB) 2 507 -3 245 -4 235 -6 016 
II. Services 
-462 -538 -730 -8146 
Income 328 398 424 569 
Expenditure 
-790 
-936 -1 154 -1 415 
Goods and services (I + - II) 
-230 -901 
-974 -664 
IV. Returns on capital 
-353 -420 -520 -662 
Profits and dividends 




V. Transfers 21 14 5 36 
VI. Balance on current account 
-562 
-1 307 -1 489 -1 290 (III + IV + v) 
VII. Liquid movements of capital 1 015 1 046 3 492 3 680 
Investment 108 168 318 900 
Loans and finanoing 
(medium* and long-term) 767 1 187 3 098 2 937 
Loans (short-term) 77 486 21 -171 
Others 63 5 55 14 
VIII. Errors and omissions 92 
-9 436 -63 
IX. Balanoe -.of -payments position 545 530 2 439 2 327 
Arrears and trade credits 
... • • 
International Monetary Fund 
-177 -47 -70 
-33 
Assets minus short-term commitments -378 -483 -2 369 -2 294 
Source: Central Bank of Brazil. 
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The growth rate of credits to the private sector - another 
important factor of monetary expansion - was 46.7 per cent in 1973, 
and 52 per cent in the case of credits granted by the Banco do Brasil. 
These two nrinaipal lines of expansiOn led to a'47-per-cent 
increase in-the means ofpaymentA.n.19731 as against one of 38.3 per 
cent in the preceding year. This expansion, which was much greater 
than had been envisaged by monetary policy, proved incompatible with 
• 	 the programmed rate of inflation. Thus, pressure on price levels 
began to make itself felt as early as the second half of 1973, and 
became more marked in the early months: of 1974.22/ By the second 
half of 1973, there was already'evidenoe'of Speculation in immovable 
assets, a sharp increase in the volume of imports, shortages of raw 
materials and basic inputs such as steel, iron and chemical products, 
speculative stockpiling and other symptons of renewed impetus in total 
demand in the economic system." 
The second source of inflationary pressI,Iresin the recent period_ 
was associated with the so-called rawmatffirials.crisis, and With the 
development of world inflation; both these generated disequilibria in 
the economy which became major causes of the inflationary trend of 
prices. 
To begin with, the considerable increases in import products 
are noteworthy. If the period January-June 1974 is used as reference, 
it may be seen that imports increased in value by 122.5 per cent 
compared with the previous year, while the increase in quantity was 
only 14.7 per cent (see table 33). In the case of basic commodities 
which include imports of petroleum and wheat, the value of imports 
increased by 225 per cent. 
22/ The rate of inflation programmed for 1973 was 12 per cent, whereas 
in fact it was 15.5 per cent. In the preparation of the overall 
price index, however, artificially fixed prices were utilized, 
which were much lower than the real market prices, so that the 
rate of inflation in that year was underestimated. 
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Table 33 
BRAZIL: STRUCTURE OF IMPORT TS IN THE 
FIRST HALF OF 1973 AND 1974 
Quantities 
	 Value 










Basic commodities 18 999.8. 19.806.5 4.3 548.9 1 784.7 225.1 
ManufactUred products 3 445.5 5 921.2 71.9 1 930.4 3 741.7 93.8 
Semimanufactures 3 209.2 5 579.4 73.9 855.1 2 177.2 154.6 
Manufactures 236.7 341.7 44.6 1 075.3 1 564.2 45.5 
Special transactions 6.2 16.5 167.3 21.2 38.4 81.0 
General total 22 451.5 
 25 744.2  14.7  2 500.7  5 564.6 122.5, 
Source: Fundasao Getulio Vargas, Conjuntura Econ6mical. October 1974. 
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It is important to observe, however, that the share of basic 
commodities in total imports only accounted for 32 per cent of the 
value of imports during this period, and thus does not explain the 
total increase in growth of expenditure on imports. In fact, imports 
of semimanufactured and manufactured products played a decisive 
role, with an increase in quantity of the order of 74 per cent in 
the case of semimanufactured and 44 per cent for manufactures; price 
• 	 increases also affected them, especially in the case of semimanufactures. 
These imports are to be explained by the large-scale stockpiling of 
raw materials, as a result of the expectation created as regards future 
trends in prices in world trade and the possibilities of profit• 
speculation. Still in the context of imports, another source of 
inflationary pressures should be mentioned, in the form of the upward 
trend in priceS of similar goods produced lodally. The lack of 
consistency between domestic, and external prices meant that some 
local industrial products, which benefited from customs protection, 
came to have prices lower than those of similar imported goods. When 
local production proved unable to cope with the entire demand of the 
domestic market, which was the case in the majority of instances, the 
price of locally-produced goods - tended..to.increase to the price-levels 
of imported goods. 
From another viewpoint, the increase in international prices 
also contributed to inflation through the increase in the prices of 
some products exported by Brazil. In fact, products whose external 
prices underwent rapid increases (see table 34) shifted part of their 
supply from the local to the external market, causing problems in 
domestic supply and a consequent rise in prices. This was the case 
of meat, soya beans, and cotton, among the most obvious cases,. and it 
became necessary to adopt a series of special measures, such as export 
quotas, the establishment of fixed proportions of sales to external and 
internal markets, the fixing of domestic prices, the introduction of 
export rates, etc. In the majority of cases, however, it was impossible 
to avoid closing the gap between external and domestic market prices, and 
this cave rise to pressures to push up prices, which made themselves felt 
late in 1973 and in the first few months of 1974. 
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Table 34 
BRAZIL: INTERNATIONAL PRICES OF EXPORT PRODUCTS 
(Dollars) 




Beef 100 pounds 41.32 63.67 ... 
C000a 100 pounds ' 32.25 61.26 67.05 
Coffee 100 pounds 53.94 66.53 69.6o 
Cotton 100 pounds 25.10 56.10 85.00 
Sisal 100 pounds 7.30 24.4o 34.00 
Soybean Bushel 2.70 6.00 6.14 
Sugar 100 pounds 8.09 10.25 15.01 	 -, 
W.ol 100'pounds 27.20 95.90 101.8o 
Iron ore Tons 7.47 8.07 9.09 
Source: Fundagao Getulio Vargas, Coniuntura Boon6mloa, October 1974. 
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Lastly, the role of the neutralizer elements of inflation should 
be stressed, as for example, currency readjustments, the use of which 
is generalized in the economy of Brazil. As may be understood, the 
monetary readjustments, which are always a posteriori tend to increase 
the effects of inflation when this is in the ascendent, exactly as 
in the case of the recent evolution of inflation in Brazil. 
As a result of these major factors, the rate of inflation jumped 
up from 15.5 per cent in the period 1972-1973 to 34.6 per cent in 1974. 
Actually, 1973 had the advantage of some arbitrary elements in the 
economic policy which made it possible to put off until 1974 part 
of the inflationary pressures which made themselves felt, particularly 
in the second half of the year. Examples of such measures may be 
found in the subsidies, the fixed prices, and the policy of the fixed 
exchange rate adopted in the second half of the year. As may be seen 
from table 35, the exchange rate was readjusted by only 1.6 per cent 
between June and December, and the policy of "mini-devaluations" was 
relaxed in an endeavour to postpone the domestic effects of the increases 
in prices of imported products. 
Table 35 
BRAZIL: PRICE OF THE DOLLAR, 1973 
(Cruzeiros) 
January 6 215 
February 6 116 
Earth 6 030 
April 6 046 
iday • 6 100 
June 6 100 
July 6 122 
August 6 130 
September 6 140 
October 6 160 
November 6 160 
December 6 195 




Naturally, these measures contributed to a later increase in 
prices in 1974; a particularly active inflationary trend was recorded 
in the first four months of the year, with rates Of growth of,the 
general price index increasing from 2.9 per cent in January to 5.1 per 
cent in the month of April, and later dropping to 2 per cent in July, 
with a cumulative growth of 22.6 per cent in the first half of the 
year.22/ However, once the months of readjustment and absorption 
of the presSures of the previous year were over, the rate of inflation 
slowed down and the year came to an end with an increase of 34.6 per 
cent in the general price index. 
(b) 	 Anti-inflationary policy in 1974  
In the context of the growth of inflation, the policy introduced 
during 1974 may be considered'as an emergency policy, aimed at dealing 
rapidly with an economic situation considered to be of a temporary 
nature 	 This, however, did not mean the abandonment of the main 
lines of policy applied from 1967. Although inflation showed upward 
grOwth rates, the main objective of maintaining -high rates of growth 
was not lost sightof,:And continued to delimit,the.anti-inflattonary 
policy's area of manoeuvre. 
(i) 1121117 and credit policyo Money and credit policy during 
the period aimed at the implementation of a financial budget which 
would bring down the growth of the means of payment in the course of 
the year by 35 per cent this was considered consistent with a high rate 
of growth of the productand_the reduction of the 'rate 'Of inflation. 
The implementation of such a budget, however, pursued rather an 
irregular course during the year. During the first half of the year 
when the main effects of inflation sank in, money supply was rigidly 
controlled. Table 36 shows that the means of payment increase by 
13.6 per cent during the period January-July while loans to the private 
sector increased by 23.1 per cent. If it is considered that during the 
first half of the year the rate of growth of prices was of the order of 
22.6 per cent, it will be understood that the economy found itself 
involved in a current liquidity crisis. 
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Table 36 
BRAZIL: MONETARY DISTRIBUTION, 1974 
(Millions of cruzeiros) 
January 15 815 56 213 14 873 86 901 74 164 37 824 111 988 
February 16 086 58 729 16 000 90 815 76 729 38 864 115 593 
March 16 317 6o 489 17 051 93 857 78 861 4o 626 119 487 
April 16 575 6o 367 18 168 95 010 80 420 41 922 122 342 
May 17 160 6o 310 19 166 96 636 83 475 43 95o 127 425 
June 17 192 64 783 18 910 10o 885 86 570 47 866 134 436 
July 16 712 62 670 19 301 98 683 88 864 48 959 137 823 
Aunust 17 653 64 310 21 242 103 705 92 119 50 392 142 511 
September 17 109 66 472 19 993 103 574 95 539 53 439 148 978 
October 17 359 67 038 21 806 106 243 98 705 56 419 155 124 
November 18 984 71 425 29 950 113 359 101 666 
December 20 798 79 788 20 681 121 267 106 910 
December 1973 90 490 
Source: Preliminary estimates of the Banco Central do Brasil, and the Fundapao Getulio Vargas. 
jDu2ing the 
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During the second half of the year, once the main impact of 
inflation was over, monetary pOlicY was redirected towards a more 
rapid growth. of money supply so-as to enable the, economy to:function 
in a more-dynamic form. The means of payment thus increased by 
22.9 pei. cent dUring the period July to December while loans to the 
private sector recorded a growth of 15.4 per cent in the four-month 
period between June and October. This meant the part alleviation of 
:the problems of liquidity in the economy. 
As a result of the strict application,of the monetary policy, the 
budget was implemented with only slight variation from that programmed, 
and showed a total annual growth in the means of payment of around 
34. 
 per cent. This forced the Government to adopt a series of 
complementary monetary measures to cope with the strong pressures and 
constraints of the money supply. 
Among the factors which most inhibited the levels of the economy's 
liquidity were the course of conduct shown by the Treasury and the 
evolution of the external sector. 
An examination of the Treasury's cash flow shows the reduction in 
the money supply throughout the year. Table 37 shows that with the 
exception of the months of July, August, October and December, the 
Treasury's cash flow constituted a major factor in reducing the money - 
-supply; 
 especially, in the months of February and September,-when major 
increases were recorded, and the etOnoMy'S liquidity problemS were 
aggravated. This surplus basically derived from Treasury income which 
increased by approximately 41 per cent during the period January- 
October 1974, compared with the same period in 1973. This was essentially 
due to the increase in earnings from the tax on manufactures, which was 
an ad valorem duty, and benefited from the increasing rates of inflation. 
Public expenditure increased by 33.5 per cent during the period January-
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February 	 2 870.1 
March 
	 3 150.9 
April 
	 3 703.5 
May 
	 4 103.1 
June 
	 4 099.3 
July 
	 4 616.4 
August 
	 3 541.0 
September 	 5 343.9 
October 	 4 655.0 
November 
	
4  998.0 
December 	 2 700.0 
Source: Fundacao Getlalio Vargas, Conjuntura EconOmica, and Banco 
Central do Brasil. 
a/ Flows accumulated in the course of the year up to the month 
considered. 
Table 38 
BRAZIL: NATIONAL TREASURY, FISCAL BUDGET 
(Millions of cruzeiros) 
1973 a/ 
	
1974 a/ Percentage variation 
Income 
	 41 576.4 	 53 602.1 	 41.0 
Expenditure 	 40 393.6 	 53 947.1 	 33.5 
Surplus 	 1 177.3 
	 4 655.0 	 295.2 




The balance of payments in 1974 was in deficit by 1.4 thousand 
million dollars, basically as a result of the vigorous increase in 
the value of imports which accounted-for a decrease in liquidity which 
was by no means negligible. In order to counter this, and guarantee 
that the level of liquidity programmed would be met, the Government 
applied a'setiet• of emergency measures in the second half of the .. " 
year which increased the supply of money in the economy. 
From then on, open market operations were intensified, but 
in the reverse of the traditional direction; this time the aim was 
to pump money into the system through purchases of Treasury Bills by 
the Central Bank and the reduction of the quantities on sale to the 
public. 
As table 39 shows, the monetary balances of operations with 
Treasury Bills increased up to the month of June, with a moderate 
decrease in the means of payment. However, as from July, open market 
operations reversed their trend and began to supply the economy with 
liquidity, with a marked reduction in the money value of the operations. 
Table 39 
BRAZIL: TREASURY BILLS, 1974 of 


























15 950 :)/ 
Source: Banco Central do Brasil. 
1 End-of-period balances. 
Preliminaty estimates. 
/In addition, 
In addition,' subscriptions to readjustabie Treasury Bonds were 
suspended, thus Avoiding-a further flow of resources into the 
Treasury. 
The credit policy sought to increase liquidity by reducing the 
compulsory loans of the commercial banks -raising the maximum limits 
for agricultural credit generated by the Banco do Brasil,, creating.- 
a special Central Dank:credit line of approximately 2,000 million 
cruzeiros for the financial operations of the. commercial sector, and 
establishing another special- Banco do Brasil credit line for the 
industrial sector' of l.3' thousand million cruzeiros.' 
Some fiscal policy measures were also introduced, with temporary 
reductions of the tax on Manufactures, affecting electrical domestic 
appliances, furniture and the textile industry, and the postponement 
for one month of collections of. payments of this tax for the majority 
of manufactures. 
With this group of special measures it was possible to rise 
above the economy's liquidity crisis and implement an anti-inflationary 
financial budget, boUnded by considerably 'stricter limits than the 
budget's of earlier years'. 
(ii) Price policy. In 1974 the price policy played a rather 
more flexible and important role than'in previous years. 
As will be understood, in the face of rising inflation the policy 
to control'prices gained in importance as one of the main instruments 
for restraining the expedtations of price increase which came to exist 
in the econothy, especially during the first half of the:year. 
Control began to be applied by the Inter-Minitterial Pricet 
Commission <IPC) and by the National'Office for the Superintendence 
of Supply (SUNAB) as. from the second quarter of the'year, when amore 
stable leVel of Prices was reached. During the first quarter, the 
Government was forced to readjust by considerable amounts a group of 
prices which-had been frozen in 1973,  in an endeaVour to delay the 
effects of the increases. 
In effect, the type of price control. practiced by the IPC in. 
particular (industrial prices) was similar to the wage policy 
/formula 21/ 
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formula 31/ applied as from 1963. The readjustment was based in the 
following principles: in the first place, it required the enterprises 
to absorb part of the increases in the cost of inputs by increasing 
productivity; secondly, the estimates of the increase in the cost of 
inputs was not made by comparing two readjustment dates., but was 
based on their average value during the period in which old and new 
prices were in force; this meant the establishment of a posteriori 
measures of readjustment in the case of sizeable underestimates. 
This provided an extra shock-absorber in prices, always'provided that 
the rate of inflation anticipated were less than that observed in the 
past. 
In addition, the prices of goods, produced by state enterprises 
were the object of direct restrictions, and readjustments exceeding 
15 per cent in the course of the whole year were prohibited. 
The price controls used were sufficiently efficient to disappoint 
expectations of an upswing in prices and to enable inflation to be 
slowed in the second half of the year. Howeveri'their'radiUs of action 
continues to be limited to industrial and agricultural prices in 
particular, with a fairly moderate impact on the marketing of the 
products. 
(iii) Wape polia. In 1974 the same wage policy that had existed 
in Brazil since 1965 was maintained. A change was introduced, however, 
in the formula for calculating the readjustments' which had been applied 
since 1963. Since then, the mode of calculation had endeavoured to 
represent the real average wage of the 24 months previous to the 
readjustment, taking into consideration the forecast of the future 
rate of inflation and the correction of the same to allow for 
underestimation, including in it 4 per cent to account for the increase 
in productivity. The change introduced in 1974 established that the 
calculation of the readjustment should represent the real average wage 
of the 12 months previous to it, maintaining the same formula in other 
respects. The result of this was a closer approach of trends in wages 
to increases in the cost of living. 
211 See page 179. 
/The readjustment 
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The readjustment of wages took place in two stages, with the 
grant of a special increase of 10 per cent as from 1 December 1974, 
while the final readjustment of around 43 per cent came into force 
as of 1 January 1975 (discouting the emergency 10 per cent). 
The new readjustment based on the new calculation formula 
introduced in 1974, is the largest wage increase which the. Government 
has permitted in the'last 10 years, during which time wage policy 
played an important role in the struggleagainst inflation. 
(iv) External sector policy. The evolution of the external 
sector in 1974 was characterized by the deficit of 1.4 thousand 
million dollars recorded in the balance of payments. Basically, this 
disequilibrium originated in the• balance of current transactions, 
which was a heavy deficit which could not be offset by the inflow 
of capital (see table 40). 
Table 40 
BRAZIL: BALANCE OF. PAYMENTS, 1974 













Current transactions -7 000 
Capital 
Direct investment 1 000 
Loans and finance 6 400 
Amortizatioh payments -1 800 
Liquid balance 5 600 
Deficit -1 400 
Source: Banco Central. do Brasil, preliminary estimates. 
/From the 
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From the point of view of the anti-infaltionary policy the 
evolution of the external .sector acquired importance in three main 
aspects. In the first place, as has already been said, this policy 
tightened up the supply of the means of payment of the system - the 
opposite of what happened in 1972 and 1973, when it became one of 
the most important factors of monetary growth. Although in one 
sense this was of assistance in implementing a strict financial budget 
in another it caused defficulties because it brought down the level 
of liquidity in the economy, especially of the existence of an 
unexpectedly large deficit at the beginning of the year. 
Secondly, the rather slow intake of external •resources from 
loans and finance made itself felt particularly in the first half of 
the year. As a result of large-scale enterprises, particularly those 
bound up with foreign capital, brought pressure to bean on domestic 
supplies of credit, jeopardizing in particular small and medium-scale 
enterprises which were unable to compete successfully for access 
to the system's sources of finance. A policy which would attract 
more foreign capital was thus required, together with the abandonment 
of the restrictions imposed in 1973, so as to cover the deficit in 
the balance of current transaction and at the same time expand external 
sources of finance. This was the reason for the elimination Lt the 
beginning of the year of the retention of 40 per cent of the cruzoiro 
counterpart of external loans, while the minimum period of duration 
for foreign capital was reduced in September from 10 to 5 years. 
In October, completing the group of the main measures, for attracting 
foreign capital, the tax on remittances of interest abroad was reduced 
from 25 to 5 per cent. Although the net inflow of capital. was inadequate 
to cover the deficit in the balance of current transactions-i'it. amounted 
to 5.6 thousand million dollars, which represented an increase of 
52_per cent compared with the-level-for 1973. 
Lastly, with reference to the policy for fixing the exchange 
rate a return was made to the tradition of periodical devaluations 
which had been abandoned in 1973, and the economy was readjusted to 
/rates of 
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rates of inflation which showed an upward trend. As may be seen from 
table 41, the exchange rate was devaluated by 19 per cent in the course 
of the year and was forced to adapt to an adverse trend in the balance 
of payments; a level of growth consistent with the emergency anti-
inflationary policy applied during the year was, however, maintained, 
the devaluation of the exchange rate being substantially less than 
the increase in domestic prices. 
Table 41 
BRAZIL: PRICE OF THE DOLLAR, 1974 
(Cruzeiros) 
December 1973 6 195 
January 6 224 
February 6 381 
March 6 455 
April 6 505 
May 6 555 
June 6 690 
July 6 867 
August 6 959 
September 7 068 
October 7 142 
November 7 262 
December 7 371 
Source: Fundacao Getfilio Vargas, Conjuntura Econbmica. 
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